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Preface
Rainer Arnold, Roberto Cippitani, Valentina Colcelli
Genetic Information and Individual Rights
The present book is one of the outputs of the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence 
“Rights and Science”, established at the Department of Experimental Medicine of the 
University of Perugia. The Centre bring scholars from several universities who deal with 
legal and societal social context of the scientific research.  
The work is focused on ethical and legal issues concerning the collection, the storage 
and other kinds of genetic data processing, especially within research and biomedical 
activities.
The theoretical and practical interest on these topics depends on the features of genetic 
information and on the potential threats to fundamental rights of the natural persons 
which may arise from research and therapeutic activities in genetics. 
other ethical issues also arise with respect to genetic information concerning animal 
and plants. This from the viewpoints of the environment protection environment and in 
order to avoid the illegitimate exploitation of the genetic resources.
Such issues should be considered within the complex and multilevel legal context, 
established by the European Union (with reference to the European Charter of the 
European Union and the EU legislation and praxis), by Members States and within 
international legal instruments. 
The essays included in the book aims at showing some among the main bio-legal 
aspects of activities on genetic information. 
The perspective of science as presented in the first part of the article by Dr. Roland 
Arnold and prof. Rainer Arnold. In this chapter, key aspects of genetic information are 
introduced. These comprise the basic molecular nature of genetic information, including 
the concepts of DNA, mutation and variation, as well as the implications of heredity. 
The stand of the art to technically read and process the genetic data are introduced. The 
importance of genetic information is motivated by several medical applications that rely 
on such data. 
The perspective of science as presented in the first part of the article by Dr. Roland 
Arnold, Institute of Cancer and Genomic Sciences, College of Medical and Dental 
Sciences, University of Birmingham, is complemented by the law perspective pointed out 
in the second part by prof. Rainer Arnold, University of Regensburg. Data protection law 
as well as fundamental rights, in particular human dignity, are regarded in their multilevel 
(national and international) application in the field of genetic information.
Hedley Christ describes how the regulation of science, and particularly biological 
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science cannot be, in general, regulated by traditional legal concepts and methods alone. 
The complexity of science requires a subtler approach to its regulation, where regulation 
is needed.  And it is, with medical science that such regulation is needed, and even more 
so when considering genetic, genomic, and proteomic information provided by patients. 
Such genetic, genomic and proteomic information is now being collected for medical 
research purposes and stored in databases which are to be made available for scientific 
investigation into such diseases as cancer and heart disease.  These databases are also 
available to an international scientific community.  In the first chapter, author argues 
that no legal system, either national or international, can provide adequate regulation 
for these databases, and that, far from considering more hard law we should use soft 
law techniques such as international regimes in which, an epistemic community may 
provide the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making processes.  Such an epistemic 
community would set the principles of individuals’ fundamental rights and duties; the 
control and access and disclosure of information, and constraints of access to the genetic 
information. It could also develop an understanding of what values can be put to the 
importance of access to data, what is the nature of ownership and intellectual property in 
these databases, and concepts such as custodianship.  Furthermore, what governments are 
doing and how they are carrying out their mandated functions of providing healthcare. 
Joaquín Sarrión Esteve studies the treatment or processing – including collection, 
recording, organisation, structuring, storage, and other uses – of personal data linked to 
health, under the European Union law framework (with reference to the European Charter 
of the European Union and EU legislation), adopting a comparative and international 
perspective (especially taking into account the sources of the European Council, like 
the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine). Indeed, health treatment fields 
face ethical and legal problems regarding the use of personal data. As we know, patients 
can benefit from having health or medical information available, and medical decisions 
can be more effective thanks to a better understanding of clinical histories, medical and 
health data. But at the same time, we need to guarantee privacy rights – including data 
protection – and confidentiality, dealing with health data treatment challenges from a 
fundamental rights’ perspective.  
Roberto Cippitani analyses the rules and principles applicable to research activities in 
genetic fields under the European legislation as well as within international law. The legal 
sources mainly provide protection for genetic information of individuals, on the grounds 
of legislation concerning personal data, especially in Europe by means of the new General 
Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679, which will replace Directive 95/46/EC. The 
General Data Protection Regulation, besides defining sensitive genetic and personal data, 
provides for (more than the directive) several exceptions about protection for such data 
(mainly the right of access, right to rectification, right to processing restriction, right 
to object, and right to erase, i.e. right “to be forgotten”), for which the reference and 
disposition can be found in Article 89.  Furthermore, as topics have arisen from European 
and international sources, specific provisions are applicable to the data processed for 
scientific purposes in respect to the specificity of the consent and the storing of data, as 
well as the biological materials which those data are derived from. on the other hand, 
privacy considerations do not cover all issues concerning experimentation, especially in 
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the case of genetic information, which is characterised by features such as “predictability” 
and “familiarity”. These privacy considerations are inspired by the objective to protect 
research freedom recognised by national constitutions and the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union. However, such freedom cannot be considered as absolute, 
but should take into account principles and rules set forth by constitutional legal systems. 
Research, besides respecting the core of other fundamental rights, and in particular 
the protection of people’s personal sphere, has to be consistent with the fundamental 
principles of the European Union legal system, such as necessity, proportionality, and 
precaution. To achieve the correct balance between freedom of research and protection 
of personal data, it is advisable to revise the proprietary idea of privacy and to consider 
consent as an instrument that is always necessary and sufficient.
The Anglo-American and Spanish experiences on informed consent and control over 
the use of genetic information are considered by Francisco Miguel Bombillar Sáenz and 
Maurizio Borghi.
Francisco Miguel Bombillar Sáenz’s paper paper is to address the legal approach of the 
informed consent and the donation of biological samples to a biobank for biomedical 
research under the Spanish regulation. It is argued that it is not possible to hide in 
consents full of lawless and indeterminate terms for elaborating a kind of blank cheque 
in order to carry out any research based on biological samples. This consent model would 
disobey the ethical and legal provisions ruling this sector, the right of all humans to decide 
on their own body integrity and on the destination of their biological samples.
Maurizio Borghi discusses the conflict between individual rights in genetic information 
and intellectual property rights arising from human genetic databases. It shows how Anglo-
American jurisprudence has addressed the issue of individuals’ control over the use genetic 
information, in particular when this use exceeds the scope of the initial consent given by 
the individual with respect to their own genetic information and other medical data. 
The main conflicts arise when the information has been initially released for therapeutic 
or research aims and then is used for commercial purposes or to develop patented 
inventions. Despite severe criticism by legal scholars, Anglo-American jurisprudence 
tends to allow secondary uses of biological material and medical information even when 
they are incompatible with the initial consent, on the sole condition that no harm is done 
to the individual’s right to privacy. The chapter examines the legal mechanisms that have 
been adopted by government authorities to regulate the use of human genetic databases 
and to ensure that research on those databases is consistent with individuals’ expectation 
and public interest. 
María José Cabezudo Bajo, analyses the using the scientific DNA test in criminal and 
civil proceedings at an EU level. The European Legislator has made significant progress in 
this area, however, there are currently controversial issues that need to be further analysed 
in order to contribute to proposals for reform and, where appropriate, regulation. For 
this reason, we will first explain the state of the work in question, its justification and 
objectives. Next, we will identify and analyse the most controversial points of the DNA 
evidence in the two mentioned fields. Finally, we will present some conclusions.
The book ends with a contribution about the legal issues concerning collection of 
information on (per genetic resources related to plants and animals. 
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Valentina Colcelli analyses how, in the European legal system, Access and Benefit-
sharing information are exchanged and this could help the implementation of the 
Nagoya Protocol and its goals, whether data flow could be controlled and whether legal 
consequences for infringement of rules on information exchange and storage could be 
more well-defined and reinforced. The flow of information available in the Access and 
Benefit-sharing Clearing-house platform seems to favour users more than providers, 
stakeholders and consumers; it also appears to kindly invite the users to respect the Access 
and Benefit-Sharing system. Providers, stakeholders and consumers, as well as the States, 
have the possibility to discover the illegal utilisation of genetic resources only accidentally, 
after products have been placed on the market. However, Art. 7(1) of Regulation (EU) n. 
511/2014 makes it clear that the due diligence declaration needs to be requested by the 
Member States, or by the European Commission if money is provided by EU funds and 
the EU offices or by the public administrations of Member States in case of request for 
market approval or placing products on the market. Nevertheless, the agencies in charge 
of Access and Benefit-Sharing control are not responsible for market approval. However, 
a rather a quite good control of the flow of information is possible in the EU legal system, 
if all involved public administrations or agencies check the Access and Benefit-Sharing 
due diligence fulfilment.
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Genetics and Constitutionalism – an introductory overview
Roland Arnold and Rainer Arnold
1. Genetics and constitutionalism. Genetics is a highly challenging scientific field which 
has manifold impacts on law. Active genetic intervention is closely related to the right to 
health, to physical integrity, to personality rights in general, and in particular to human 
dignity, which has evolved as a specific constitutional category in the latest developments 
of constitutionalism. Moreover, as genetic data is of a highly personal character, questions 
of data protection, data processing, data transfer and use of data, are therefore central. A 
further dimension is that of research, which enlarges the problem in specific additional 
respects.
Before discussing some of these aspects in the second part of this article, we introduce 
the background and special properties of genetic information, including medical examples. 
2. Genetic information and its use in science and clinical applications – an introduction. 
Genetic information comprises inherited variation as well as acquired mutations and can 
nowadays be read by DNA sequencing and related techniques – ultimately translating 
sensitive personal information into accessible data, which is open to interpretation in 
various ways. Whereas, until recently, the process of DNA sequencing1 was expensive and 
restricted to specialised laboratories, it is now almost generally available and is set to enter 
the mainstream through governmental and health programs such as the 100.000 genome 
initiative in the Uk,2 and also through private companies offering diverse genetic testing 
services such as 23andMe. These novel developments make adaptation and clarification 
of relevant legal boundaries necessary, especially since genetic data concerns information 
which is related to and affects individuals, but can only be accessed and assessed by 
specialists. Indeed, genetic information is seen as a “special kind of personal data”, by for 
example, the novel EU General Data Protection Regulation, which will enter into force 
in 2018.
a) DNA, the process of DNA sequencing, and some concepts of analysis. 
Genetic information is encoded in the DNA as a sequence of ‘letters’, chemically 
nucleic acids.3 Each cell carries a set of complete DNA. Genes comprise a sub-set of the 
DNA and are carrying information to encode proteins which are the active substances 
1 METzkER, MICHAEL L. “Sequencing technologies – the next generation.” Nature reviews ge-
netics 11.1 (2010): 31-46.
2 CAULFIELD, M., et al., “The 100,000 Genomes project protocol”, in Genomics England, 2015.
3 WATSoN JAMES D., and FRANCIS HC CRICk, “Molecular structure of nucleic acids”, in Na-
ture 171.4356, 1953, pp. 737-738.
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and building blocks of the cell.4 The process of DNA sequencing enables the determina-
tion of the consecutive sequence of these letters. In reality, millions of short fragments of 
the DNA are read by a sequencing machine and subsequently connected computation-
ally with or without the use of a reference genome.5 With modern methods, a single cell 
can be sufficient to get a complete picture of the DNA.6 It is also possible to restrict the 
sequencing to a small area of interest in the genome, for example to a gene of interest 
(targeted sequencing). Changes in the sequence compared to a reference that reflects the 
DNA sequence of a couple of individuals7 can then be derived. These changes may be 
caused by mutational events, but most often reflect individual variability which is inher-
ited.8 Statistical and computational methods must be applied to deduce and subsequently 
interpret this variation, most often on the basis of previous knowledge and comparative 
analyses between sets of genomes. In many cases, analysis of a large exploratory set of 
genomes and (anonymised) patient data is necessary in order to obtain statistically sig-
nificant results. Therefore, there are large scale efforts underway to sequence thousands 
of genomes (as in the aforementioned 100000 genomes initiative in the Uk), and data 
is shared internationally via online accessible databases to allow re-use of the data for 
further research. However, different levels of data have different levels of protection, and 
only accredited researchers may access the most sensitive data (especially raw sequencing 
and clinical data) after an application process and the provision of secured infrastructure.
knowledge derived from genetic information is inherently difficult to understand9 
due to technical limitations, limited understanding of the biological impact of mutations 
on the cellular system and body in general, and due to its statistical nature. This implies 
that clear deductions (such as health status) often cannot be made with certainty or at all: 
the information gained can often only provide probability ranges for a certain effect, and 
a large proportion of information potentially encoded in the genomic variation is still not 
yet interpretable. Consequently, more information could be deduced from DNA samples 
in the future due to the availability of improved mathematical and algorithmic methods 
and to a larger amount of prior knowledge and data.
b) Most genetic information is inherited and defines an individual. 
The genome of a person is individual and unique, with the exception of identical 
twins, which can differ in the exact composition of their DNA but share most of their 
inherited genetic make-up. This manifests itself in many individual changes of the DNA, 
named genetic variation. This variation comprises, amongst others, many small changes 
4 CRICk F., “Central dogma of molecular biology”, in Nature 227.5258, 1970, pp. 561-563.
5 WHEELER DAVID A., et al., “The complete genome of an individual by massively parallel DNA 
sequencing”, in Nature 452.7189, 2008, pp. 872-876.
6 GAWAD C., WINSToN k., and. QUAkE S. R., “Single-cell genome sequencing: current state of 
the science” in Nature Reviews Genetics 17.3, 2016, pp. 175-188.
7 Mainly, the individuals which donated DNA in the initial human genome projects.
8 kRUGLYAk L., and NICkERSoN D. A., “Variation is the spice of life”, in Nature genetics 27.3, 
2001, pp. 234-236.
9 Especially for disease or trait related questions, where genetic fingerprint techniques and paternity 
tests result in clear results since they don’t need to take molecular consequences of genetic variation 
into account.
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in the actual DNA-sequence (called single nucleotide variants, SNVs) which may or 
may not have an effect on the genetic composition of their cells. The information in 
the DNA is inherited from both parents and resembles an individual mixture from both 
parental genomes. As a consequence, each person carries information inherited from his 
lineage, and also potential information on their offspring. Both the individuality and the 
hereditability of this information has been applied forensically in genetic fingerprinting 
and for parenthood determination – however, using techniques that harvest much less 
genetic information than modern DNA sequencing. 
c) Genetic information can provide information on disease risks and acquired diseases, 
i.e. cancer. 
Genetic information can provide information on inherited diseases - however, the 
genetic component and effect of mutations varies widely between different diseases.10 The 
most extreme cases comprise rather rare but very severe conditions such as Huntington 
disease11 which is solely caused by a genetic defect in the Huntingtin gene, leads to a 
severe brain damage and is always fatal, with the onset of the symptoms typically around 
30-50 years of age (and as such within or towards to the end of the typical reproductive 
period). The probability of inheriting the mutation in case of an affected parent is 50%, 
which, together with the fatality of the disease, may strongly motivate genetic testing of 
members of affected families – which might, however, have strong psychological impact 
on healthy individuals.
Where this is an example of a relatively rare disease (around 7 cases per 100000 
individuals in the Caucasian population), it becomes more and more apparent that 
frequent disorders also have a genetic component that increases disease risk and may alter 
prognosis and outcome. Such disorders comprise diabetes,12 Alzheimer’s,13 a variety of 
mental diseases such as autism spectrum disorders,14 and others. For these conditions, the 
genetic influence is typically weaker than for solely genetic disorders and may be based on 
different mutations and the interplay of their cellular effects. Consequently, their impact 
is much harder to assess and genetic information is much more difficult to interpret in 
their regard.
The most prominent class of diseases based on genetic alterations is cancer, where 
in most cases the genetic cause is acquired during one’s lifetime rather than inherited. 
Currently, more than 200 different types and sub-types of cancer have been identified, with 
their only common theme being a ‘disease of the genome’ where an initial mutation event 
(referred to as ‘driving’ event) initiates further genetic and cellular alterations that lead to 
10 FRAzER k. A., et al. “Human genetic variation and its contribution to complex traits”, in Nature 
Reviews Genetics 10.4, 2009, pp. 241-251.
11 WALkER F. o., “Huntington’s disease”, in The Lancet 369.9557, 2007, pp. 218-228.
12 MERINo J., et al. “A Decade of Genetic and Metabolomic Contributions to Type 2 Diabetes Risk 
Prediction”, in Current diabetes reports 17.12, 2017, p. 135.
13 GATz M. et al. “Role of genes and environments for explaining Alzheimer disease”, in Archives of 
general psychiatry 63.2, 2006, pp. 168-174.
14 RoBINSoN E. B. et al., “Genetic risk for autism spectrum disorders and neuropsychiatric variation 
in the general population”, in Nature genetics 48.5, 2016, pp. 552-555.
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uncontrolled growth of the cancer tissue.15 16 Due to the vast differences in the genetic and 
molecular make-up of cancers, novel strategies aim to selectively attack the cancer on its 
individual molecular make-up, a concept termed precision or personalised medicine.17 Such 
approaches rely on the determination of genetic information of each individual cancer case. 
A prominent example for personalised medicine is the use of genetic testing to determine 
inherited mutations leading to a certain type of breast cancer (defects in the BRCA1 or 
BRCA2 gene which abolish their function in DNA repair).18 Such defects are prevalent, 
depending on ethnic group, in 0.3-10% of the population and cause up to 10% of breast 
cancer cases in the respective ethnic groups. Defects in these genes increase the risk of 
breast and ovarian cancer significantly (the risk of developing breast cancer increases by 
approximately 5 times, whilst also increasing the risk of other cancers). 50-60% of affected 
women will develop breast cancer before the age of 70; this genetic defect has been linked 
early onset of the disease. Due to potential early onset, carriers are advised to undergo 
early and regular testing since an early detection increases positive results of treatment. 
other preventive measures can also be applied, such as hormone therapy to induce the 
menopause – which reduces the risk of ovarian cancer – or by prophylactic removal of the 
organ (bilateral mastectomy and/or oophorectomy), reducing the risk of breast cancer by 
95%. Treatment can be tailored to the special molecular setup of BRCA deficient cancers, 
such as by PARP19 inhibitors which are currently at the clinical trial stage.20 21 Whereas 
for the detection of BRCA mutation a targeted approach is sufficient (only sequencing 
the respective genes, which does not potentially reveal other sensitive genetic information), 
other precision medicine approaches are based on more comprehensive determination of 
genetic information. A prominent example relates to immunotherapy, which constitutes one 
of the biggest advancements in cancer treatment within the recent years. The idea behind 
immunotherapy is to block the cancer’s ability to evade the immune system. However, 
since cancer tissue is essentially derived from normal tissue, the immune system will only 
recognise cancer cells if they carry antigens that are sufficiently different from normal cells – 
which depends on their mutation load 22 and the existence of mutations that form suitable 
15 HANAHAN D., and. WEINBERG R. A., “The hallmarks of cancer”, in Cell, 2000, pp. 57-70.
16 For an example pan-cancer study see: kANDoTH C., et al. “Mutational landscape and significance 
across 12 major cancer types”, in Nature, 2013, pp. 333-339
17 DENG X., and YUSUkE N., “Cancer precision medicine: From cancer screening to drug selection 
and personalized immunotherapy”, in Trends in pharmacological sciences, 2017, pp. 15-24.
18 JACkSoN S. E., and CHESTER J. D., “Personalised cancer medicine”, in International journal of 
cancer , 2015, pp. 262-266.
19 PARP is a protein that repairs DNA damage, as BRCA1 and BRCA2 do. If both are malfunctioning, 
as BRCA1 or 2 by their mutations, and PARP by chemical inhibition, the cancer cell accumulates 
too much damage on the DNA and dies.
 http://www.nature.com/bjc/journal/v115/n10/full/bjc2016311a.html
20 NARoD S. A., “BRCA mutations in the management of breast cancer: the state of the art”, in 
Nature Reviews Clinical oncology , 2010, pp. 702-707.
21 TILANUS-LINTHoRST M. M. A., et al., “Earlier detection of breast cancer by surveillance of 
women at familial risk”, in European Journal of Cancer, 2000, pp. 514-519.
22 GUBIN M. M., and SCHREIBER R. D., “The odds of immunotherapy success”, in Science, 2015, 
pp. 158-159.
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antigens that can be detected by the immune system. To determine if a cancer is likely to 
trigger an immune response, these two aspects have to be assessed by the sequencing of large 
part of the genome (i.e. all coding regions in the genome) and subsequent bioinformatics 
analysis. As an impressive example, we want to mention the case of two siblings with a 
very rare but severe inherited cancer syndrome (bi-allelic mismatch repair deficiency, which 
leads to hyper-mutation of the genome) which induces early onset cancer, most often of the 
brain. Both children presented with re-current glioblastoma, which, in children, normally 
leads to death within 3 to 6 months. After the complete coding regions of these two children 
had been sequenced, it was possible to bioinformatically assess that they might profit from 
immune checkpoint inhibition, and they were subsequently subjected to a clinical trial for a 
therapy with nivolumab, an immunotherapy agent. After 9 and 5 months respectively, both 
“resumed normal schooling and daily activities”.23
d) Future cures through alteration of genomic information. 
As described above, the main clinical use of genetic information is of a diagnostic 
nature, mainly to assess disease risks and to tailor treatments. Recent developments in 
biotechnology may open opportunities of treatment which are not only based on genetic 
information but also on its manipulation. A number of such approaches are summarized 
under the umbrella term ‘gene therapy’. The idea of gene therapy is to introduce (by 
altering or complementing the genome) genetic material that complements defective 
cellular functionality or activates novel processes, for example by specifically activating 
an immune response. one example is Tisagenlecleucel, a treatment which is licenced by 
Novartis and manipulates part of the immune system to recognize cells that play a role in 
certain Leukemias.24 In the USA, the drug received FDA approval in 2017. 
More recently, a new technology has begun to revolutionise genetic research, named the 
CRISPR-CAS9 system.25 It allows a very targeted manipulation of genetic information, 
including in living organisms. Initial studies have shown success in manipulating different 
higher organisms, including human embryos.26
Importantly, these techniques could be applied to a single part of the body (such as 
the immune system or the actual cancer) but not to the eggs or sperms, known ‘somatic 
gene therapy’. Alternatively, when applied to a fertilized egg or an embryo in early 
stage, the germline would be manipulated, and the alteration would be transferred to 
the offspring and future generations. Clearly, the latter would create additional ethical 
and legal implications. Such an alteration of the germline in humans is currently legally 
prohibited in many western countries.
23 BoUFFET E., et al., “Immune checkpoint inhibition for hypermutant glioblastoma multiforme 
resulting from germline biallelic mismatch repair deficiency”, in Journal of Clinical oncology, 2016, 
pp. 2206-2211.
24 RoSENBAUM L., “Tragedy, perseverance, and chance – the story of CAR-T therapy”, in New 
England Journal of Medicine, 2017, pp. 1313-1315.
25 DoUDNA J. A., and CHARPENTIER E., “The new frontier of genome engineering with CRIS-
PR-Cas9”, in Science, 2014, p 1258096.
26 LIANG PUPING et al., “CRISPR/Cas9-mediated gene editing in human tripronuclear zygotes”, 
on Protein & cell, 2015, pp. 363-372.
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3. The transnational character of constitutionalism.
a) The term “Constitution/constitutional” is a notion with reference to basic matters 
which is not limited to national law. 
The following reflections focus on the constitutional status of genetic data and its 
protection. Constitutional in this sense has a substantive meaning, not only a formally 
normative one: it connotes something fundamental, related to personality, to the inner 
sphere of a person which is particularly protected. This protection can be anchored in 
national law but is also determined by international principles and norms which have 
constitutional character in the aforementioned sense. The content and degree of protection 
must therefore be transnational and has therefore to include, at least in the coherent cultural 
region of Europe, not only national constitutional law but also the European Convention 
of Human Rights, the further instruments (in particular related to data protection and 
biomedicine) of the Council of Europe, as well as the principles and norms which have 
evolved and been created within the European Union.27
b) The functional relativization of the difference between strict and soft law. 
In State law and, to an even greater extent, in international law, both strict and soft 
law co-exist. It is obvious that the importance of soft law, of resolutions, declarations, 
opinions, and similar non-binding expressions of convictions, orientations and intentions 
is underestimated. Their function can be of higher efficiency than that of binding rules. 
Their ideological impact can have a greater reach. The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948, an emphatic appeal of the General Assembly of the then newly installed 
United Nations, sent out significant impulses for the worldwide dissemination of the new 
conviction that values related to human beings are the indispensable pillar of every legal 
order. This is not a result of any normative obligation but of the particular normative 
power inherent in the Declaration. Soft law has contributed, and continues to contribute, 
to the formation of new viewpoints and to the consolidation of emerging ideas which 
are not yet anchored in political reality. It initiates the emergence of customary law and 
influences the interpretation of vague terms in statutory law. Soft law often has pre-
normative character and contributes to the establishment of convictions which shape 
general principles of law, and themselves constitute initial forms of customary law. It 
seems therefore adequate for the study in the field of genetics not only to focus on strict 
law but also to duly consider soft law.
c) Transnationality through an interfunctional three-level-constitutionalism.
Constitutionalism today has multiple dimensions. In Europe, fundamental rights 
are protected by national, conventional and supranational legal orders. Normatively 
these orders are autonomous, but functionally they are interconnected and constitute a 
European “constitutional unit”, a bloc de constitutionnalité européen.28 The relationship 
27 ARNoLD R., “Begriff und Entwicklung des Europäischen Verfassungsrechtes“, in Staat – kirche 
– Verwaltung, Festschrift für Hartmut Maurer, M.-E. Geis/D. Lorenz (Hrsg.), München 2001, pp. 
855 - 868.
28 ARNoLD R., “Protección de los derechos fundamentales (en Europa)”, in Mario I. Álvarez Ledes-
ma y Roberto Cippitani (Edit by), Diccionario Analítico de Derechos Humanos e Integración 
Jurídica, ISEG Roma-Perugia-México, 2013, p. 555 – 565, 556-558.
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between national orders and the European Convention of Human Rights is cumulative, 
while the relationship between the constitutional guarantees of the EU member States 
and the EU Fundamental Rights Charter is an alternative one, as it is expressed in article 
51.1 of the Charter.
The process of Europeanization (a particularly intensive form of internationalization) 
continues to develop in both a formal and informal way. Formal internationalization is a 
consequence of the binding force of the Convention for the Council of Europe member 
states, a human rights instrument which is obligatory for most European countries and 
has over 60 years’ history, largely detailed in its jurisprudence. It is obvious that the 
high authority of this convention has given it the leading role in European human rights 
constitutionalism. Moreover, the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights is 
more than half a century younger than the Convention, and for this reason its contents 
have been shaped by the Convention, reiterating its principles in a modern form, albeit 
with less authority. This development can also be explained by the fact that the evolution 
of fundamental rights protection in the European Communities has, since its origin, been 
heavily influenced by the Convention and the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court. The 
Convention therefore is, in an essential respect, the ideological mother of the Charter, the 
latter being influenced both by the Convention and by national constitutions which have 
been shaped by the Convention themselves. 
The importance of the Convention results therefore from a quantitative element (the 
great number of signatory states), from the element of time (over 60 years of proven 
experience), and from the functional element that the Convention had the chance, from 
an early stage, to influence constitutionalism in Europe. The new democracies in Central, 
East and Southeast Europe have taken their main inspiration from the Convention, 
regarded as the real European common charter which guarantees European legitimacy 
and adherence to the European family of nations.29
The leading role of the ECHR in providing direction to many other countries’ 
protection of human rights is also demonstrated by the fact that European legal thinking 
is essentially shaped by how the Convention is interpreted in Strasbourg jurisprudence. 
All guarantees laid down in separate documents such as national constitutions or the EU 
Charter are so influenced. 
European three-level-constitutionalism is characterized by a vertical and horizontal 
inter-functionality.30 The first type is based on normative obligation, the second on 
dialogue, acceptance of foreign concepts, coordination and not subordination. A vertical 
relationship exists for the Council of Europe member states which have to comply 
with the Convention, and for the EU Member States - which are integrated into the 
supranational order of the EU – EU law enjoys immediate effect within national orders 
and primacy over national law. The relationship between the EU and ECHR is horizontal, 
29 SARRIÓN ESTEVE J., “El Tribunal de justicia de Luxemburgo como garante de los Derechos 
fundamentales”, 2013, p. 112-121 and 127-132.
30 ARNoLD R., “Foreign influences on national Constitutional Law, in: Constitutionalism - old 
Concepts, New Worlds, German contributions to the VIth World Congress of the International 
Association of Constitutional Law (IACL) in Santiago de Chile 2004, Eibe Riedel (Hrsg.)”, Berlin 
2005, pp. 37 - 54.
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as is the relationship between each of the European States. This relationship is not based 
on normative obligations but on a voluntary approximation of law. This is essentially 
reinforced by the vertical relationship of these countries to the ECHR which creates 
parallel similarities as a basis for further horizontal dialogue. In a similar way, Strasbourg 
jurisprudence influences interpretations of the EU Charter, either by express provision 
(see article 52.3 of the Charter) or by the general influence of the Convention as the 
leading fundamental rights document in Europe. Furthermore, article 6.3 TEU (Treaty 
on the European Union) recognizes Convention rights as general principles of EU law, 
which confirms and reinforces its above-mentioned leading role.
In conclusion we can state that European fundamental rights constitutionalism 
shows a significant tendency to converge, and shows a functional interconnection in 
respect of the interpretation of written norms, in determination of unwritten rights and 
in adapting the law to major social changes. This functional interconnection is mainly 
realized by the constitutional judges whose task it is to understand the constitutional 
texts as “living instruments” which have to be interpreted in correspondence to the 
basic principle of freedom in a substantively and functionally efficient way, and must be 
brought into concordance with international perspectives. This is the real basis for the 
transnationalization process of constitutional values. 
d) Human rights as universal rights by nature. European three-level-convergence is a 
specific form of intensive internationalization. 
Similarly, outside Europe, national values are undergoing an internationalization 
process which is furthered by the existence of numerous general and specific multilateral 
treaties on human rights and a huge amount of international soft law. This reflects the 
world wide ideological orientation in favour of the protection of the individual which has 
been supported by the opinion that world peace is not reachable without the respect of 
human rights, a basic idea of the United Nations. 
The importance of internationally-held values is demonstrated by the fact that 
collective values reflect, far more potently than individual, isolated national views, which 
rights are most deserving of protection. The reason for the intrinsic transnational tendency 
of human rights protection is that human rights are not nation-related but expressions of 
the international human community, because they refer to the very nature of the person. 
Universality is therefore inherent in human rights, of course apart from certain regional 
divergences. The transnational character of human rights is a direct consequence of the 
uniqueness and equality of human beings. 
Violations of human rights as they frequently occur in many countries are not grounds 
on which to adopt a pessimistic attitude towards rights protection. International law is 
clearly aware of the indispensability and absoluteness of human rights protection and 
has even developed the understanding that they constitute a universal public order of 
values, in form of ius cogens, the breach of it being a breach affecting the whole universal 
community.31
31 DE SCHUTTER o., “International Human Rights Law”, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 
31 - 47.
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4. The basic structure of constitutionalism - a universal model. Constitutionalism of today 
has its basic orientation in the human person. It is anthropocentric. The individual has 
gained the supreme position in law, which is mainly expressed by constitutional law. The 
supreme constitutional value is human dignity. The individual is recognized as a subject, 
a value in itself, which cannot be made an object, an instrument for another purpose. 
Dignity is the supreme value for state and society, is absolute and does not underlie 
restrictions nor relativizations by a balance with other values. Human dignity has become 
a constitutional category and is, written or unwritten, inherent in all democratic-liberal 
constitutional orders. Law ultimately exists for the benefit of man, to serve his existence, 
his life and the deployment of his personality in spiritual, cultural, economic and social 
spheres; goals shared with constitutional law. Constitutional law in this sense, as will be 
discussed further, is to be understood in a broader sense, as basic law whether on the 
national, supranational or even international level.
Human dignity is accompanied necessarily by a twin value: the principle of freedom 
of the individual. Dignity presupposes freedom and freedom does not exist without the 
recognition of dignity. While dignity is absolute and never under restrictions, freedom 
has to be shared with the community of individuals. However, dignity is a value of the 
individual as such, not of the community. The respect of the dignity of a person is always 
related to this person; the absoluteness of dignity results from the direct and exclusive 
relationship with the person. However, freedom is based on the relationship with the 
community, with all other individuals who are, each of them, holders of the right to 
freedom. It is evident that limitations on individual freedom result from this relationship 
with the community.
It is a consequence of dignity that freedom of the person is the principle and restriction 
of freedom is the exception which must be legitimized. 
The most appropriate instrument with which to find the right balance between freedom 
and restriction of freedom is the principle of proportionality, which has evolved as one of 
the most important – perhaps even the most important - instruments in contemporary 
constitutionalism. originally, it seems, emanating from Europe it has spread out all over 
the democratic-liberal world. This principle only allows restrictions of freedom which 
are really indispensable for a legitimate public interest and which are adequate in their 
intensity.
The principle of freedom which is the basis of specified fundamental rights must 
be substantively and functionally efficient. Substantive efficiency means protection 
from all restrictions on freedom, notwithstanding whether this protection is written in 
constitutions or not. The principle of freedom presupposes completeness of protection. 
As constitutional texts are written in a certain historical moment, they reflect the legal 
thinking of that moment. However, they are also living instruments which must be 
effective throughout their existence, often extremely long periods. It is obvious that these 
texts have to be adapted to the major social changes which occur, adaptation to be made 
either by formal reform (which is a politically difficult process) or by interpretation. 
In the field of rights, interpretation is the adequate instrument. Judges, in particular 
constitutional judges, have the task and the obligation to complete the written text by 
interpretation. The principle of freedom requires comprehensive, complete protection 
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of the individual. Therefore the judges have to formulate the unwritten aspects of 
fundamental rights protection. Furthermore, they have to make the protection efficient 
by interpreting the rights in a dynamic, effet utile - oriented way. Interpretation has to 
adapt the meaning of fundamental rights, which are regularly formulated in a general, 
undetermined way so as to be adaptable to the evolving convictions and orientations of 
society. It is obvious that interpretation is not able to and should not modify the objective 
regulatory intention of the constitutional provisions; it has to find the right way between 
normative evolution and normative conservation.
Functional efficiency of the protection of rights means the preservation of freedom 
against excessive restriction by the legislator through a strict observation of the principle 
of proportionality, as well as by a safeguard of the very essence of fundamental rights. 
It is commonly recognized that restrictions of freedom can only be effectuated by the 
legislator, not by the executive as such. Consequently, as Jean-Jacques Rousseau states, the 
individual is born free and therefore has to consent, as a consequence of autonomy flowing 
from dignity, to restrictions of freedom. Legislation is made by the representatives of the 
people, and therefore by individuals realizing their freedom of self-determination. They 
have to consent, on the basis of the majority rule expressed by legislation, to restrictions 
of freedom. It is therefore the prerogative of Parliament to define the limitations of 
freedom.32
The rule of law is the most important pillar of constitutionalism. In its modern 
form it focuses on the constitutionality, not only the legality, of public actions – it also 
encompasses values, and is value-oriented. The principle of freedom is therefore an 
integral part of rule of law, together with the respect of human dignity. Primacy of the 
constitution over legislation is the institutional aspect of rule of law, while values and 
principles are its main substantive dimension.
The rule of law, democracy and the principle of freedom as expressed by fundamental 
rights constitute a functional unit the components of which cannot exist in an isolated 
way. Democracy is not a formal institution based on numeric majority, is not a matter of 
numbers but a matter of substance, in particular of values. If democracy is not the bridge 
between the people and rule of law, it is no true democracy. Furthermore, democracy is 
political self-determination and therefore the expression of freedom. The German Federal 
Constitutional Court has rightly underlined that democracy is closely linked to human 
dignity.
This basic structure of a constitutional order exists in all democratic-liberal systems, 
in national orders as well as in the supranational EU, which is based on common values 
between the member states, and in the system of the Council of Europe, encompassing the 
European Convention of Human Rights and other human rights related instruments. The 
anthropocentric approach as the main characteristic of contemporary constitutionalism is 
present at all these levels, and multinational human rights guarantees can be found even 
in some of the less integrated areas of international law.
32 ARNoLD R., “Common Principles of Constitutional Law in EuropeSpeech on the Constitution 
Day of Lithuania 2016”, in konstitucine Jurisprudencija Lietuvos Respublikos konstitucinio Bi-
uletenis Nr.4 (46), 156-163, Constitutional Court of Lithuania, Vilnius 2017.
21
Genetics and Constitutionalism – an introductory overview
5. Constitutionalism and its link with genetics. In our context, it is important to stress 
the particularly close link between genetics and the constitutional guarantees for the 
individual. This link results from the specific impact of genetics on the human person.
Human dignity is central for genetic intervention as well as for the protection of genetic 
data. National laws, supranational and international instruments are substantively of 
constitutional character if they define solutions for concurrent and conflicting principles. 
one of the most recent concretizations of constitutional principles in this context 
is the EU general regulation on data protection which encompasses genetic data. 
The constitutional principles which have to be weighed out are laid down in the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. However, human dignity – the highest value within 
the EU Charter – is absolute and cannot be outweighed or restricted in favor of another 
constitutional value. This has already been mentioned above in relation to other 
constitutional documents.
Data protection is significant for a further characteristic of modern constitutionalism: 
in order to prevent the violation of this right, various procedural rules are regulated 
by ordinary legislation. Complying with these rules means efficiently preventing the 
infringement of the constitutional principle of privacy. Rights protection by procedure 
is a modern, frequently used approach to protect freedom and dignity especially in the 
field of new technologies.
Genetic data is closely linked to basic constitutional questions: is it permissible, from 
the viewpoint of human dignity and the rights of personality, to collect and analyze 
genetic data, to store it and to use it? These basic questions are also relevant at the 
supranational and international level. It can be said that even on these levels the issue 
is functionally constitutional although formally international. It becomes evident from 
the relevant multinational documents that the same problems are also recognized there 
in the same way.
In view of the fact that data protection is close to human dignity it is not surprising 
that the human being is in the center of data related argumentation. This is also reflected 
in international documents.33 It is recognized for this reason that genetic data enjoys a 
special status, as is underlined by article 4 of the International Declaration on Human 
Genetic Data of 16 oct. 2003, confirmed in recent documents such as article 9 of the 
EU general regulation on data protection which will come into force in 2018.
It is evident that the basic requirement is the consent of the persons concerned 
that their genetic data be collected; consent which can be freely revoked as an exercise 
of their personality-based rights and individual character.34 The right of access to the 
data (article 13 of the Declaration 2003) by the person concerned is evident as long 
as the data exists, duration of existence being dependent upon the person’s will. This 
individual right of disposal can only be restricted if the data (the subject of the research) 
has been made anonymous, no longer able to be individualized.35 The right to access 
33 VoSSENkUHL C., “Der Schutz genetischer Daten. Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Gen-
diagnostikgesetzes”, 2013.
34 See Art. 9 of the Declaration 2003.
35 See for details Art.14 c,d of the Declaration 2003.
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this data belongs exclusively to the persons concerned, and under the protection of 
privacy cannot be revealed to third persons in the field of insurance, labor relations, 
education etc.36 
It flows from human dignity and personality rights that the individual has a right to 
know as well as the right not to know his/her genetic data. These rights comprise data 
knowledge which has been intentionally researched as well as discovered by chance.37
It is not possible in this context to fully evaluate the legal details on genetic data 
which have been developed by strict and soft law, and at national, supranational and 
international levels.38 It seems adequate to reflect on the general principles which can be 
drawn from the broad perspective of the legal protection of genetic data at various levels.
It is important to state that human dignity is recognized as an expression of the primacy 
of the individual and has developed into a normative category of prime importance. Basic 
normative requirements for data collection and processing are related to dignity, such as 
individual consent, exclusive disposal of personalized data, free decision on whether to 
acquire knowledge of such data, etc. However, it is commonly accepted that the individual 
is not an isolated person but a member of the community. To this extent, the individual’s 
personal sphere is limited by the legitimate interests of the other individuals. Exceptions 
and limitations of individual disposals of genetic data must be examined for their 
compatibility with human dignity. This involves the question of the definition of dignity, 
the question where the genuine sphere of dignity ends and the sphere of freedom begins; 
freedom is restrictable, but only within the confines of the principle of proportionality. In 
order to appreciate the importance of dignity and freedom in this respect, it is necessary 
to apply a comprehensive perspective which takes into account not only the national but 
also supra- and international approaches.
36 See Art. 14 b of the Declaration 2003.
37 See Art. 10 of the Declaration 2003.
38 See Vossenkuhl (note 33) and Pawel kwiatkowski, DoI 10.4746/ppuam.2016.6.04.
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Soft Law Governance in Genetic, Genomic, and Proteomic
Databases. An International Regime Approach
Hedley Christ
1. Introduction. The concept of human rights in patient care has wide application. It in-
cludes bioethics, patients’ rights, right to health, and patient safety. But beyond this there 
is a societal good in that, information gathered from patients may help in providing cures 
for specific diseases or conditions. Human rights in patient care therefore, addresses wid-
er rights, including the benefits to other patients than the one undergoing investigation 
and treatment. However, this inevitably encompasses a conflict between the right of the 
patient and the information that they provide, particularly when the information they 
provide is their own genetic information.1 The European Convention on Human Rights 
and Biomedicine provides a number of rights and protections to individuals who provide 
genetic information useful for research of however, this does not address the issues of stor-
age and the provision of access to this information for research purposes. Furthermore, 
this form of information as data is significantly different from that conceived in the Con-
vention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data. We therefore, need to consider how genetic information, provided by patients, can 
be governed, such that, both protection is given to the patient and researchers have the 
opportunity to use such information in medical research. We need to consider whether 
soft law techniques are, in fact, more appropriate to such governance.
2. The Nature of Genetic Information. Since the mapping of the human genome the 
amount of genetic sequence information now being generated has been called a tidal 
wave of data. The range and type of these databases are numerous. International collab-
orations have provided three primary sequence databases: GenBank, maintained by the 
National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI), Nucleotide Sequence Data-
bases, maintained by the European Molecular Biology Laboratory (EMBL), and DNA 
Databank of Japan. These primary sequence databases have subsidiary databases for 
the storage of particular types of sequence data.2 These include: dbEST for expressed 
sequence tags, dbGSS for single pass genomic survey, dbSTS for sequence tagged sites, 
1 The genetic information provided is specific to the individual, and thereby may readily identify them 
and their health issues.
2 GoSTIN L.o. ET AL, “The Public Health Information Infrastructure: A National Review of the 
Law on Health Information Privacy”, in Journal of the American Medical Association, 1996, 275, 
pp. 1921-1927.
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and HTG for high-throughput genomic division used to store unfinished genomic 
sequences data. Two important protein sequence databases are; SWISS-PoT, and 
TrEMBL. Beyond these there are a range of specific databases including, rDNA, tRNA, 
Promoter Sequences, Regulatory Elements, and Inbase, a database of inteins which are 
small peptides that are spliced out of some microbial protein. oMIM (online Mende-
lian Inheritance in Man) is a database of human genes and genetic disorders maintained 
by NCBI. Incyte is a commercial database containing DNA sequences, transcripts, 
extensive annotations, expression data and access to cDNA for experimental studies. 
There are, therefore, a vast number of databases widely distributed. In addition, there 
are now two databases which specifically hold data on individuals’ genes: Uk Biobank3 
which recruited 500,000 people aged between 40-69 years in 2006-2010 from across 
the Uk to take part in this project, and EGA which provides a service for the per-
manent archiving and distribution of personally identifiable genetic and phenotypic 
data resulting from biomedical research projects.4
These data are being collated and stored in genetic, genomic, and proteomic data-
bases within a computer-assisted data management system known as bioinformatics. As 
more and more genetic and protein information is generated, the intention is to link 
these databases, both nationally and internationally, to other genetic, genomic, and 
proteomic databases and/or public health information systems, leading finally perhaps 
to a few international mega-database systems. This network of database systems will 
then be able to provide vast genetic and protein data and information important in 
the development of medicine, both in research (pure and applied) and clinical prac-
tice. However, genetic, genomic and proteomic databases contain information about 
individuals’ and their families’ health which has long been considered as sensitive in-
formation with strict confidentiality rules. Fundamental to the development of these 
databases will be the balance to be drawn between an individual’s privacy rights and 
the social welfare in health that these bioinformatics systems will be able to provide. 
The notion of this balance is compounded by the development of intellectual prop-
erty rights within these genetic, genomic, and proteomic databases. This network of 
national and international databases will, therefore, need to develop management and 
governance within an international framework.5
3 Uk Biobank is a major national and international health resource, and a registered charity in its 
own right, with the aim of improving the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of a wide range of 
serious and life-threatening illnesses – including cancer, heart diseases, stroke, diabetes, arthritis, 
osteoporosis, eye disorders, depression and forms of dementia. Patients provided blood, urine and 
saliva samples for future analysis, detailed information about themselves and agreed to have their 
health followed. over many years this will build into a powerful resource to help scientists discover 
why some people develop particular diseases and others do not.
4 Data at EGA was collected from individuals whose consent agreements authorize data release only 
for specific research use to bona fide researchers. Strict protocols govern how information is man-
aged, stored and distributed by the EGA project.
5 RoSENAU J.N., “Towards an ontology for Global Governance”, in HEWSoN, M. & SIN-
CLAIR, T.J. (edit by), Approaches to Global Governance Theory, New York, State University of 
New York Press, 1999.
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Such management and governance will need to develop within a legal framework. 
However, no such international framework exists; there is instead a collection of inter-
national human rights’ agreements and certain national laws, none of which provide a 
coherent legal framework for the management of such databases.6 one such approach, 
therefore, is to consider soft law as a means by which the management of these databases 
could be undertaken, for example; an international regime to enable the efficient, effec-
tive, ethical, and best use of this network system of genetic, genomic, and proteomic da-
tabases. However, there is no clear understanding of who the actors are in producing and 
controlling the development of bioinformatics systems, what type of databases are being 
produced and whether and to what extent these databases are being linked.
3. What are Genetic, Genomic and Proteomic Databases and why are they important? Ge-
netic, genomic, and proteomic databases are computer-assisted data management systems 
that gather, and analyze genetic, genomic, and proteomic data. They store and search7 
data on gene and protein sequences,8 structures,9 expression profiles, and biochemical 
pathways. The importance of these databases is that they analyze genetic and proteomic 
sequences and structures, enabling an understanding of how genes and proteins influence 
the working of the body at a molecular level. They enable biological data to be used to 
understand the higher-level functions of the cell, such as biochemical pathways, regula-
tory networks, signal transduction pathways, and what influences the behaviour of cell, 
organ and organisms. They enable the modelling of target proteins’ interactions with 
drug molecules and the way individuals are affected by the interaction between their ge-
netic make-up and their environment or life circumstances. In 2001 the Uk Parliament, 
House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology on Human Genetic Data-
bases recognized that understanding the genome will bring substantial improvements in 
medicine, particularly through the use of genetic data10 and medical histories.11
6 BoVENBERG J.A. (2000) “Should Companies Set-up Databases in Europe?”, in Nature Biotech-
nology, 2000, 18, pp. 907-909.
7 There are a range of retrieval tools which allow a text-based search within a number of linked data-
bases. Most widely used are Entrez, DBGET, and SRS. Sequence searches can be done with BLAST 
or FASTA.
8 Sequences are derived from DNA, RNA, and Proteins. Genomic DNA is taken directly from the 
genome, e.g. its natural state and therefore contains introns, and regulatory elements. cDNA is gen-
erated by reverse transcribing of mRNA. rDNA includes the sequences of vectors (e.g. Plasmids), 
modified viruses and other genetic elements.
9 Structures related to proteins and nucleic acids.
10 Uk Parliament, House of Lords, Select Committee on Science and Technology, Fourth report: Hu-
man Genetic Databases: Challenges and opportunities, HMSo 2001.
11 Uk Parliament (2001), House of Lords, Select Committee on Science and Technology, Fourth 
Report: Human Genetic Databases: Challenges and opportunities. London: HMSP. GoST-
IN,L.o.ET AL, “The Public Health Information Infrastructure: A National Review of the Law 
on Health Information Privacy”, in Journal of the American Medical Association, 1996, 275, pp. 
1921-1927.
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over the last ten years the development of genetic, genomic, and proteomic data-
bases, along with combinational chemistry, has made a significant contribution to the 
understanding of disease and drug development. Both genomics and proteomics have 
revolutionized the way target molecules are identified and validated for drug targeting. 
Thousands of potential new targets can now be identified by sequences, structures, and 
functions. The contribution of these databases, particularly in medicine, is their ability to 
analyze sequences and structures, enabling an understanding of how genes and proteins 
influence the working of the body at a molecular level, and model target protein inter-
actions with drug molecules inter alia and is being practiced worldwide by academics’ 
groups, companies, and national and international research consortia.12
Genetic, genomic, and proteomic databases and their database management systems 
are resources, therefore, that must be managed. Data ownership13 and the legal frame-
works which regulate their control are vital in determining the availability and control 
of the information which is stored, manipulated, and disseminated. This is particularly 
important for these databases where, as the Uk House of Lords noted; information about 
individuals and their health can be very sensitive and genetic data are particularly so. 
Genetic information may say something about family members as well as the individual 
directly concerned. The challenge, therefore, is to find ways of protecting the interests of 
individuals, while at the same time making essential information available to medical re-
search. A principal concern, therefore, is that these data systems must be managed in such 
an efficient way as to bring social welfare benefits to the international community while 
at the same time respecting the informational privacy of individuals. However, set against 
this is the demand for open science. organizations campaigning against any notion of 
ownership of biological information are working to develop a public or open licensing 
plan for information.14 In contrast to open science is the issue of intellectual property (IP) 
in these databases and how such IP should be managed.
During February and March of 2004, the oECD held a Workshop on Human Ge-
netic Research Databases (HGRDs) – Issues of Privacy and Security (Tokyo Workshop), 
recognizing that HGRDs are invaluable tools which will have immense possibilities for 
medicine. The Workshop felt that clear procedures must be in place for informing pa-
tients about the way that data, based on their genetics, might be used, and whether, 
therefore, current informed consent is sufficient to assure patients’ privacy and achieve an 
appropriate balance with research and access. Whether or not such a balance is achieved 
12 kRASNER S.D., (edit by) “International Regimes, Ithaca and London”, Cornell University Press, 
1983.
13 In database systems, the data site is often termed master site (or primary site) which makes data 
available to slave sites (or subscribers). A master site may own the data; however, there may also be 
multiple sites in which ownership is invested in distinct fragments.
14 Bioinformatics.org and the open Lab offer web hosting and project support relating to bioinfor-
matics. The projects within the open Lab are primarily end-user software tools for scientists looking 
to solve particular biological and bioinformatics problems. The Distributed Sequence Annotation 
systems (DAS) developed at the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory and Ensembl are both projects 
intended to bring the human genome into the public domain. Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory is 
looking at using MP3 players as a means to sharing genetic information, peer-to-peer.
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in public policy will affect how successful genetic science is as a driver for innovation 
products and processes and delivery of better health. The Workshop also concluded that 
the oECD should develop principles of best practice, that is soft law principles, for the 
management and governance of HGRDs, but as yet has been unable to provide such 
principles of best practice.
The reason for this lack of management and governance guidance of HGRDs lies in 
the complexity of the task-in-hand. In part the oECD acknowledges: “The protection of 
individuals’ genetic information relies on a combination of health-related, confidentiality, 
and/or personal data protection laws.15 Many countries also provide constitutional pro-
tection, human rights legislation or both. In general, however, no specific laws distinguish 
the processing of genetic data from other personal or sensitive information. Yet genetic 
data is perceived as being special because it can reveal important information about both 
an individual and his/her family and can have a significant impact on an individual’s life, 
including his or her reproductive choices.”
Beyond the use of genetic, genomic, and proteomic databases for personal health-
care these databases may also play a significant role in public health management.16 As 
Gostin (1996) has pointed out; the development of public health information has pro-
duced a vast reservoir of information on health status giving states a means of health 
surveillance. Public health investigation through epidemiological research, testing and 
screening for disease, and now genetic and proteomic databases “enable the public health 
systems to identify health problems, inform the public, intervene, and influence funding 
decisions”. However, like the oECD Gostin also recognizes: “Patients, often physically 
and mentally vulnerable, divulge intimate details of their lives to their physician, medi-
cine’s paternalistic traditions have long-recognized that the patient’s weakened position 
compels strict confidentiality assurances even in the face of government demands…Law 
and ethics in late twentieth emphasize autonomy as a theoretical justification for privacy, 
patient autonomy encompasses the right to control the dissemination of person health 
information…Confidentiality is central to a trusting physician/patient relationship – this 
promotes patient’s candor about health and disease risks.”
This conflict between an individual’s informational privacy and the disclosure and 
access to genetic and proteomic data is compounded by the introduction of intellectual 
property and the possibility of a commercial application to these databases. In the final 
report from the oECD Working Group on Biological Information it stated: “The ac-
tual holding of biological materials clearly leads to the control of the access to related 
information and, in practice, also to the control of any possible invention that could 
derive from those materials. In this perspective, the problem of intellectual property of 
15 In the Uk, the construction of a genetic, genomic, or proteomic database has to receive ethical com-
mittee approval before it can be developed. Such approval will only allow the database to be construct-
ed on the basis of the application for ethics approval. Any alteration, development, or linkage not in 
the initial application requires further ethical committee approval. These ethical committees are par-
ticularly concerned with patient consent which cannot be ‘blanket’ consent for any use of the database.
16 office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. CESCR General Comment No. 14: The 
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12). Adopted at the Twenty-Second Ses-
sion of the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, on 11 August 2000.
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biological information is also connected to this problem of ownership of media where 
that information is stored.”
In the European Union, many EU countries have implemented the 1996 Database 
Directive (96/9/EC) which gives an intellectual property right in databases. As Bovenberg 
(2000) notes, these database rights in a DNA database would almost undoubtedly rep-
resent valuable intellectual property, especially with the uncertainty that still surrounds 
DNA sequence patenting. Database rights allows its holder to prevent extraction or reu-
tilization of substantial parts of the database for fifteen years after completion of a data-
base. In fact, the right may pertain in perpetuity given that it can be rolled over following 
any substantial modification to the database that requires a substantial investment. Such 
modifications include the routine business of DNA databases: extension, deletions, and 
amendments. The Uk Chorley Report identified a wide range of public datasets which 
could have commercial application and where possible should be commercialized to re-
coup the development costs. Many states now recognize the potential for the commercial-
ization and intellectual property exploitation of public research.17
As more and more genetic and protein information is generated with the purpose 
of linking this information either to other genetic, genomic, and proteomic databases 
or other types of databases such as clinical records, the need to manage these resources 
efficiently and within strict legal boundaries has become paramount. Governments and 
international organizations are driving greater and deeper linkages within these databases 
at the same time as demanding tighter controls over informational privacy and intellec-
tual property rights. Central to this debate is the issue of ownership. The contribution 
that these databases can make to medicine, both in research and in clinical practice will 
depend on the network system that is created for it. This network system will be of an 
international character bringing about both economies of scale and economies of scope. 
Good governance should bring about economies of scale through efficiency gains in coor-
dinating rulemaking, enforcement activities, and the acquisition of specialized skills and 
organizations, while reducing unnecessary regulatory disharmony. Economies of scope 
will bring about reductions in costs resulting from centralized access points and wider 
benefits to the international community.
Within this framework are international and national legal systems (developed in a 
pre-digital age), which were not designed for genetic, genomic and proteomic databases. 
In fact, these legal systems may positively inhibit the efficient management of these data-
base systems. Furthermore, this still emerging technology requires international cooper-
ation and an understanding between a wide range of actors (epistemic community) as to 
the nature of efficient database regulation. If an international regime is to be developed 
then it is necessary to identify the actors concerned (the epistemic community), the range 
of and type of genetic, genomic, and proteomic databases being produced, and identify 
the legal issues that will constitute the agenda setting.18 We therefore need to consider soft 
17 Uk Parliament (1987) Select Committee Report into the Handling of Geographic Information. 
The Chorley Report.
18 VoGLER J.,“The Global Commons. Environment and Technology Governance”, Chichester, John 
Willey & Sons, 2000.
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law approaches to the management of these databases, rather than relying on disparate 
international and national legal frameworks.
Any form of soft law approach for the management of these databases will need to 
consider a range of issues. For example, in determining the practical goal for these da-
tabases, that is, for whom is the knowledge intended to be useful rather than patients, 
society, government, or industry? What is the degree of transdisciplinarity; biology, med-
icine, computer science, legal and policy, and ethics inter alia. The nature of linkage, 
electronically, organizationally, socially, informally, through a functioning network of 
communication, and the degree of flexibility. How is brokering to be achieved with in-
dividuals coming from many different institutions and organizations which are dispersed 
geographically. Then there is the nature of social accountability and transparency. There 
are therefore a range of policy responses such as networks, alliances, agreements, shared 
facilities, governments and business relations, and considerations such as complexity, 
costs, risks, and technology, which have to be considered within an international arena.19 
This cannot be achieved through legal frameworks based on regulation and control, it 
must be undertaken through a form of global governance.
The nature of global governance covers a range of themes and approaches. There is no 
single model or form of global governance, no single structure or set of structures. As the 
Commission for Global Governance has stated, it is a broad, dynamic, complex process 
of interactive decision-making that is constantly evolving and responding to changing 
circumstances. Implicit in this broad conception of governance are the control mech-
anisms necessary for the management of these databases. However, one form of global 
governance, or model of global governance is regime analysis.
4. Regimes as a Means of Governing GGP Databases. krasner (1983) has defined an 
international regime as a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and deci-
sion-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations. The concept of regimes is therefore, conceived of as an issue 
area in which relevant actors share the principles, norms, rules and determine how deci-
sion-making processes are made and implemented.20 However, as Rosenau (1999) notes 
little attention has been paid generally to the actors, other than governmental actors, 
who could form such a regime, despite considerable evidence that in many regimes oth-
er types of actors play a crucial role. Ruggie (1975) argued that the existing literature on 
technology change and international cooperation was inadequate because of its restrict-
ed focus on law and organization. “What was required was a wider view encompassing 
implicit understanding between a whole range of actors.” More recently Vogler (2000) 
stated “A form of regime analysis that has been relatively neglected is the fundamental 
one of how agendas are set and issues arise, altered and are aggregated together. Who 
19 RUGGIE, J.G., “International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends”, in International 
organization, 1975, 29, pp. 557-583.
20 International regimes were first defined by krasner, S.D. (1983) as a “set of implicit or explicit prin-
ciples, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in 
a given area of international relations”.
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defines what this social construct- the issue area – will be? Who are the actors?”
Such views are particularly important for genetic, genomic, and proteomic databases. 
Throughout the international molecular biology community many genetic, genomic, and 
proteomic databases are being produced with an agenda to integrate these databases. The 
result could be a few international databases accessible by national public health systems 
and an international research community. However, it is not clear how many research 
groups are producing genetic, genomic, and proteomic databases. How many of these 
databases are already linked, either to other genetic, genomic, or proteomic databases or 
public health records such as clinical records? How many of these databases are linked na-
tionally and/or internationally? What type of genetic, genomic, and proteomic databases 
are being produced, i.e. specific disease types, protein interaction drug targeting, and 
diagnostic testing, and for what purpose? Who has access to these databases, and who has 
control over the development, use, and access to these databases?
Just as important as understanding who the actors are in this developing technology 
are the issues that will need to be addressed by these actors as these databases become 
more and more linked, particularly on an international level. It is already apparent that, 
apart from the issues of standardization, these issues will principally surround the balance 
to be drawn over individual privacy rights, intellectual property rights, and social welfare. 
However, it is not apparent how these agenda-setting issues affect the epistemic commu-
nity. What are the principal concerns the actors have in developing genetic, genomic, and 
proteomic databases? How do these concerns manifest themselves when these databases 
are linked? What do the actors believe will be the important issues that will determine 
whether an efficient, effective international database system will be developed, and how 
will an international system be managed, monitored, controlled, developed, and accessed?
The policy choices open to the international community wishing or needing to take 
action to manage genetic, genomic, and proteomic databases fall into a number of cat-
egories. These include regulation, persuasion (often considered as soft law), the use of 
property rights, the use of targeted economic instruments, and adjusting direct or indirect 
economic policies that do not have as their goal the efficient regulation of these databas-
es, such as the overriding aim of commercial exploitation of these databases. Alongside 
these policy choices is the risk of fragmentation, that is, where policies develop on indi-
vidual lines lacking the coordination that efficient regulation will require. Such soft law 
policy will, therefore, need to consider which policy variables are most likely to affect 
the efficient regulation of these databases set against the desired goals and concerns over 
fragmentation.21 For example, what is the typology and linkage of the genetic, genomic, 
and proteomic databases, who forms the epistemic community22 and what is the nature of 
21 Resulting from ‘market failure’, i.e. conflict of interest among states and conflict of interest across 
states, the approach of agenda setting issues must develop policy choices of cooperation, particularly 
within the distinct areas of database usage, privacy, and intellectual property, which will coordinate 
rather than contradict one another.
22 The policy choice of who constitutes the epistemic community will have a strong influence on the 
nature, form, structure, and management of the genetic, genomic, and proteomic databases, i.e. cer-
tain interest groups may impose externalities on others, how interests are balanced, and how a wide 
epistemic community may not understand the uncertainties that actors commonly face regarding 
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their capacity, and what are the agenda setting issues23 for such an international regime in 
these databases, what are the policy options?24 Principal among these is the policy choices 
which will need be taken within the existing legal framework of the research. These pol-
icy options and choices will fundamentally determine the nature, form, structure, and 
overall efficient regulation of an international regime in genetic, genomic, and proteomic 
databases and how these databases will be used for research, clinical practice, and public 
health welfare regulation. Furthermore, they will determine the balance of public and 
private involvement of this international regime.
In considering how genetic, genomic and proteomic databases are to be managed with 
forms of governance in the absence of governments, or at least only partial governmental 
input or involvement, the nature of soft law regimes will need to sit within a corpus of 
legal rules related to human rights in patient care, privacy laws, database laws, intellec-
tual property laws, inter alia. The generation, therefore, of soft law principles requires 
a foundation in hard law principles. These hard law principles should begin with the 
right to health set within the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. However General 
Comment No. 14 clearly states that in considering the right to health of an individual, 
that right does not exclude, in fact the right becomes dependent upon, the realization of 
other human rights. The legal framework in which an international regime on genetic, 
genomic, and proteomic databases must sit therefore, within a wider understanding of 
patient rights, that is, although the DNA sample is obtained from a patient, having given 
informed consent, the right of the patient over their sample is constrained by other rights.
The concept of human rights in patient care has wide application. It includes bio-
ethics, patient’s rights, right to health and patient safety. But beyond this there is a so-
cietal good in that information gathered from a patient may help in providing cures for 
specific diseases or conditions. Human rights in patient care therefore addresses wider 
rights including the benefits to other patients than just the one undergoing investigation 
and treatment. However, this inevitably encompasses a conflict between the rights of the 
patient undergoing treatment and the information that may come from such a patient, 
particularly in the area of scientific research. Such issues therefore as how can patients give 
informed consent to keeping and sharing information that comes from their treatment 
and how can the privacy and confidentiality of such information be assured to the patient 
when that information will be potentially important to other patients?
the nature of the particular issues in everyday management.
23 In developing an agenda setting programme for an international regime what should constitute the 
substantive content governing the area of international genetic, genomic, and proteomic database 
regulation. This reflects not only the policy choices of form of approach taken, and elimination of 
fragmentation, as above, but also on the nature of the obligation it provides and on the delegation 
to third parties (WHo, oECD, or newly created institution).
24 Certain policy options have already been undertaken by Governments covering the subject matter 
of database usage, privacy, and intellectual property. These will constrain the type of options avail-
able and it may be unrealistic to expect the desired policy changes to happen at once. It might be 
appropriate to take a longer-term view entering into ‘policy dialogue’ with the epistemic community 
perhaps involving the exchange of information at a professional and technical level.
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However, General Comment 1425 clearly states that in considering the right to health 
of an individual, that right does not exclude other human rights. The legal framework in 
which an international regime on genetic, genomic, and proteomic databases must be set, 
falls within, a wider understanding of patients’ rights, that is, although the DNA sample 
is obtained from a patient, having given informed consent, the right of the patient to that 
sample is constrained by other rights. General Comment 14 therefore notes, that unlike 
the concept of patients’ rights, which provides certain specific rights to the patient, the 
concept of human rights in health, refers to the application of general or universal human 
rights to all those involved. That is, not only other patients but also all those involved in 
the provision of healthcare. This therefore, brings into the notion, that healthcare also 
involves the scientific community who bring an understanding of the nature of disease. 
Human rights in healthcare therefore, encompass a wider range of individuals whose hu-
man rights we also need to consider, such as the scientific community, hospitals, clinics, 
and other places where healthcare provision is given.
Such considerations do require a balancing of those rights. In General Comment 14 
it notes that the right of the acceptability of healthcare includes the right to seek, receive, 
and impart information, and ideas concerning health issues. However, accessibility to in-
formation should not impair the right to have personal healthcare treated with confiden-
tiality. This is specifically the case with genetic, genomic and proteomic databases, which 
require, in their management, the consideration of privacy and confidentiality set against 
the provisions of information for research into the various diseases and conditions. The 
European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine26 also notes that those instru-
ments, that is, a human rights approach, differs when we consider the patient’s rights 
approach in that such rights applied to both the patient and healthcare providers and also 
that information provided by the patient may advance medical understanding.
Beyond the notion of a wider human rights approach to the sharing of genetic and 
protein information, concerns the requirement of governments to promote care, health, 
including the positions for research into disease. Under the United Nations Regime (arti-
cle 12, ICESR) it obliges states with a number of duties including the implementation of 
effective measures for the prevention, treatment, and control of disease. However, Gen-
eral Comment 14 interprets this article to include freedom from human rights abuses 
including human dignity, privacy, the access to information. Thus, the right to privacy 
and confidentiality becomes an essential aspect of healthcare provision. This presumably 
also includes the rights to information.
25 General Comment No. 14 states that the right to health includes the availability of public health 
and healthcare facilities and that the right includes the right to privacy and access to information. 
However, it also states that the right to health is realized through the pursuit of numerous comple-
mentary approaches and therefore involves a range of activities which are to benefit many, not just 
an individual.
26 Also note the Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dig-
nity of the Human Being with regard to Application of Biology and Medicine on the Prohibition 
of Cloning Human Beings, and the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicines Concerning Biomedical Research.
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The nature of privacy is often stated as a right, and thereby an individual right. How-
ever, more recently the notion of privacy has been seen as a value rather than a right, in 
which the individual chooses the level of privacy which they wish to impose. But in terms 
of healthcare there is a distinction between the individual’s privacy and the social value 
of that privacy. Privacy here must be understood in terms of the purposes that transcend 
that of the individual without denying the importance of the value of that privacy to the 
individual.27 There is therefore a continuing balance to be drawn between the patients’ 
rights. As Rahu and Mckee note, it is important to recognize that the individual’s right 
to confidentiality is circumscribed by the individual’s responsibility to contribute that 
information to promote societal good such as, the disclosure of their health informa-
tion. The balance therefore is one in which we have to ensure patient participation in 
the decision-making process as enshrined in the World Health organizations’ Alma-Ata 
Declaration which provides for the universal access and patient participation in health-
care and public health decision-making.28 Here then patients not only have certain rights 
but also certain duties. Within the European Charter of Patients’ Rights Article 3; indi-
viduals have rights to access all kinds of information regarding their state of health and 
all that scientific research and technological innovation makes available. This therefore, 
clearly implies that individuals have a duty to participate in the further understanding 
of healthcare issues. However, the European Charter of Patients’ Rights also recognizes, 
the genetic information may be different. At Article 11 discrimination against a person 
on the grounds of his or her genetic heritage is prohibited. Furthermore Article 12 states 
that tests, which are predictive of genetic diseases and which either identify the subject 
as a carrier of the genetic disease or detect a genetic predisposition or susceptibility to 
disease may be performed only for health purposes or for scientific research linked to 
health purposes.
The nature of scientific research is therefore at the heart of health provision. There 
are clear safeguards that are required to protect patients, particularly when it is also clear 
that the patient has a duty to improve healthcare provisions by being subject to or of 
scientific research. Chapter 5 of the European Charter of Patients’ Rights provides for 
the need of approval of the scientific research by some competent body,29 and that the 
patient provides free and informed consent to being part of the research, along with being 
informed of their rights and safeguards prescribed by law. There are therefore, a number 
of human rights’ provisions, both hard law and soft law, to which the management of 
genetic, genomic and proteomic databases can draw in producing an international regime 
for their management.
27 This is specifically an issue when considering informed consent. However, as Bennett and Raab note 
that privacy cannot be allowed to sit in the way of the exploitation of modern technologies. How-
ever, the primacy of privacy as a basic human right and into which incursion can be made, must be 
justified.
28 Article 4 notes that the people have the right and duty to participate individually and collectively in 
the planning and implementation of their healthcare.
29 Articles 5 and 16. Article 17 also provides that the research itself should aim at contributing to the 
significant improvement in scientific understanding of a disease or disorder and that there is a po-
tential to produce real and direct benefits to the patient.
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Beyond the legal framework of healthcare provision, lies the issue of data processing. 
The Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing 
of Personal Data does provide, at Article 1, the overall protection of individuals’ fun-
damental rights and freedoms, particularly that of the right to privacy with regard to 
the automatic processing of personal data. Consideration therefore, needs to be given 
as to how genetic information, housed within these databases, can be governed. That is, 
how the patient’s genetic information can be safeguarded at the same time as providing 
the opportunity of researchers to use the genetic information. Would such databases be 
considered legitimate? Article 5 of the Convention gives a clear indication that such da-
tabases are legitimate in that they are obtained and processed fairly and lawfully; they 
are produced for a specific purpose; that the data is relevant and not excessive; the data 
is accurate and kept up-to-date, and that the database permits the identification of the 
data subject for no longer than is necessary. At the same time the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Biomedicine at Article 10 provides that individuals have the right 
to know the information collected about their health and that they have the opportunity 
to check that such information is accurate, adequate, and relevant. The difficulty is, that 
these general principles, cannot hold for patients to see information which would not be 
understood by them and therefore not be able to consider its accuracy, and to consider 
whether it is complete or not.
of major significance for the information held in these databases is that they have, 
or potentially have, economic significance. The nature of how these databases are owned 
thus becomes an important issue. Is the genetic information held in these databases, sub-
ject to intellectual property rights; particularly if such information has a commercial po-
tential? The notion of ownership therefore, becomes paramount. Do we conceive there-
fore, that the ownership of the data is one of a contractual obligation between researcher 
and patient. or could we conceive of this information is being held on trust. Here the 
nature of the trust would be that the property, here the genetic material, is managed in 
trust for the patient, the researcher becoming trustee manager of the genetic information.
The management of genetic, genomic and proteomic databases cannot therefore, be 
undertaken by hard law alone. A better approach, therefore, may be to consider a soft law 
approach which can sit within a hard law legal framework. one such approach could be 
to consider an international regime in which the principles, norms, rules, and decision 
making processes, can be identified, within the hard law framework. This can provide for 
patient safeguarding and at the same time provide access to genetic and protein data for 
the furtherance of medical research. Such development of an international regime being 
in the hands of an epistemic community. That is, a community who has the knowledge 
for its development. Such an epistemic community, constituted of experts and interest-
ed groups, including patients, whose quasi-autonomous character would allow them to 
constitute a broad international community, setting the principles of individuals’ funda-
mental rights and duties; the control and access and disclosure of information, by con-
sidering such issues as informed consent, and anonymizing of data, constraints of access 
to the genetic information, inter alia, which would lead into the norm building and rule 
making processes. It could also develop an understanding of what values can be put to 
the importance of access to data, depending perhaps, on the final usage of the data and 
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including such concepts as the freedom of information; what is the nature of ownership, 
and concepts such as custodianship. Furthermore, what governments are doing and how 
they are carrying out their mandated functions of providing healthcare. These and many 
other considerations could be undertaken by an international regime for the management 
of genetic, genomic and proteomic databases set within a hard law framework of human 
rights, database laws, and ownership and intellectual property laws. A system which could 
provide significant benefits to the understanding of disease and the furtherance of health-
care provision.
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Health Data Treatment. 
An approach to the International and EU Legal Framework
Joaquín Sarrión Esteve
1. Motivation. Health treatment fields face ethical and legal problems regarding the use of 
data. As we know, patients can benefit from having health or medical information avail-
able, and medical decisions can be more effective with a better understanding of clinical 
histories, medical and health data. Nevertheless, we need to guarantee privacy – including 
data protection rights – and confidentiality dealing with health data treatment challenges 
from a fundamental rights perspective.
Although the New European Union (EU) Privacy regulation has been seen as a ‘prop-
erty-based conception’ regulation,1 the reality is that this is  a very important instrument 
to guarantee fair and quality use and treatment of privacy data. 
The complaint about ethical and legal requirements – including constitutional ones 
– is particularly relevant in the use and treatment of health issues (health data) because 
when dealing with health we need a fundamental rights protection approach in order to 
identify the ethical and legal limits regarding the use of this type of sensitive data. 
Moreover, in order to address this, we need to use multilevel methodology because 
we live immersed in a European legal space comprised of legal systems with different 
levels which are increasingly interconnected.2 Therefore, we need a theoretical basis to 
approach it and try to study any element or reality included in these related legal systems, 
and dealing meanwhile with the new constitutional horizon opened in the EU after the 
Lisbon Treaty.3 
 First, the methodology we are going to use, the multilevel one, will be described. Af-
ter that, we study the concept of health data, the uses and purposes – both for health and 
medical uses among others – of health data, the legal requirements of processing health 
data, an analysis of relevant case law and finally the actual trends on this issue in the EU.
1 Due to the entitlement of data rights, the protection of rights even after the transfer and the exist-
ence of remedies to protect rights, and particularly because it ‘treats personal data as commodity ca-
pable of changing hands’. See VICToR, J. M., “The EU general data protection regulation: Toward 
a property regime for protecting data privacy”, in Yale Law Journal , 2013,  v. 123, 2, p. 515 and p. 
527.
2 GÓMEz SÁNCHEz, Y., “Constitucionalismo multinivel: Derechos Fundamentales”, Sanz y Tor-
res, 2011, p. 20.
3 SARRIÓN ESTEVE, J., “El nuevo horizonte constitucional para la Unión Europea: a propósito 
de la entrada en vigor del Tratado de Lisboa y la Carta de Derechos Fundamentales”, in CEFLegal: 
Revista Práctica del Derecho, p. 162.
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2. Multilevel methodology on health data treatment. It is typical – from the Law perspec-
tive4 – to describe the relationship between EU law and national ones in terms of a multi-
level legal system, i.e., constitutional pluralism5 or multilevel constitutionalism.6 In both 
cases, we speak about theoretical constructions which try to explain the EU multilevel 
fundamental rights protection architecture,7 and therefore the relationship and interac-
tion of different legal systems or levels, particularly EU and national ones. These are 
becoming progressively more interconnected, because we need to approach this complex 
‘legal reality’ as Prof. Gómez Sánchez pointed out some years before,8 with the logic of 
relationships and integration.9
Certainly, the problem that arises is the special complexity of fundamental rights pro-
tection in this type of multilevel reality which deals with multisided systems and we need 
4 There are other approaches from Political Science, Economics, or Sociology. Regarding the inter-
disciplinary status of EU studies and a comparison between them and Law approaches, see MIL-
CzAREk, D., “Theoretical Aspects of European Studies” in the book “Introduction to European 
Studies: A New Approach to Uniting Europe, Centre for Europe”, University of Warsaw, 2012, 
p.13-32.
5 See for example MACCoRMICk, N., “Questioning Sovereignty. Law, State and Nation in the 
European commonwealth”, oxford University Press, 1999; ToRRES PÉREz, A., “Conflicts of 
Rights in the European Union. A Theory of supranational Adjudication”, oxford Scholarship on-
line, 2009; JAkLIC, k., “Constitutional Pluralism in the EU”, oxford University Press, 2014. It is a 
way to approach EU integration that differs from the traditional sovereigntist one as pointed out by 
Fabbrini (See FABBRINI, F., “Fundamental Rights in Europe”, oxford University Press, 2015, p. 
19). However, some authors outline differences between Legal Pluralism and Plural Constitutional-
ism, see CHALMERS, D., & DAVIES, G.,  and MoNTI, G. “European Union Law”, 3rd edition, 
Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 219-222.
6 PERNICE, I., “Multilevel constituionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European Constitu-
tion-making evisited?”, in Common Market Law Review, 36, 1999; PERNICE, I., “Multilevel con-
stitutionalism in the European Union” in European Law Review, 27; BALAGUER CALLEJÓN, 
F., “Constitucionalismo multinivel y derechos fundamentales en la Unión Europea” in the book 
“Estudios en homenaje al Profesor Gregorio Peces Barba”, v. 2, 2008; FREIXES SAN JUAN, T., 
“Constitucionalismo multinivel e integración europea” in the book “Constitucionalismo Multinivel 
y relaciones entre Parlamentos: Parlamento europeo, Parlamentos nacionales, Parlamentos region-
ales con competencias legislativas”, CEPC, 2011; GÓMEz SÁNCHEz, Y., “Constitucionalismo 
multinivel. Derechos fundamentales”, 2nd edition, Sanz y Torres, 2014. Nevertheless, it is impor-
tant to note that although Multilevel Constitutionalism and Constitutional Pluralism have a dif-
ferent origin and development in the European integration studies debate, both of them ‘display 
significant similarities in terms of theoretical foundations’ (MAYER, F. C.  & WENDER, M., “Mul-
tilevel Constitutionalism and Constitutional Pluralism”, in the book “Constitutional Pluralism in 
the European Union and Beyond”, Hart Publishing, 2012, p. 151).
7 Although it is difficult to affirm the existence of a Human Rights or Fundamental Rights protection 
system in a strict sense, we are facing a system in construction (SARRIÓN ESTEVE, J., “El Tribunal 
de Justicia de Luxemburgo como garante de los derechos fundamentales”, Dykinson, 2013) rational-
ised by scholars (TENoRIo SÁNCHEz, P. “Diálogo entre Tribunales y Protección de los Derechos 
Fundamentales en el ámbito europeo”, in Revista General de Derecho Europeo, 31, p. 2-4).
8 GÓMEz SÁNCHEz, Y., “Constitucionalismo multinivel. Derechos fundamentales”, cit. p. 55.
9 BILANCIA, P., “The Dyanimcs of the EU integration and the impact on the National Constitution-
al Law”, Giuffrè, 2012, p. 84.
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to take into account not only EU and national law, but also international law and obli-
gations10 including the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),11 and other 
international instruments such as the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
(oviedo Convention).12 
Nevertheless, some authors usually tend to share an assumption that seems prob-
lematic, as komárek pointed out recently13: the identity of fundamental rights at the 
different levels and systems, based on the universality of human rights. Certainly, funda-
mental rights are founded on universal values, but are linked to a specific legal order, and 
therefore to a specific constitutional and national identity (of which they are a part). The 
reality is that Fundamental Rights protection in the EU Legal order has its own ground 
and standard of protection and guarantees, which differs from national ones and even 
from the ECHR order. This makes it more difficult to determine the applicable level of 
protection and fundamental rights guarantees. 
Certainly, according to article 51(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,14 
the EU Charter provisions are addressed not only to EU institutions but also to the EU 
Member States when they are implementing EU law. The European Court of Justice’s 
(ECJ) interpretation of this provision is very extensive, in the sense that it is linked to 
the concept of the scope of EU law. Therefore, EU Fundamental Rights protection is 
binding for EU member states not only when they implement EU law but in any case 
within the scope of EU law (Åkerberg Fransson, C-617/10),15 and the application of EU 
Fundamental Rights standard is binding, not allowing the application of the national 
one unless the EU law provides a margin to do so without questioning the primacy 
10 We differentiate between external produced/approved law and internal produced law. Within the 
external law we can also point out a very relevant distinction between international law and supra-
national law, i.e., EU law is supranational law because EU law applies thanks to its own principles 
in Member States ex EU legal order. 
11 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4 Nov. 1950, 
better known as the European Convention on Human Rights.
12 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and dignity of the Human Being with regard to 
the Application of Biology and Medicine, oviedo, 4 April 1997, better known as Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine or Oviedo Convention. Entry into force on 1.12.1999. Italy signed it 
(4.4.1997) but has not yet ratified it. Spain signed it and ratified it on 23.07.1999.
13 komárek argued that the origin and bases of fundamental rights are different: Constitutional fun-
damental rights protection is based on a political constitutional project after World War II, and EU 
fundamental rights protection on the foundations of the European market integration project. See 
koMÁREk, J., “Why National Constitutional Courts Should Not Embrace EU Fundamental 
Rights”, in LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers, 23/2014, available on: http://www.lse.
ac.uk/collections/law/wps/ , 2014, p. 8-10.
14 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, better known as EU Charter, elaborated 
in 2000, Niza. After that the Charter was adapted in Strasbourg in 2007 and entered into force 
with the Lisbon Treaty on Dec. 2009. The last version of 26.10.2012 was published in the oJEU C 
326/391 and is available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX-
:12012P/TXT&from=EN
15 CJEU, C-617/10,  Åkerberg Fransson.
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of EU law (Melloni, C-399/1116; and Åkerberg Fransson, C-617/10) challenging the 
multilevel system.17
Therefore, there is no simple answer regarding fundamental rights protection on 
health data treatments, but we are going to try to develop an overview on the actual legal 
framework of health data treatments in the EU by outlining actual challenges. 
3. Health data treatment legal framework. Health, Biological and Biometric data are sensitive 
because they concern the privacy of the person (private life) in different dimensions. on the 
one hand, health data are personal data linked to the health of a person (derived from health 
care treatments), and on the other hand, biological and biometric data enable the identify of 
a person.18 In both cases, we deal with sensitive and relevant data linked to privacy. 
My aim in this paper is to overview the legal framework regarding the treatment or 
processing (including collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, and other 
uses) of health data. In other words, particularly I focus on one of these dimensions of 
privacy (the health one), although we think that it is also important to outline relevant 
related issues.19
3.1 Health data treatment international legal framework. At the international law lev-
el, it is important to note the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 
as a milestone document in human rights protection adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly. Although it is not a binding document, it can be an important source 
for the interpretation of the law. Article 12 provides for privacy: 
‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or cor-
respondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the 
protection of the law against such interference or attacks’.
There are also other non-binding international instruments such as the Universal Dec-
laration on Bioethics and Human Rights of 19 october 2005 (UDBHR) within UNE-
SCo (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural organization) framework, 
which aims to ‘provide a universal framework of principles and procedures to guide States 
16 CJEU, C-399/11, Melloni.
17 Regarding the challenges of the application of the EU fundamental rights protection standard limit-
ing the national ones, see my previous work SARRIÓN ESTEVE, J. “Actual Trends and Challenges 
of the Constitutional Fundamental Rights and Principles in the ECJ Case Law from the Perspec-
tive of Multilevel Constitutionalism” (September 4, 2015), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2656394 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2656394
18 on biologic and biometric data linked to identify persons, I suggest the lecture of the work CABE-
zUDo BAJo, M. J., “Genetic Evidence” in this book “Genetic Information and Individual Rights”, 
Universitsverlag, Regensburg, 2017. 
19 In this paper, we focus particularly on the privacy of health data related to the interest and control 
power of the patient related to collection, storage and processing of such data. But of course, it is 
also important to deal with the question of confidentiality related to the respect of privacy in the 
relationship between the doctor and the patient.
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in the formulation of their legislation, policies or other instruments in the field of bioeth-
ics’ (art. 2(a) UDBHR), and emphasises the need to carry out medical research within the 
framework of the ethical principles that the Declaration states by respecting the dignity, 
human rights, and fundamental freedoms (art. 2 (d) UDBHR).
It provides for minimisation regarding applying and advancing scientific knowledge, 
medical practice and associated technologies; maximising direct and indirect benefits to 
patients and individuals (art. 4 UDBHR); respecting the autonomy of persons (art. 5 
UDBHR); requires ‘the prior, free and informed consent of the person concerned, based 
on adequate information’ (art. 6(1) UDBHR) or the authorisation according to national 
law (art. 7 UDBHR) and the respect for privacy and confidentiality (art. 9 UDBHR); 
prohibition of discrimination (art. 11 UDBHR), inter alia. In particular, regarding priva-
cy and confidentiality, article 9 UDBHR stipulates that: 
‘The privacy of the persons concerned and the confidentiality of their personal information 
should be respected. To the greatest extent possible, such information should not be used or 
discloses for purposes other than those for which it was collected or consented to, consistent with 
international law, in particular international human rights law’. 
More importantly, due to its binding nature, the ECHR at the Council of Europe 
(CoE) regional system provides in article 8 that: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his corre-
spondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
There are other articles in the ECHR relevant for health treatments including article 
2 (right to life), article 3 (prohibition of torture, rights to integrity and dignity), and par-
ticularly on health data, article 14 provides the prohibition of discrimination without any 
distinction, which we must interpret as including the prohibition of genetic discrimina-
tion; and article 9 related to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, which anyone 
can use in order to limit some of his or her health data treatments. 
Certainly, the relevance of the ECHR is that any individual can ask for the protec-
tion of human rights recognised after the end of the national action. And EHRC had 
the opportunity to resolve questions on the issue of health data treatment under article 
8 ECHR, as for example in the case Z v. Finland (1996) when EHRC called for a more 
careful scrutiny relating the disclosure of personal information from medical records 
without a patient’s consent.20 
20 EHRC, 25 February 1997, z v. Finland, Application No. 9/1996/627/811. It is interesting that 
in this case the disclosure of the medical file was ordered during a trial of the patient’s husband for 
manslaughter, and in this case the EHRC considered the disclosure as necessary for the purpose of 
the trial, but that the publication of personal data such as the witness’s name and health data (HIV 
status) in the subsequent appeal trial was not justified, because the limitation of privacy must be at 
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However, privacy rights cannot restrict or limit the right to identity also covered by 
art. 4 ECHR, as essential to an effective privacy right, as EHRC pointed out in the case 
Bensaid v. The United Kingdom (2001).21 Privacy also includes the right to know the cir-
cumstances of those born and to establish the identity of the ascendants as a vital interest 
(Jäggi v. Switzerland, 2003).22
The consent for health treatment or medical examination is essential (a precondition) 
to the implementation of health or medical treatment or examination unless it is a med-
ical emergency. Therefore, it is also essential to the subsequent health data treatments. 
Regarding persons not able to consent, such as minors or adults unable to consent, 
it is important to obtain the parent’s or legal representative’s consent. In this sense, the 
EHRC ruled in M.A.K. and R.K v. United Kingdom (2010) that a medical examination 
of a nine-year-old girl without the required parental consent was a violation of articles 8 
and 13 ECHR.23
Based on article 8 ECHR, the Convention for the protection of individuals with re-
gard to the automatic processing of personal data of 1981 provides specific rules regarding 
the processing of personal data.24 This instrument requires taking the necessary steps in 
the national legislation to apply its principles (art.4(1)), including: 
1) Quality of data (art. 5): data shall be obtained and processed fairly and lawfully; 
stored for specified and legitimate purposes and not used in an incompatible way; 
adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the sole purposes; accurate and 
where necessary kept up to date; preserved in a way that permits identification no 
longer than is required for the storage purposes. 
2) Special safeguards for special categories of data, including personal data concern-
ing health (art. 6). 
3) Appropriate security measures (art. 7). 
4) Safeguard rights for the data subject including access, rectification or erasure of 
data (art. 8).
5) Special provisions for transborder data flows (art. 12).
a minimum. Nevertheless, in Colak and Tsakiridis v. Germany (2010) protected the confidentiality 
principle and the doctor’s decision to not inform the patient’s partner on the patient’s HIV status 
according to his request, even her risk exposure in this case (EHRC, 5 March 2009, Colak and Tsa-
kiridis v. Germany, Application Nos 77144/01 and 35493/05)
21 EHRC 6 February 2001, Bensaid v. The United kingdom, Application No.44599/98. Certainly, the 
EHRC stated that article 8 ‘protects a right to identity and personal development (...) The preserva-
tion of mental stability is in that context an indispensable precondition to effective enjoyment of the 
right to respect for private life’. 
22 EHRC 3 July 2003, Jäggi v. Witzerland, Application No. 58757/00. 
23 EHRC 24 March 2010, M.A.k. and R.k v. United kingdom, Application nos. 45901/05 and 
40146/06. It is an interesting case because there was a blood sample that could be used to conduct 
a test in order to investigate eventual sexual abuse by the parent without the parent’s consent. Al-
though the existence of medical suspects on the father, the Court ruled against Uk and the medical 
actuation without the parent’s consent. 
24 Convention for the protection of individuals with regard to the automatic processing of personal 
data (No108), 1981.
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The CoE Council of Minister adopted in 1997 the Recommendation on the protec-
tion of medical data providing for the application of privacy legislation for all medical 
data.25
Moreover, in the CoE system, there is a specific convention as we pointed out before: 
the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (Oviedo Convention) of 1997.26 The 
purpose of the oviedo Convention is precisely to serve as an instrument for the protec-
tion of human rights in the field of biomedicine, signed and ratified by Spain. However, 
one of the obstacles to its implementation is that some relevant CoE States have still not 
signed it (such as Germany, the United kingdom or Russia) while others that have signed 
it have still not ratified it (Italy, Holland or Poland).27 Notwithstanding, there was no 
obstacle for the EHRC to mention the oviedo Convention in case law affecting those 
countries.28
Furthermore, the oviedo Convention, which is 20 years old, is now supplemented by 
4 protocols: on the prohibition of human cloning (ETS No. 168), on human organ and 
tissue transplantation (ETS No. 186), biomedical research (ETS No. 195), and genetic 
tests for health purposes (ECTS No. 203). 
Certainly, the oviedo Convention focused on biomedicine, and it is important due 
to the specific provisions on protection of ‘dignity and identity of all human beings’ and 
‘guarantee everyone, without discrimination, respect for their integrity and other rights 
and fundamental freedoms with regard to the application of biology and medicine’ (ar-
ticle 1(1) oviedo Convention), and it is a binding instrument which compels States to 
partake at an internal level to give effect to the Convention provisions (art. 1(2) oviedo 
Convention): 
– The Primacy of the human being (art. 2 oviedo Convention). 
– Equitable access to health care (art. 3 oviedo Convention). 
– Professional standards in the health field (art. 4 oviedo Convention)
– Free and informed consent in the health field (arts. 5-9 oviedo Convention).
– Private life and right to information (art. 10 oviedo Convention). 
– Non-discrimination on grounds of genetics (art. 11 oviedo Convention). 
There are other provisions for other issues on scientific research, organ transplant, 
prohibition of financial gain which are not relevant to this paper. 
25 CoE Recommendation No. R (97) 5 on the protection of medical data.
26 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and dignity of the Human Being with regard to 
the Application of Biology and Medicine, oviedo, 4 April 1997 (ETS No. 164) better known as 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine or Oviedo Convention.
27 Chart of signatures and ratifications of Treaty 164. Convention for the protection of Human Rights 
and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Conven-
tion on Human Rights and Biomedicine. Status as of 10/04/2017. Available at: http://www.coe.int/
en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/164/signatures?p_auth=C9Qv25Dq
28 For example, EHRC 9 March 2004, Glass v. Uk, Application no. 6187/00; 10 April 2007, Evans 
v. UK (GC), Application no. 6339/05, 23 March 2010, M.A.k. and R.k. v. Uk, Application no. 
45901/05 and 40146/06; 26 May 2011, R.R. v. Poland, Application no. 27617/04; 23 July 2015, 
Bataliny v. Russia, Application no. 10060/07; 27 August 2015, Parrillo v. Italy (GC), Application 
no. 46043/14.
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Regarding the restrictions on the exercise of the rights guaranteed, article 26 stipulates 
that no restrictions shall be placed other than those prescribed by law necessary in a dem-
ocratic society in the interest of public safety, prevention of crime, protection of public 
health or other's rights. 
Article 27 of oviedo Convention regulates wider protection, in the sense that none of 
the oviedo Convention provisions ‘shall be interpreted as limiting or otherwise affecting 
the possibility for a Party to grant a wider measure of protection’ regarding biology and 
medicine. Therefore, the oviedo Convention provides a minimum standard regarding 
medicine in this field. 
We shall only emphasise, as we pointed out before, the relevance of free and in-
formed consent as a requirement to health treatment, and therefore as a previous pre-
condition to subsequent health data treatment. The general rule for consent under the 
oviedo Convention is that ‘An intervention in the health field may only be carried out 
after the person concerned has given free and informed consent to it’, with previous 
appropriated information (to the purpose and nature of the intervention, consequences 
and risks), and with the right to freely withdraw consent ‘at any time’ (article 5 oviedo 
Convention). We must interpret article 5 of the oviedo Convention in the sense that 
the information must be appropriate regarding the intervention, consequences and 
risk, and it must be a previous information, but the article does not speak about a full 
information. 
Regarding the protection of persons unable to consent (minors and adults without the 
capacity to consent) according to the national law, the intervention is only allowed if it 
is in their direct benefit (art. 6(1)oviedo Convention) with the authorisation of parents 
or legal representatives, a person or body provided by the law (art. 6(2)and(3)) receiv-
ing  a previous appropriate information (art. 6(3) oviedo Convention), and who may 
withdraw authorisation at any time in the best interest of the patient (art. 6(5) oviedo 
Convention). 
Moreover, article 8 concerns an emergency situation when the appropriate consent 
cannot be obtained: ‘any medically necessary intervention may be carried out immediate-
ly for the benefit of the health of the individual concerned’ (art. 8 oviedo Convention). 
The previously expressed wishes by a patient, who at the time of the medical intervention 
is not in a state to express wishes shall be taken into account (art. 9 oviedo Convention). 
Private life is protected in relation to the information about health (art. 10(1) oviedo 
Convention), and the patient is entitled to know any information collected about his/
her health (10(2) oviedo Convention), although this can be limited in the patient's 
interest (art. 10(3) oviedo Convention). Moreover, there is no obligation to know the 
information as ‘the wishes of individuals not to be so informed shall be observed’ (art. 
10(2) oviedo Convention). 
3.2 Health data treatment European Union legal framework. At the European Union 
Law level, we must consider the EU Charter (EUCFR), which recognises the principle of 
human dignity (article 1), the right to life (article 2), the right to the integrity of the per-
son (article 3), the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment (article 4), respect for private and family life (article 7), protection of personal data 
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(article 8),29 the prohibition of all discrimination including that of genetic characteristics 
in an express way (article 21). 
It is particularly relevant to outline article 3 EUCFR, since it recognises the right of 
everyone to respect his or her physical and mental integrity. Article 3(1) states that ‘in 
the fields of medicine and biology, the following must be respected in particular’ (article 
3(2))30: 
(a) the free and informed consent of the person concerned, according to the procedures laid 
down by law; 
(b) the prohibition of eugenic practices, in particular those aiming at the selection of per-
sons;
(c) the prohibition on making the human body and its parts as such a source of financial 
gain;
(d) the prohibition of the reproductive cloning of human beings.
Although the EU Charter is a very advanced human rights instrument with the in-
clusion of the last generation of rights, and it is assumed to provide the higher standard 
of protection for fundamental rights, it includes (as other human rights instruments) a 
safeguard clause in article 53, ruling that: 
Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human 
rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of application, by 
Union law and international law and by international agreements to which the Union or all 
the Member States are party, including the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by the Member States' constitutions.
Nevertheless, as we pointed out before, the ECJ interpreted article 53 in a non-safe-
guard sense, i.e., that this provision does not allow a Member State to the application 
of the national fundamental rights standard (in the scope of EU law) unless the EU 
law provides a margin to do so without questioning the primacy of EU law (Melloni, 
C-399/11; and Åkerberg Fransson, C-617/10). Consequently the EU standard of pro-
tection will be binding as a general rule when we are in the scope of EU law, which is 
most of the time.
on the issue of privacy and data protection for health data treatment, the actual EU 
legislation31 is Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
29 European Court of Justice developed the right to data protection including the right to be forgotten, 
see  CJEU, C-131/12, Google Spain.
30   From my point of view article 3 applies to the field of health, genetic and biometric data treatment 
or processing -including collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, and other uses- 
because we are speaking about the treatment or processing of data linked to medicine and biology.  
31 Excluding the treatment in criminal and security areas. The Data Protection Directive explicitly ex-
cluded from its scope of application data processing ‘in the course of an activity which falls outside the 
scope of Community law, such as those provided for by Titles V and VI of the Treaty on European Union 
and in any case to processing operations concerning public security, defense, State security (including the 
economic well-being of the State when the processing operation relates to State security matters) and the 
activities of the State in areas of criminal law’ (art. 3(2)); and the new Data Protection Package includ-
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processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (Data Protection 
Directive, DPD).32 This was in force until the application of the new Data Protection 
legislation33: the Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of EP and the Council on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data on the free movement of 
such data (General Data Protection Regulation, GDPR),34 planned for 25 May 2018. 
Certainly, article 99 of GDPR stipulates the enter into force of the GDPR ‘on the 
twentieth day following that of its publication in the official Journal of the European 
Union’ (99(1) and that ‘It shall apply from 25 May 2018’. Therefore, it entered into force 
on 25 May 2017 but it shall not apply until 25 May 2018. Nowadays the current legis-
lation consists of the DPD and the national transposition and development legislation of 
the Data Protection Directive. 
Nevertheless, to take into account both of them we are going to focus on the new 
regulation, the GDPR, particularly the new provisions that may apply to health data 
treatments.35 
First, it is important to note the concepts included in the GDPR: 
– ‘Processing’ means any operation or set of operations which is performed on per-
sonal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as 
collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, 
retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise 
making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction 
(art. 4(2) GDPR).
– ‘Controller’ means the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other 
body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of 
the processing of personal data; where the purposes and means of such processing 
are determined by Union or Member State law, the controller or the specific crite-
ria for its nomination may be provided for by the Union or Member State law (art. 
4(7) GDPR).
ed these areas in a new Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by 
competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of 
criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA.
32 Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data (Data Protection Directive), oJ 1995 L 281.
33 Actually, the new Data Protection legislation known as Data Protection Package includes two instru-
ments: the general Regulation in which we are interested, and a Directive on criminal and security 
areas. See above. 
34 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of EP and the Council on the protection of natural persons with regard 
to the processing of personal data on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection 
Regulation), oJ 4.5.2016 L 119/1.
35 There are relevant differences between the two instruments. Although the PDD was adopted by 
EU Member States, there are important differences in the implementation, and it did not take into 
account new technologies. Besides this, the new GDPR will apply to all EU member states since 28 
May 2018, and it takes into account new technologies. 
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– ‘Processor’ means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body 
which processes personal data on behalf of the controller (art. 4(8) GDPR). 
The DPD and GDPR stipulate as a general rule the prohibition of the processing of 
data concerning health (art. 8(1) DPD, art. 9(1) GDPR) except in some situations (art. 
8(2) and (3) DPD, and art. 9(2) GDPR). Nevertheless, the new GDPR introduces ge-
netic36 and biometric data,37 as particular data (different from health data38) and provides 
the same protection, and permits Members States to introduce further conditions about 
genetic, biometric and health data.
Certainly, the processing of genetic data, biometric data and data concerning health 
shall be prohibited as a general rule (art. 9(1) GDPR), except art. 9(2) GDPR: 
(h) processing is necessary for the purposes of preventive or occupational medicine, 
for the assessment of the working capacity of the employee, medical diagnosis, 
the provision of health or social care or treatment or the management of health 
or social care systems and services on the basis of Union or Member State law or 
pursuant to contract with a health professional and subject to the conditions and 
safeguards referred to in paragraph 3; 
(i) processing is necessary for reasons of public interest in the area of public health, 
such as protecting against serious cross-border threats to health or ensuring high stand-
ards of quality and safety of health care and of medicinal products or medical devices, 
on the basis of Union or Member State law which provides for suitable and specific 
measures to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the data subject, in particular profes-
sional secrecy; L 119/38 EN Official Journal of the European Union 4.5.2016
(j) processing is necessary for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific 
or historical research purposes or statistical purposes in accordance with Article 
89(1) based on Union or Member State law which shall be proportionate to the aim 
pursued, respect the essence of the right to data protection and provide for suitable and 
specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and the interests of the data sub-
ject’. (Emphasis added by the author)
The New General regulation provides for general principles when processing data in 
the same way,as the Directive, but with some innovation which we will outline. The gen-
eral principles for processing data are (according to art. 5 GDPR): 
36 ‘Genetic data’ means personal data relating to the inherited or acquired genetic characteristics of a 
natural person which give unique information about the physiology or the health of that natural 
person and which result, in particular, from an analysis of a biological sample from the natural per-
son in question (art. 4(13) GDPR).
37 ‘Biometric data’ are defined as personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating to 
the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a natural person, which allow or confirm 
the unique identification of that natural person, such as facial images or dactyloscopic data (art. 
4(14) GDPR). 
38    Defined as personal data related to the physical or mental health of a natural person, including the 
provision of health care services, which reveal information about his or her health status (art. 4(15) 
GDPR).
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1) Principle of lawfulness, fairness and transparency. Data shall be processed lawful-
ly, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject (art. 5.1(a) 
GDPR).
2) Principle of purpose limitation. Data shall be collected for specified, explicit and 
legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible 
with those purposes; further processing for archiving purposes in the public in-
terest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes shall, in ac-
cordance with Article 89(1), not be considered to be incompatible with the initial 
purpose (art.5.1(b) GDPR).
3) Principle of data minimisation. Processing shall be adequate, relevant and limited 
to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed (art. 
5.1(c) GDPR).
4) Principle of accuracy. Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up 
to date; every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that personal data that are 
inaccurate, having regard to the purposes for which they are processed, are erased 
or rectified without delay (art. 5.1(d) GDPR).
5) Principle of storage limitation. Data shall be kept in a form which permits identi-
fication of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which 
the personal data are processed; personal data may be stored for longer periods 
insofar as the personal data will be processed solely for archiving purposes in the 
public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes in 
accordance with Article 89(1) subject to implementation of the appropriate tech-
nical and organisational measures required by this Regulation in order to safeguard 
the rights and freedoms of the data subject (art.5.1(e) GDPR).
6) Principles of integrity and confidentiality. Data shall be processed in a manner that 
ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against un-
authorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or dam-
age, using appropriate technical or organisational measures (art. 5.1(f ) GDPR)
7) Principle of accountability. The controller shall be responsible for, and be able to 
demonstrate compliance with previous obligations, paragraph 1 art. 5 (art. 5(2) 
GDPR). 
It is important to outline that the principle of accountability is a new principle, the 
controller has to prove that he or she respects the above principles (the burden of the 
proof is with him or her).
The processing of data will be lawful only applying one of the following principles 
(art. 6(1) GDPR)39: a) Explicit and unambiguous consent40 or the authorisation of the 
39 Note that these are not a requirement list, i.e., the regulation allows for processing applying any of 
the principles covered by art. 6(1). Therefore, the consent or authorisation principle is a legitimate 
way to process data, but it is not the unique way to do it. 
40 The data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more spe-
cific purposes (art.6(1)(a)) GDPR). The conditions for the consent are developed in art. 7 GDPR: 
1) The controller shall be able to demonstrate that the data subject has consented, i.e., burden of 
the proof is with controller (art. 7(1) GDPR). 2) Consent must be informed in intelligible and ac-
cessible forms, using clear and plain language, any part which constitutes an infringement shall not 
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holder of parental responsibility41 (art. 6.1(a) GDPR; b) the processing is necessary for 
the performance of a contract with the data subject (art. 6.1(b) GDPR; c) processing 
is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation ((art. 6.1(c) GDPR); d) processing 
is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or another natural 
person ((art. 6.1(d) GDPR); e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task car-
ried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority (art. 6.1(e) GDPR); 
f ) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimated interests pursued by the 
controller or by a third party except where such interests are overridden by the interests 
or fundamental rights of data subject (not applicable to the authorities) (a(art. 6.1(f ) 
GDPR).42
Nevertheless, as we pointed out before, health data are a special category of personal 
data (sensitive data), and they are included in article 9 with biological and biometric 
data. The general rule is that these special categories cannot be processed (art. 9(1) 
GDPR) with the exceptions provided in art. 9.2(h), i and j GDPR, so the processing of 
these data categories is based on the legitimate purposes of preventive or occupational 
medicine, medical diagnosis, provision of health or social care, health or social care 
treatment or management system (art. 9.2(h) GDPR), for reasons of public interest 
in the area of public health (art. 9.2(i) GPDR), and where appropriate for archiving 
purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical 
ones (art. 9.2(j) GDPR).43 
one might ask whether in these cases consent or authorisation is needed (art. 6.1(a) 
GDPR) or we should not apply this provision -art. 6.1(a)-. My interpretation is that 
the processing of health data for these purposes can be covered by consent (art. 6.1(a) 
GDPR), or any other principles of art. 6(1) but we need to be covered by one of them,44 
although it is true that it seems to me easy to justify the processing of health data in the 
purposes of art. 9, in any of the principles ruled in art. 6(1) as the protection of the vital 
interests of the data subject or another person (art. 6.1(d) GDPR), legitimated interest of 
the medical centre or hospital (art. 6.1(f ) guaranteeing fundamental rights and interests 
be binding (art. 7(2) GDPR). Therefore, the consent must be explicit and unambiguous. We can 
say that we need a clear affirmative act, for example although it can be written, electronic or oral, in 
the last case we need to record it in order to prove the consent. 3) The data subject has the right to 
withdraw the consent at any time (art. 7(3) GDPR). 
41 In the case of minors under 16, it is necessary to have consent or authorisation by the holder of 
parental responsibility. Member States may provide by law for a lower age (not below 13), according 
to art. 8 GDPR. 
42 Moreover, Member States may introduce more specific provisions in pints c and e (art. 6(2) GDPR).
43 Moreover, according to art. 9.2(e) GDPR if the health data are public because patients made their 
data ‘manifestly public’, these data are no longer protected as sensitive data. It is obvious that this 
concept is subject to interpretation. 
44 Certainly I think that although perhaps the original aim of the GDPR is to allow the processing of 
health, genetic and biometric data without the consent of the data subject, the correct interpretation 
should be other, i.e., according to article 3(2) of EU Fundamental Rights Charter -which must be 
applied in the processing of data in the fields of medicine and biology- we need the consent of the 
data subject or in any of the other principles ruled in art. 6(1) GDPR as lawful bases for the process-
ing of these types of data. 
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GDPR), for compliance with a contract (6.1 (b) GDPR) in the case for example medical 
or health preventive treatment under employment contracts or health insurances con-
tracts, or a legal obligation (art. 6.1(c) covered by health or social management legislation, 
or for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of 
official authority (art. 6.1(e) GDPR). Nevertheless several authors suggest that Member 
States must use the provision of article 9(4)-which allow EU Member States to  introduce 
additional conditions to the processing of health, biometric and genetic data - to end 
interpreting doubts.45 
At any rate, it is important to note that health data should be processed by or under 
the responsibility of a professional subject under the obligation of professional confiden-
tiality  under EU or Member State law or rules established by national competent bodies 
or by another person also subject to an obligation of secrecy under EU or Member State 
law or other rules (art. 9(3) GDPR).
European Court of Justice ruled in the Lindquist case (ECJ C-101/01)46 that charge of 
criminal violation of Swedish data protection law based in the publication on the internet 
of health information relating a Lindquist's colleague, particularly the fact that she [Lind-
quist's colleague] had injured her foot and was on medical leave, are health data and, i.e., 
the charge was  not a disproportionate violation of the principle of freedom of expression. 
on the processing of data, the patient or data subject has several rights: 
1) Right to access (art. 15 and recital 63 GDPR). Access to your own personal data, 
including your medical record, and request a copy (the controller can charge a 
fee). The New General Regulation regulates remote ways to provide access to 
data, in this case the information shall be provided in a commonly used elec-
tronic form.
2) Right to rectification (art. 16 GDPR). Rectification of inaccurate personal data 
concerning him or her. Taking into account the purposes of the processing, the 
data subject shall have the right to have missing personal data completed, in-
cluding by means of providing a supplementary statement. 
3) Right to be informed (arts. 13 and 14 GDPR). Right to be provided in a concise, 
transparent, intelligible and clear and plain language some information as the 
identity and detailed contact of the controller, the purposes of the processing, 
the recipients of personal data, the period of storement, the existence of the 
rights to access, the existence of automated decision-making; and if the informa-
tion has not been obtained from the data subject; the source of the data.
4) Right to erasure (including right to be forgotten) (art. 17 GDPR). Right to ob-
tain the erasure of personal data when the personal data are no longer necessary 
– this provision, we think, is difficult to apply to health data, in fact we deal 
45 See BELTRAN AGUIRRE, J. L., “Tratamiento de datos personales de salud: incidencia del Regla-
mento General de Protección de Datos”, in the book “Salud electrónica. Perspectiva y realidad”, 
Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia, 2017, p. 121 and 122; BoMBILLAR SÁENz, F., “Tratamiento jurídico 
del consentimiento informado y la donación de muestras biológicas a un biobanco para investi-
gación biomédica: los consentimientos en blanco”, in Derecho y Salud, 2017, v. 27, 1, p. 111. 
46 CJEU, C-101/01, Lindquist.
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with an exception below –, have been unlawfully processed, for compliance with 
a legal obligation, etc. 
Exceptions: the processing is necessary for legal compliance, for reasons of pub-
lic interest in the area of public health, for archiving purposes in the public 
interest or historical research purposes or statistical purposes, for the establish-
ment, exercise or defense of legal claims.
5) Right to portability (arts. 20 GDPR). Right to receive the personal data pro-
vided to a controller, in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable 
format and have the right to transmit those data to another controller without 
hindrance from the controller which have been provided when the processing 
is based on a consent pursuant to point (a) of article 9.(2) (consent) and the 
processing is carried out by automated means. 
 Certainly, there is a clear limitation of the use of this right regarding the health 
data processed on other grounds, but we suppose that hospitals and medical 
centres may give the complete information regarding processing by reasons of 
effectiveness.
6) Right to object (art. 21 GDPR). Right to object to the data processing if the pro-
cessing is based on public interest (art. 6.1(e), for the legitimate purpose of the 
controller (art. 6.1(f ) GDPR), or in the context of direct marketing, or based 
on the ground of scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes 
unless the processing is necessary for public interest reasons.
7) Right to communication of a personal data breach (art. 34 GDPR). When the 
personal data breach is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms 
of natural persons, the controller shall communicate the personal data breach to 
the subject without undue delay. Moreover, there is also a provision to notify the 
breach to the Data Protection Authority (art. 33 GDPR).
8) Right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority (art. 77 GDPR). Right 
to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority, in particular in the Member 
State of his or her habitual residence, place of work or place of the alleged in-
fringement in the case of considering a processing that infringes the regulation. 
There is also the right to an effective judicial remedy against a supervisory au-
thority (art. 78 GDPR).
9) Right to an effective judicial remedy against a controller or processor (art. 79 
GDPR). Right to an effective judicial remedy against a controller or processor 
before the courts of the Member State where the controller or processor has an 
establishment, or alternatively before the courts of the Member State where the 
data subject has his or her habitual residence, unless the controller or processor is 
a public authority of a Member State acting in the exercise of its public powers.
10) Right to a compensation and liability (art. 82 GDPR). Right to receive com-
pensation from the controller or processor for the damage suffered (material and 
non-material damage) as a result of an infringement of the GDPR. 
one of the most interesting parts of the new GDPR is the binding figure of the Data 
Protection officer (DPo). Certainly, the DPD allows the possibility for national law to 
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provide that controllers may appoint an official to act as a personal data protection officer 
(art. 18(2) DPD). The objective is to ensure the respect to the rights and freedoms of the 
data subjects in the processing operations. However, this figure was only included (as far 
as we know) in the German Federal Law on Data Protection.47 
Actually, the new regulation (GDPR) introduces this interesting figure in arts. 37, 38 
and 39. The controller and as far as we know, the processor shall designate a DPo in any 
case where: 
a) The processing is carried out by a public authority or body, except for courts acting 
in their judicial capacity; 
b) The core activities of the controller or the processor consist of processing operations 
which, by virtue of their nature, their scope and/or their purposes, require regular 
and systematic monitoring of data subjects on a large scale; or
c) The core activities of the controller or the processor consist of processing a large 
scale of special categories of data pursuant to art. 9 GDPR (including health data) 
and personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences referred to in art. 
10 GDPR.
In other cases, the controller or processor or associations and other bodies repre-
senting categories of controllers or processors may or, where required by the Union or 
member State, shall designate a DPo. The DPo may act for such associations and other 
bodies representing controllers or processors (art. 37(5) GDPR). 
A group of undertakings may appoint a single DPo provided that a DPo may be 
designated for several such authorities or bodies, taking account of their organisational 
structure and size (art. 37(2) GDPR). 
Where the controller or the processor is a public authority or body, a single DPo may 
be designated for several such authorities or bodies, taking account of their organisational 
structure and size (art 37(3) GDPR). 
The DPo shall be designated on the basis of professional qualities and, in particular, 
expert knowledge of data protection law and practices and the ability to fulfil the tasks of 
art. 39 (art. 37(5) GDPR). And may be a staff member of the controller or processor, or 
fulfil the tasks on the basis of a service contract (art. 37(6) GDPR).
Finally, the controller or the processor shall publish the contact details of the DPo 
and communicate them to the supervisory authority (art. 37(7) GDPR).
Certainly, with these provisions we guess that the DPo will be a very relevant figure in 
the future from the point of view of fundamental rights protection regarding the process-
ing of data, including health ones, and it will be very important to guarantee the highest 
position in the structure to allow him or her to develop the assigned attributed tasks. In 
fact, article 38 GDPR states regarding the DPo position that the controller and proces-
47 It is pointed out by the FRA 2014 Handbook on data protection law (pages 100-101), for example: 
‘In Germany, according to Section 4f, Subsection 1 of the German Federal Data Protection Act 
(Bundesdatenschutzgesetz), privately owned companies are required to appoint an internal personal 
data protection official if they permanently employ 10 or more persons in the automated processing 
of personal data’. See FRA 2014 Handbook on data protection law, available at: http://fra.europa.
eu/en/publication/2014/handbook-european-data-protection-law (22 April 2017)
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sor shall ensure that the DPo is involved, properly and in a timely manner, in all issues 
which relate to the protection of personal data (38.1 GDPR); shall support the DPo in 
performing the tasks referred to in art. 39 by providing resources necessary to carry out 
those tasks and access to personal data and processing operations, and to maintain his/
her knowledge (art. 8(2)); shall ensure that the DPo does not receive any instructions 
regarding the exercise of those tasks. He or she shall not be dismissed or penalised by 
the controller or the processor for performing his tasks. The DPo shall directly report 
to the highest management level of the controller or the processor (art. 38(3) GDPR). 
Data subjects may contact the DPo with regard to all issues related to processing of 
their personal data and to the exercise of their rights under GDPR (art. 38(4) GDPR). 
The DPo is bound by secrecy or confidentiality about the developed tasks according to 
the national law (art. 38(5) GDPR) as a way to guarantee the protection of the rights ex-
ercised. Although the DPo may fulfil other tasks and duties, the controller or processor 
shall ensure that any such tasks and duties do not result in a conflict of interests (38(3) 
GDPR). Despite this attempt to avoid conflicts of interest, we think that it would be a 
better option to forbid the development of other tasks by the DPo in order to guarantee 
effective and correctly developed data protection tasks, due to the amount and complex-
ity, which are, according to article 39 GDPR:  
(a) to inform and advise the controller or the processor and the employees who carry 
out processing of their GDPR obligations and national data protection provi-
sions; 
(b) to monitor compliance with GDPR, other EU and national data protection pro-
visions, and with the policies of the controller or processor in relation to the 
protection of personal data, including the assignment of responsibilities, aware-
ness-raising and training of staff involved in processing operations, and the relat-
ed audits;
 (c) to provide advice where requested as regards the data protection impact assess-
ment and monitor its performance pursuant to art. 35 GDPR; 
(d) to cooperate with the supervisory authority; 
(e) to act as the contact point for the supervisory authority on issues relating to 
processing, including the prior consultation referred to in art. 36 GDPR, and to 
consult, where appropriate, with regard to any other matter.
The promotion of codes of conduct regarding the processing of personal data, in-
cluding health ones, are included both in the Directive (art. 27 DPD) and in the GDPR 
(article 40). However, the GDPR goes further including the promotion, in particular 
at the EU level, of the establishment of data protection certification mechanisms and of 
data protection seals and marks for the purpose of demonstrating compliance with this 
Regulation (art. 42 GDPR) with a voluntary character and a transparent process. 
4. Conclusions and actual challenges regarding health data treatment. As we pointed out 
at the beginning, health treatment or processing fields face ethical and legal problems 
regarding the use of data. As we know, patients can benefit from having health or med-
ical information available, and medical decisions can be more effective with a better 
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understanding of clinical histories, medical and health data. Nevertheless, we need to 
guarantee privacy (including data protection rights) and confidentiality when dealing 
with health data treatment challenges from a fundamental rights perspective. To do so, 
we need to respect the legal framework: including international, EU and national, ac-
cording to a multilevel perspective, because we live in a multilevel legal space. 
Furthermore, new technologies face health, and particularly, health data. In fact, 
actual trends in processing health data include big data challenges (Bointerpretation, 
propensity, correlations (searching quality)), Standards and Interoperability, Data Gov-
ernance and Trust, Data Expertise and Infrastructure, etc.48 But also, as we know, Inter-
net on Things (IoT) including m-Health (mobile-lifestyle and wellbeing apps),49 Mo-
bile Medicine, Cloud-computing, Electronic Patient Records (EPRs),50 etc., and the 
question of health data as an economic commodity51 are facing health data treatment. 
Therefore, health data treatment, as a biomedical data privacy space, is nowadays a mul-
ti-disciplinary space, crossing ‘ethical, legal and technical boundaries and is specialised 
to the type of data and processes being supported’.52 When addressing these challenges, 
we must keep in mind and apply the health data legal framework which we tried to 
outline in this paper. 
48 European Commission Directorate-General for Health and Consumers Unit D3 e-Health and 
Health Technology Assessment, The use of Big Data in Public Health Policy and Research, 29 Au-
gust 2014, p. 8-10, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/health//sites/health/files/ehealth/docs/
ev_20141118_co07b_en.pdf (22 April 2017)
49  European Data Protection Supervisor, opinion 1/2015, Mobile Health. Reconciling technological 
innovation with data protection, 21 May 2015, available at: https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/
our-work/publications/opinions/mobile-health_en (22 April 2017). 
50 Digital medical records focused on interoperability standards to allow healthcare and medical pro-
viders to exchange and share medical information. See BRoWN, I., “The challenges to European 
data protection laws and principles” in Comparative Study on Different approaches to new privacy 
challenges, in particular in the light of technological developments, Working Paper 1, 20 January 
2010, p. 10, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/studies/files/new_
privacy_challenges/final_report_working_paper_1_en.pdf (22 April 2017). 
51 Certainly, corporations increasingly treat personal data as a commodity, collecting, compiling and 
selling collections to others, VICToR, J. M., “The EU General Data Protection Regulation: Toward 
a Property Regime for Protecting Data Privacy”, cit. p. 517. In fact, the Uk Court allowed a com-
pany to sell pharmacy data with the consent of the patient thanks to anonymisation, see 2000, R. v. 
Department of Health, Ex Parte Source Informatics Ltd, 48. Cited in kAPLAN, B., “Selling health 
data: de-identification, privacy, and speech”, in IPS-BIoETHICS WoRkING PAPER, ISPS 14-
024, available at: http://bioethics.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/ISPS14-024.pdf (22 April 2017).
52 MALIN, B. A., EL EMAN, k., o’kEEFE, C.M., “Biomedical data privacy: problems, perspectives, 
and recent advances”, in J Am Med Inform Assoc, January 2013, v. 20, 1, p. 5. 
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to the protection of personal data
Roberto Cippitani
1. Freedom of research and respect for fundamental rights. Today one of the most powerful 
expressions of techno-science (i.e., scientific activities that affect the world through tech-
nology) is represented by genetic research.
Interest in genetics by scholars and the public has been growing ever since the ma-
nipulative power of techno-science has allowed it to not only gain greater meaning from 
genetic information1 but also to be used for intervention in the structure of life through 
techniques such as cloning and genetic editing.2
on the other hand, the law governs individual rights and duties concerning genetic 
information depending on the typology of living beings and thus on the specific interests 
to be protected3 (in respect to the EU and international legal instruments concerning 
animals and plants, see in this book V. Colcelli).
With reference to individuals, Article 1 of the Recommendation of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe, No. R (97) 5 on the Protection of Medical Data (of 
13 February 1997) considers genetic information to be “medical data”, that is, “personal 
data concerning the health of an individual”. 
As medical data, genetic information is taken into consideration by the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (approved by the Council of Europe in 
1997 in oviedo), especially by its Chapter IV on the Human Genome and by additional 
protocols.4 Within European Union law, the Charter of Fundamental Rights explicitly 
refers to genetic information in provisions Articles 3 and 21.
For individual nations, only some recently amended constitutions, such as those of 
1 An important milestone in the history of this sector is represented by the Human Genome Project, 
initiated by the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) along with a private undertaking, Celera 
Corporation, established and run by the biochemist Craig Venter.
2 See for example recent news (2 August 2017) concerning CRISPR, a technique that allows scien-
tists to make changes to genomes in order to correct disease-causing mutations in human embryos. 
Ledford H., “CRISPR” fixes embryo error. Gene-editing experiment in human embryos pushes 
scientific and ethical boundaries, in Nature, 3 August 2017, Vol. 548, pp. 13–14.
3 See Janneke H. Gerards, General Issues Concerning Genetic Information, in GERANRDS J.H., 
HERINGA A.W., and JANSEEN H.L., Genetic Discrimination and Genetic Privacy in a Compar-
ative Perspective, Itersentia, oxford, 2005, 5 ff. 
4 Several additional protocols refer to genetic information: Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings 
(1998); Human Rights and Biomedicine: Transplantation of organs and Tissues of Human origin 
(2001); Biomedical Research (2005); and Genetic Testing for Health Purposes (2008).
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Switzerland (Article 24nonies) and Portugal (Article 26.3, para. 2), make specific refer-
ence to the protection of genetic data. More typically, legal issues concerning genetic in-
formation are regulated by legislation, such as in the legal systems of France and Austria,5 
and in other legislation.6 
According to legal sources, there are at least two interests that are protected in the case 
of individuals’ genetic information. First, genetic information is considered a particularly 
important component of personality, and therefore its use must respect the dignity7 of in-
dividuals and in general their fundamental rights.8 In particular, the protection of dignity 
is necessary to prevent or punish discrimination based on genetic characteristics (Article 
11 of the Convention of oviedo and Article 21 of the EU Charter). 
Another interest taken into consideration does not concern the person but human-
kind: the intangibility of the human genome. The protection of the human genome 
is achieved from several perspectives: any alteration of human genetic patrimony (see 
Article 16-4 of the French Civil Code) in a transmissible manner (see the Universal Dec-
laration on the Human Genome and Human Rights of UNESCo of 1997 and Article 
13 of the Convention of oviedo) is prohibited. This, in particular, concerns whether 
such modifications arise from scientific practices (see article 57 of the new Argentine 
Civil Code, which prohibits all scientific or therapeutic practices aiming at genetically 
modifying the human embryo). 
Reproductive cloning of human beings is also considered unlawful under Article 3 of 
the EU Charter and Article 16-4 of the French Civil Code). 
Furthermore, supranational sources consider it “important to exclude unequivocally 
from patentability processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of human be-
ings and processes for cloning human beings” (see recitals no. 40 Directive 98/44/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions; see also Article 6, para. 2.b of the directive). 
Protection of genetic identity is considered as a safeguard of human identity.9
5 In particular, French law regulates the use of genetic data through Chapter III of Title I of the Civil 
Code concerning “De l’examen des caractéristiques génétiques d’une personne et de l’identification d’une 
personne par ses empreintes génétiques” (examining the genetic characteristics of a person and his/her 
identification using genetic prints), which was introduced by laws concerning bioethics, the last 
one being Law 2011-267 of 14 March 2011. About the French loi de bioétique, see CIPPITANI 
R., “Principi e metodo nella revisione della normativa francese relativa alla bioetica”, in Diritto di 
Famiglia e delle Persone, 2012, pp. 1836–1865; Id., “La nueva ley Francesa en tema de bioética en 
el contexto europeo”, in Criminogenesis, 2011, pp. 199–214.
6 With respect to Swiss law, see the Federal Law on Human Genetic Testing, approved in 2004 and en-
tered into force on 1 April 2007. In Germany in recent years a law concerning genetic diagnostics was 
approved (Gendiagnostikgesetz - GenDG) and entered into force on 1 February 2010. See DIURNI A., 
“Esperienze di regolamentazione della diagnostica genetica”, in Danno e Resp., 2010, 7, 660.
7 FALCoNE A., “La tutela del patrimonio genetico umano, fra Costituzione e diritti. Verso la For-
mazione di un Corpus Iuris sul genoma umano”, Rubettino, Catanzaro, 2012, p. 17.
8 RUGGERI A., “Nuovi Diritti fondamentali e tecniche di positivizzazione”, in Politica del Diritto, 
n. 2, 1993, p. 183.
9 ECJ, judgement of 18 october 2011, C-34/10, oliver Brüstle/Greenpeace eV, ECLI:EU:C:2011:669, 
para. 33.
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2. Protection of genetic information through the discipline of privacy. As mentioned in the 
previous paragraph, among the interests protected by law in respect to human genetic 
information, personality in its more intimate aspects is of primary importance.
Due to the ethical and legal issues concerning these kinds of interests, this chapter 
is focused on the legal aspects of scientific research carried out on genetic information. 
From that perspective, legal sources consider genetic information as “personal data” re-
lated to the health of a person. Therefore, the main legal instrument for the protection 
of fundamental rights associated with genetic data is represented by the discipline of 
privacy. 
At the European level, early legal sources concerning the protection of personal data, 
such as the Strasbourg Convention no. 108 on the Protection of Individuals with regard 
to the Automatic Processing of Personal Data of 1981 of the Council of Europe (herein-
after referred to as “Convention no. 108”), as well as Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Union of 24 october 1995, do not explicitly consider genetic information. 
However, they include references to data that can also involve genetic data. Article 8, 
para. 1, of the directive, especially, takes into consideration “personal data revealing racial 
or ethnic origin, and (…) data concerning health”. Such data are considered “sensitive” 
because they may reveal particularly intimate aspects of the life of a person. on these 
grounds, the processing of those data can be prohibited or subject to special control by 
authorities, in order to guarantee the reinforced protection provided by the directive (see 
also Article 6 of the Convention no. 108).
In any case, the qualification of genetic information as personal data has been con-
firmed in the literature10 and by documents issued by supranational bodies.
The Explanatory Memorandum of Recommendation No. R (97) 5 of the Committee 
of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the protection of medical data states that “For 
the purposes of the recommendation, the drafters of the recommendation considered that 
most of the principles should apply to genetic data as well as to medical data” (para. 41). 
The appendix to that recommendation provides a definition of genetic data (among the 
medical ones) and affirms that the text “refers to all data on the carrying of any genetic 
information (genes) in an individual or genetic line relating to any aspect of health or 
disease, whether present as identifiable characteristics or not”.
Additionally, the Working Document on Genetic Data, adopted on 17 March 2004 
by the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party,11 states that genetic information must 
be considered as personal data (para. III, p. 5). 
Today, the new Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of 27 April 2016 of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council (General Data Protection Regulation), which will soon replace 
the directive, explicitly considers genetic information as “personal data” (Article 4, 1), de-
fining the information as “data relating to the inherited or acquired genetic characteristics 
of a natural person which give unique information about the physiology or the health of 
that natural person” (Article 4, no. 13). 
10 D’AMICo M., “Il trattamento pubblico dei dati sensibili: la disciplina italiana a confronto con il 
modello europeo”, in Il diritto comunitario e degli scambi internazionali, Vol. n. 4, 2002, p. 817 ff.
11 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2004/wp91_en.pdf.
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Article 9, para. 2, of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 confirms the qualification of genetic 
data as “sensitive”, establishing the prohibition of their processing if some conditions are 
not met.
As a consequence of the reference to the discipline of privacy, it is possible to apply to 
genetic information the rules concerning collection, processing, and storage of personal 
data, especially those that must be considered sensitive.
However, as explained in the subsequent paragraphs, the discipline of protection of 
personal data has deviated from the general discipline concerning privacy due to the fact 
that data are processed with scientific research purposes and, also, that research is carried 
out on genetic information.
3. Scientific purposes. According to Article 5, para. 1 of Regulation (EU) 2106/679, per-
sonal data must be collected lawfully (let. a) and only to achieve specific proposes, and 
must be processed in a way that is compatible with those purposes (so called “finality 
principle”). Not all purposes are acceptable.12 Pursuant to Article 5 of the International 
Declaration of UNESCo on Human Genetic Data of 2003 (hereinafter referred to as 
“Declaration of UNESCo”), the scopes available for the use of genetic data are those 
concerning health and criminal investigations, that is to say, diagnosis and health care, 
including screening and predictive testing; and forensic medicine with regard to civil, 
criminal, and other legal proceedings.
Furthermore, any other purpose consistent with legal definitions and requirements 
is admissible if it does not violate fundamental rights (see for example Article 20 of the 
Recommendation CM/Rec(2015)5 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on 
the processing of personal data in the context of employment).
Among other purposes, research activities may represent a legitimate purpose to col-
lect and process genetic information, as legal sources explicitly establish, at different lev-
els. In particular, Article 5 (ii) of the Declaration of UNESCo considers “medical and 
scientific research”, that is to say medical and other scientific research, including epidemi-
ological research, especially population-based genetic studies, as well as anthropological 
or archaeological studies, to be legitimate.
Research concerning genetic information is also accepted by supranational legislation 
(Article 8, para. 3 of Directive 95/46/EC) and by national laws (see Article 16-10 and 
16-11 of the French Civil Code; see also the Italian “Garante per la protezione dei dati 
personali”, General Authorisation No. 8/2012 of 15 December 2016, para. 3).
Generally speaking, the acceptability of scientific purposes arises from the relevance 
assumed by science for society and legal systems. Today, national and supranational con-
stitutions, as well as international legal agreements, consider academic activity, and es-
pecially research, as a fundamental freedom (see mainly Article 13 of the EU Charter).13
12 The processing of genetic information for purposes not legally recognised may be punished by crim-
inal law, as is the case in France for those requesting genetic testing on themselves or others, outside 
the cases authorized by law (see Article 226-28-1 penal code).
13 For commentary on this disposition, see MoLINA DEL Pozo F. and ARCHoNTAkI C., 
“Liber tad de artes y de Investigación Científica, Libertad de Cátedra”, In ALVAREz LEDESMA M. 
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This freedom is considered necessary for the benefit of humankind. As stated by Arti-
cle 2 of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights of UNE-
SCo of 1997, the “benefits from advances in biology, genetics and medicine, concerning 
the human genome, shall be made available to all” (Article 2.a) and “Freedom of research, 
which is necessary for the progress of knowledge, is part of freedom of thought. The appli-
cations of research, including applications in biology, genetics and medicine, concerning 
the human genome, shall seek to offer relief from suffering and improve the health of 
individuals and humankind as a whole.” (see letter b). According to Article 14 of that 
declaration, states have the obligation to grant the exercise of such freedom. 
Sub-constitutional legislation also underlines the importance of research. This is par-
ticularly clear in the field of personal data and especially in the EU’s General Data Pro-
tection Regulation. As in other EU directives during the last thirty years, research is 
considered as the fulcrum of European integration. This is explained by the institutional 
documents of the Lisbon strategy of 2000 and today in “Europe 2020”.14
In particular, the General Data Protection Regulation (see recital no. 159 mentioned 
above) underlines the importance of the circulation of information for the building of 
the European Research Area (hereinafter referred to as “ERA”), as provided for by Article 
179, para. 1, TFU, “in which researchers, scientific knowledge and technology circulate 
freely”.
ERA is not only a dimension of the internal market, but also the expression of a cul-
tural pillar on which the European integration process should be built. As a matter of fact, 
the regulation itself affirms that “the legitimate expectations of society for an increase of 
knowledge should be taken into consideration” (recital no. 113) and also points out that 
“To meet the specificities of processing personal data for scientific research purposes, spe-
cific conditions should apply in particular as regards the publication or otherwise disclo-
sure of personal data in the context of scientific research purposes” (recital 159 as above). 
Due to the above-mentioned reasons, and especially on the bases of the particulari-
ties of research activities, the European discipline concerning protection of personal data 
provides some specific derogations or exceptions to data use in the case of processing of 
personal data for scientific purposes.
4. Scientific purposes and exceptions to the rule of consent. on the ground of the qualifica-
tion as “personal data” (see Article 4, nn. 1 and 13, Regulation (EU) 2016/679), genetic 
information should be under the control of the “data subject”, who is entitled to give her/
his “informed, free, express, specific and documented consent of the person” (Convention 
of oviedo, see in particular Article 14) for processing such data (see also Article 6, letter 
d, Declaration of UNESCo).15
I. and CIPPITANI R. (coord.), Diccionario analítico de Derechos humanos e integración jurídica, 
ISEG, Roma-Perugia-México, 2013, pp. 361–367.
14 Communication, Europe 2020, A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, CoM(2010) 
2020 final, 3 March 2010.  on the legal issues of a knowledge-based society, see CIPPITANI R. 
(editor), El Derecho en la Sociedad del Conocimiento, ISEG, Roma-Perugia, 2012.
15 About informed consent to use personal genetic information, see CIPPITANI R., “Consent to the 
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According to the definition provided for by Article 2(iii) of the Declaration of UNE-
SCo, consent is the “specific, informed and express permission that a person freely gives 
for his genetic data to be collected, processed, used and preserved” (see also Article 2 (j) 
of the Directive 2001/20/EC on clinical trials).16
Due to the qualification of genetic information as “personal health data”, the subject’s 
consent should be not only clear (see Article 4, no. 11 of the General Data Protection 
Regulation), but also explicit.17 This is because legal texts state that the form of expression 
of consent should depend on the importance of the interests to be protected.18
Explicit written consent is needed in the case of the individual’s participation in bi-
omedical scientific research (see Convention of oviedo, Article 16, v), especially when 
research activities are related to genetic information (see the General authorisation no. 
8/2012 para. 6; see also Article 16-10 of the Code Civil, and also in French Law Article L. 
1131-1 of the Code Santé Publique, hereinafter “CSP”).
In particular, consent is needed when the genetic data are “stored for diagnostic and 
health care purposes and for medical and other scientific research purposes, unless other-
wise provided for by domestic law for compelling reasons and consistent with the inter-
national law of human rights” (see Article 22).
Furthermore, Article 8, para. 2 of the EU Charter states that “Everyone has the right 
of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have 
it rectified”. 
However, the individual’s consent and the linked rights on personal data may be sub-
ject to several exceptions to safeguard other interests recognised by constitutional norms. 
Privacy should be coordinated with these other important freedoms or rights recognised 
by constitutional norms.
National or supranational legislation may impose limitations to some rights in order 
to protect personal data, for reasons such as national security; defence; public security; 
prevention, investigation, detection, and prosecution of criminal offences or breaches of 
ethics for regulated professions; important economic or financial interests; or the protec-
tion of data subjects or of the rights and freedoms of others.
Moreover, legal sources provide an important set of exceptions in case personal infor-
mation is used in scientific activities.19 
The necessity for exceptions to the right of consent arises from the features of research, 
the development of which depends on the availability of data. In fact, public policies 
Use of Genetic Information: Between Respect of Privacy and Protection of other Fundamental 
Interests”, in Diritto e Processo/Right and Remedies/Derecho y Proceso, 2014, pp. 493–532.
16 See SASSI A., “Derechos patrimonialmente neutros”, in Mario ALVAREz LEDESMA M. I. and 
CIP PITANI R. (edit by), Diccionario analítico de Derechos humanos e integración jurídica..., pp. 
213–218.
17 See WP131 - Working Document on the processing of personal data relating to health in electronic 
health records (EHR).
18 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent, Adopt-
ed on 13 July 2011, para. III.A.3; available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wp-
docs/2011/wp187_en.pdf.
19 See Commission, Open Innovation, Open Science, Open to the World - a vision for Europe, Bruxelles, 2016.
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limiting access to data20 may adversely affect scientific research, especially in the case of 
genetics.21 For these reasons, legislation on privacy provides some limits to the rights of 
data subjects.
Directive 95/46/EC established that member states can be “authorized, when justified 
by grounds of important public interest, to derogate from the prohibition on processing 
sensitive categories of data where important reasons of public interest so justify in areas 
such as public health and social protection (…) scientific research and government statis-
tics” (recital no. 34 of the Preamble).
Such derogations from the general rules were possible in two cases: rights of the data 
subject when the information is not obtained directly by the data subject her/himself 
(Article 11, para. 1); and the right of access in order to know how the data are processed, 
as well as rights of rectification, erasure, or blocking (see Article 12, para. 1). In those 
cases, legislation of member states was allowed to provide derogations from the data sub-
jects’ rights when these data were used for scientific purposes. In the first case, exceptions 
were possible if “the provision of (…) information proves impossible or would involve a 
disproportionate effort or if recording or disclosure is expressly laid down by law”. In the 
case of the rights of access, limitations of the data subjects’ rights were authorised by the 
EU directive for processing solely for scientific research purposes (see Article 13, para. 3).
The new regulation concerning protection of personal data aims at establishing a more 
general framework of derogations from the rights of the data subject.
Regulation no. 2016/679 considers the same case of Article 11, para. 1, of the direc-
tive, establishing for research activities a derogation from the rights of the data subject if 
the data are collected from sources other than the latter (see Article 14, para. 5, Regula-
tion 2016/679; see also recitals nn. 61 and 62). Furthermore, in a wider perspective than 
the directive, the regulation establishes that when “personal data are processed for scien-
tific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes”, European and national laws 
may provide derogations from the rights normally belonging to the data subjects such as 
the right of access (Article 15); right to rectification (Article 16); right to restriction of 
processing (Article 18), and the right to object (Article 21).
Laws may also establish a derogation from the right to erasure (the right to be forgot-
ten), established by Article 17, para. 1, of Regulation (EU) 2016/679: “The data subject 
shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data concerning 
him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have the obligation to erase per-
sonal data without undue delay”.
Derogations from the rights usually recognised to data subjects are also provided for 
by documents of the Council of Europe’s bodies. For instance, Article 8, para. 2.d, of Rec-
20 LoWRANCE W. and CoLLINS F. S., “Identifiability in Genomic Research”, in Science, 3 August 
2007, vol. 317, pp. 600–602.
21 See the conclusions of GYMREk M., McGUIRE A., GoLAN D., HAPERIN E. and ERLICH 
Y., “Identifying Personal Genomes by Surname Inference”, in Science, 18 Jan 2013, vol. 339, Issue 
6117, pp. 321–324; and also the editorial in Nature concerning research on science titled “Genetic 
Privacy”. (“The ability to identify an individual from their anonymous genome sequence, using a 
clever algorithm and data from public databases, threatens the principle of subject confidentiality.”) 
Nature, 24 January 2013, vol. 493, p. 451.
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ommendation R(97) states that access to medical data (including genetic data) and the 
right of rectification may be refused when “the data are used for statistical or for scientific 
research purposes where there is clearly no risk of an infringement of the privacy of the 
data subject, notably the possibility of using the data collected in support of decisions or 
measures regarding any particular individual”.
Therefore, according to EU law, once genetic information is processed within scientif-
ic activities, the data subject loses her/his power over the information, as provided for on 
the contrary in other cases of processing of personal data.
Such limitations are justified from both subjective and objective points of view: staff 
dealing with genetic information must be professionally qualified (see for example para. 
14 of the Declaration of Helsinki, Article 3, para., lett. a, Directive 2001/20/EC)22 and 
must respect “relevant professional obligations and standards” (see Article 14 of the Con-
vention of oviedo); the activities carried out must be qualified as “research”.
According to the latter condition, due to the favourable legal and political context, 
“research” and “research purposes” should be considered in a broad manner, in accordance 
with EU law, therefore “including for example technological development and demon-
stration, fundamental research, applied research and privately funded research” (recital 
no. 159, Regulation 2016/679).
In order to avoid any doubt, research activities must be formalised in a project (see 
para. 4, Authorisation no. 8 of the Italian Garante) that has to be drawn up in accordance 
with the standards of the relevant disciplinary field, in order to provide evidence that 
the processing of data and the use of biological samples are carried out for suitable and 
effective scientific purposes.
5. Further uses. Normally, legal sources provide a “specific consent”, meaning that the data 
subject is entitled to give her/his authorisation for any specific use of personal data, in or-
der to achieve a more complete safeguard of the autonomy of persons. In addition to the 
aforesaid dispositions of the Convention of oviedo and of the Declaration of UNESCo, 
the specificity of consent is provided within EU legislation, such as by Article 8, para. 2 
of the EU Charter, which states that “[personal] data must be processed fairly for specified 
purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate 
basis laid down by law.” Article 4, no. 11 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 provides likewise.
Therefore, the discipline of protecting personal data is based on the rules of “granular-
ity”,23 that is to say the necessity that the consent should be given for limited aims and for 
specific situations.24 When the purposes of processing or the situation of the data subject 
change, the person should be requested to express a new consent.
22 Freedom of research is different from freedom of expression, because it is recognised only to quali-
fied persons acting within academic institutions or undertakings, who have the necessary skills and 
instruments. See CIPPITANI R., “Academic Freedom as a Fundamental Right”. In: 1st Interna-
tional Conference on Higher Education Advances, HEAd’15, Universitat Politècnica de València, 
Valencia, 24–26 June 2015, Universitat Politècnica de València, pp. 552–558.
23 See para. III.A.1 of the Advice 15/2011 on the definition of consent, ref. 
24 Ibidem. 
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This is what emerges, for example, from the Recommendation of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe Rec (2006) 4 of 15 March 2006, concerning research 
on biological material of human origin. Article 12, paragraph 1 required that biological 
material collected for purposes other than scientific research (i.e., for therapeutic pur-
poses) could not be used without consent or authorisation. Thus, when the subsequent 
activity is “substantially different” as regards the authorised individual,25 new consent 
should be given.
Consent should not be given without time limits. EU documents set forth that those 
responsible for the processing of personal data shall re-ask the person to confirm her/his 
consent26 if the situation of the data subject has changed (e.g., because a child becomes 
a teenager).27
The granularity rule may constitute an obstacle for research activities. As a matter of 
fact, the collection of data is normally realised in the frame of other activities, such as for 
diagnostic analysis, and then processed for scientific purposes. Those purposes are not 
so specifically clear at the moment of data collection, and they can change over time. 
Furthermore, the same base of data may be useful for many types of research, even in 
different fields of research (genetic data can be processed in the medical, biological, an-
thropological, and sociological fields, for example). Therefore, it could be difficult to 
acquire a consent concerning specific programmes of research, and it can be problematic 
and expensive to require consent for each specific scientific activity.
This is especially true for bio-banks activities, that is to say large collections of biological 
samples (in particular of human origin) and associated data, such as genetic information.28 
Bio-banks are established for various reasons, such as criminal investigation, therapeutic 
treatments, and research activities. Public and private interests (e.g., those of pharmacolog-
ical industries) need to maintain genetic information in bio-banks for many years. Many 
kinds of research activities with stored information could be carried out in the future, but 
they are not all known or at least foreseeable when data and biological material are collect-
ed. This makes it particularly difficult to require consent for a specific purpose and over 
the entire time that research could be undertaken with the samples and associated data.
25 Council of Europe, Explanatory report to the convention on human rights and biomedicine, 1997, para. 
214.
26 See also Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 2/2010 on online behavioural advertising, adopted on 22 
June 2010, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opin-
ion-recommendation/files/2010/wp171_en.pdf. 
27 Article 29 Working Party, Working document 1/2008 on the protection of children’s personal data, adopt-
ed on 18 February 2008. Available at http://194.242.234.211/documents/10160/10704/1531889. 
28 For an overview of European, international, and national legislation relating to bio-banks, see, among 
others, TESÓN I. V., “Bioresearch, Biobanks and Informed Consent from Vulnerable Donors in 
Spanish Law”, in Europa e Diritto private, 2013, p. 1069 ff.; SCAFFARDI L., “Legal Protection 
and Ethical Management of Genetic Databases: Challenges of the European Process of Harmoni-
zation”, in European Legal Integration: The New Italian Scholarship, Jean Monnet Working Paper 
19/08, New York University School of Law, New York, 2008; GoDARD B., SCHMIDTkE J., 
CASSIMAN J.J. and AYMÉ S., “Data storage and DNA banking for biomedical research: informed 
consent, confidentiality, quality issues, ownership, return of benefits. A professional perspective”, in 
European Journal of Human Genetics, 2003, 11, Suppl 2, S88–S122.
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For those reasons, studies in the literature and praxis suggest more flexible approaches. 
Furthermore, from an institutional point of view, in recent years we can observe a tenden-
cy to mitigate the principle of granularity.
It is possible to find solutions that refer to enlarged or broad consent (for a range 
of broadly defined uses); to presumed consent (where people who do not want to be 
involved have to opt out voluntarily); and, in some cases, also “blanket consent”, that is 
to say consent to whatever future use has been outlined. According to the latter, which 
seems the furthest removed from specific consent, the World Health organisation, in a 
document of 1998, admits that “[a] blanket informed consent that would allow use of 
sample for genetic research in general, including future as yet unspecified projects appears 
to be the most efficient and economical approach, avoiding costly re-contact before each 
new research project”.29 It would seem that this approach should be put in place to grant 
protection of personal data30; the more widely used approach, however, is broad consent.
Therefore, the Recommendation of 2016 of the Committee of Ministers of the Coun-
cil of Europe has replaced the obligation to give information concerning each research 
activity (as established by Article 10, para. 2 of the Recommendation of 2012) with the 
duty to inform the data subject about a more general “nature of any envisaged research 
use” (Article 10, para. 1, Recommendation of 2016).
Also, the Draft Explanatory Memorandum to the Draft Recommendation on Re-
search on Biological Materials of Human origin, of the Committee on Bioethics (DH-
BIo) of the Council of Europe of 2015, specifies that when human biological materials 
or associated personal data are collected, it is good practice to obtain the consent to their 
use for future research, even in cases where the specific research is not known. If future 
research cannot be identified, the consent should not be unconditional (i.e., a blanket 
consent) but should be as specific as possible, given the knowledge at the time consent is 
obtained.31 
At the national level, for example, the Uk Ethics and Governance Framework pro-
vides explicitly that “[b]ecause it will be impossible to anticipate all future research uses, 
consent will be sought for research in general that is consistent with Uk Biobank’s stated 
purpose (rather than for specific research)”. A “[f ]urther consent will be sought for any 
proposed activities that do not fall within the existing consent”.
other examples of the implementation of broad consent can be found in the German 
29 World Health organisation, Proposed international guidelines on ethical issues in medical genetics 
and genetic services, 1998,  p. 13, available at http://www.who.int/genomics/publications/en/ethi-
calguidelines1998.pdf .
30 Ibidem.
31 See Article 12, para. 48 of the Draft Explanatory Memorandum to the Draft Recommendation on 
Research on Biological Materials of Human origin of Steering Committee on Bioethics: “When 
biological materials of human origin and personal data are collected it is best practice to ask the 
sources for their consent to future use, even in cases where the specifics of the future research pro-
jects are unknown. If future research use of biological materials of human origin and personal data 
cannot be specifically anticipated, the consent should not be framed too broadly in order to prevent 
unconditional, “blanket” consent. The request for consent should be as explicit as possible in regard 
to the future research uses of the biological material of human origin and personal data”.
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Nationaler Ethikrat of 200432 as well as in the Code of Practice of the Uk Human Tissue 
Authority of 2006 and in Swedish,33 Icelandic, and Estonian laws that allow a broad de-
scription of the purposes of research. The Spanish law on biomedical research34 provides 
the possibility to give consent for specific research projects even if they are carried out by 
other subjects.35 
Additionally. the EU regulation concerning privacy considers the hypothesis that it is 
not possible to fully identify the purpose of personal data processing for scientific research 
at the time of data collection. In that case, data subjects should be allowed to give their 
consent within certain areas of scientific research, if recognised ethical standards for scien-
tific research will be observed (recital no. 33, Regulation (EU) no. 2016/679).
on the other hand, Regulation no. 2106/679 and other European sources extend the 
effectiveness of consent. If the principle of purpose limitation prescribes that “the pro-
cessing of personal data for purposes other than those for which the personal data were 
initially collected should be allowed only where the processing is compatible with the 
purposes for which the personal data were initially collected” (recital no. 50), nevertheless 
“further processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical 
research purposes or statistical purposes shall, in accordance with Article 89(1), not be 
considered to be incompatible with the initial purposes” (Article 5, para. 1, let. b) Regu-
lation 2016/679).36 For these types of purposes, to be a sort of presumed consent is given.
The same approach is chosen by the Council of Europe in the draft of the Recom-
mendation on the Protection of Health-Related Data, which will replace the above-men-
tioned recommendation of 1997 (see Article 4.1.b); this also seems to consider it difficult 
to provide detailed information to the data subject about the use of health-related data at 
the time of collection (see Article 11.2).
In application of the model of presumed consent, the Italian Authority of Privacy, 
in its General Authorisation No. 8/2014 for the Processing of Genetic Data, allows pro-
cessing research for scientific purposes “directly linked” to the original one. otherwise, 
processing is authorised only if samples are anonymised or in the case of a new consent, 
but in the absence of the latter consent can be authorised by the relevant ethics committee 
32 Nationaler Ethikrat, Biobanken für die Forschung. Stellunghame, 2004, Berlin, available at www.
ethikrat.org/_english/publications/opinion_Biobanks-for-research.pdf. 
33 The Recommendation R(2006)4 of the Council of Europe was inspired by the Uk Human Tissue 
Act of 2004 and by the linked code of practice issued by the Human Tissue Authority of January 
2006. In particular, point 106 of the Code of Practice Consent provides that “consent can be gen-
eral, i.e. if someone consents to the use of tissue for research, it need not be limited to a particular 
project”. See also para. 90 stating that “consent should be generic where appropriate”.
34 Ley no. 14/2007, de Investigación biomédica, of 3 July 2007.
35 See Article 60, para. 1: “El consentimiento sobre la utilización de la muestra biológica se otorgará, bien 
en el acto de obtención de la muestra, bien con posterioridad, de forma específica para una investigación 
concreta. 2. El consentimiento específico podrá prever el empleo de la muestra para otras líneas de investi-
gación relacionadas con la inicialmente propuesta, incluidas las realizadas por terceros. Si no fuera este el 
caso, se solicitará al sujeto fuente que otorgue, si lo estima procedente, un nuevo consentimento”.
36 By EU and national laws. An example of such national provisions is the Austrian Data Protection 
Act (Datenschutzgesetz), Federal Law Gazette No. 165/1999, para. 46, available in English at www.
dsk.gv.at/DocView.axd?CobId=41936.
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and authority. However, it may not be simple to identify either the meaning of the “link” 
or who has control over the compliance. 
Another solution regarding research can be found in the Recommendation of 2016 of 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in case of collection of biological 
material. In that hypothesis, the material “should only be used in a research project if the 
latter is within the scope of the consentor authorisation given by the person concerned” 
(Article 21, para. 1). However, if the proposed use will not be within the scope of prior 
consent or authorisation, if any, given by the person concerned, reasonable efforts should 
be made to contact the person concerned (para. 2.a), and the process must be subject to 
an independent evaluation (para. 2.b).
6. Storage of genetic data and data retention. Storage and retention of personal data are reg-
ulated in a special manner when they are put in place within research activities. Although 
the discipline of privacy does not establish a fixed term for storing data, it provides for 
rules that are incompatible with long-time storage, such as the above-mentioned right to 
be forgotten and the right to withdraw, as well as the principle of “storage limitation”, 
according to which data must “[be] kept in a form which permits identification of data 
subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are 
processed” (Article 5, para. 1.e, Regulation (EU) 2016/679). Also in this case, scientific 
purposes allow exceptions from rules concerning data processing in general.
As explained above, it is very important for current scientific activities to have ac-
cess to data and materials included in long-term collections. Regulation no. 2016/679 
takes into consideration the need of science to collect information and to store it (also 
for historical research purposes, see recital no. 160). The reason to improve archiving 
is explained by recital no. 157 of the new regulation: “By coupling information from 
registries, researchers can obtain new knowledge of great value with regard to widespread 
medical conditions such as cardiovascular disease, cancer and depression. on the basis of 
registries, research results can be enhanced, as they draw on a larger population. Within 
social science, research on the basis of registries enables researchers to obtain essential 
knowledge about the long-term correlation of a number of social conditions, such as un-
employment and education with other life conditions. Research results obtained through 
registries provide solid, high-quality knowledge which can provide the basis for the for-
mulation and implementation of knowledge-based policy, improve the quality of life for 
a number of people and improve the efficiency of social services”.37
Public interest and the use for research are considered legitimate grounds for storing 
health-linked personal data, including genetic data, for a longer period (see Article 4.1.f 
draft Recommendation on the Protection of Health-Related Data). In respect to the rule 
that personal data cannot be stored longer than it is necessary, national law should lay 
37 In the case of historical research purposes, the value of the archiving is underlined by recital no. 158, 
where it states that “Member States should also be authorised to provide for the further processing 
of personal data for archiving purposes, for example with a view to providing specific information 
related to the political behaviour under former totalitarian state regimes, genocide, crimes against 
humanity, in particular the Holocaust, or war crimes”.
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down “more detailed provisions, including the necessary safeguards, to reconcile the in-
terest in scientific research with the right to data protection”,38 and “keeping data for 
future scientific, historical or statistical use is explicitly exempt from the principle of 
limited data retention.”39
With respect to the right to erase, as mentioned above, the regulation provides a spe-
cific exception in consideration of research purposes. As a matter of fact, Article 17, para. 
1.b provides the right to erase (the “right to be forgotten”) “where there is no other legal 
ground for the processing”. As stated above, scientific purposes are considered the ground 
for not applying the rights provided under Article 17. According to the right to withdraw, 
Article 7, para. 3 establishes that “The data subject shall have the right to withdraw his 
or her consent at any time”. However, the same provision states that “The withdrawal of 
consent shall not affect the lawfulness of processing based on consent before its withdraw-
al”. Therefore, it seems that ongoing research activities at least should not be affected by 
the withdrawal of consent. 
When biological material is collected in addition to data, Recommendation CM/
Rec(2016)6 of the Committee of Ministers on research on biological materials of human 
origin provides for the right to withdraw “in the manner foreseen by law” (see in particu-
lar Article 13), but it also states, in regard to informing the person prior to removing the 
material, that “This information should also include any possible limitation on withdraw-
al of the consent or authorisation” (Article 10, para. 2).
It should be emphasised that the guarantee of withdrawal of consent, due to the con-
siderable size achieved by bio-banks and the continuous exchange of materials and data 
among researchers, is weak and difficult to concretise, especially as far as the information 
dimension is concerned. In this regard, Spanish law no. 14/2007 concerning biomedical 
research states that, in case of withdrawal, biological samples will be destroyed. However, 
the data obtained in the preceding phases can be maintained.40
7. Specificity of genetic information. As research activities are carried out using genetic in-
formation, it is necessary to consider some further specific issues. Although genetic infor-
mation is protected by legislation concerning personal data, the Declaration of UNESCo 
as well as other documents (see paragraph 2 of the Working Document on Genetic Data 
of 2004) recognise it as having a “particular status”. Some scholars do not agree with the 
presumed particularity of genetic information, increasing the resistance of public opinion 
in respect to genetic technologies.41
38 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Council of Europe, Handbook on European data 
protection law, Luxembourg: Publications office of the European Union, 2014, p. 31.
39 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Council of Europe, Handbook on European data 
protection law, … p. 73.
40 Article 60.3: “El consentimiento podrá ser revocado […] en cualquier momento. Cuando la revocación 
se refiera a cualquier uso de la muestra, se procederá a su inmediata destrucción, sin perjuicio de la con-
servación de los datos resultantes de las investigaciones que se hubiesen realizado con carácter previo”.
41 RICHARDS M. P.M., “How distinctive is genetic information?”, in Studies in the History and 
Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 2001, 32, pp. 663–687.
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Indeed, so-called “genetic exceptionalism” has been criticised due to the exaggerated 
view of the significance of genetic information in people’s lives, based on an unacceptable 
genetic determinism and genetic reductionism.42 Nevertheless, the special status of genet-
ic data may be observed in relation to several cases.
As a matter of fact, genetic information is different from other types of information, 
due to the fact that it identifies a specific individual in a permanent way (“immutability”) 
and it is predictive of predisposition to diseases (“predictability”). Furthermore, genetic 
information belongs not only to the concerned person but also to people sharing the same 
genetic patrimony (“familiarity”).43 For example, in regard to the use of genetic data in 
criminal investigations, it has been argued that “DNA samples or profiles are intrinsically 
‘more private’ objects or their collection involves greater infringement of bodily integrity 
than, for example, fingerprints or photographs.” 44
DNA is akin to a “future diary” of persons (it includes information about our present 
and future medical conditions), and the right of protection from unwanted “readership” 
must be imperative in order to maintain autonomous control of personal and sensitive 
information.45
The above-mentioned features of genetic information should lead to a specific regula-
tion, also taking into account the great risks of misuse and/or re-use for various purposes 
and the risks of discrimination and stigmatization that may affect the individual. Moreo-
ver, some authors underline that the discipline of privacy can cover only some aspects of 
the protection of genetic information and related rights.46 At least some issues may arise 
from the use of genetic information especially in the context of research activities: infor-
mation to be provided to the data subject, relativity of anonymisation, and the rights of 
other subjects.
A) Information to be provided to the data subject. 
Despite the limitations of the rights of data subjects in the context of scientific activ-
ity, the fact that research is carried out on genetic information may lead to solving other 
problems. The special informative content of genetic data has important consequences 
on the right of the data subject to know or not to know the implications of such data for 
future health. 
42 MURRAY T.H., “Genetic Exceptionalism and Future Diaries: Is genetic Information Different from 
other Medical Information”, in RoTHSTEIN M.A., Genetic Secrets: Protecting Privacy and Confi-
dentiality in the Genetic Era, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1997, pp. 60–73, in particular p. 71.
43 on the co-shared nature of genetic information, see TAYLoR M.J., “Data Protection, Shared (Ge-
netic) Data and Genetic Discrimination”, in Medical Law International, 8, 1, 2006, p. 51.
44 WILLIAMS R., JoHNSoN P.  and MARTIN P., “Genetic information and crime investigation: 
social, ethical and public policy aspects of the establishment, expansion and police use of the Na-
tional DNA Database. Project Report”, Durham University, School of Applied Social Sciences, 
Durham, 2004, para. 6.2.2, p. 78
45 ANNAS G.J., “Genetic Privacy”, in LAzER D., DNA and the Criminal Justice System: The Tech-
nology of Justice, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004.
46 In particular, see TAYLoR M., “Genetic Data and the Law: A Critical Perspective on Privacy Pro-
tection”, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012, passim. 
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A first problem arises if the development of a new technique may give more informa-
tion in comparison with the past. With reference to biomedical research, such a hypoth-
esis seems to be covered by Article 24 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention of 
oviedo on Biomedical Research, which provides for the re-examination of a research pro-
ject in the “light of scientific developments or events arising in the course of the research”, 
when “research participants, or if applicable their representatives, need to be informed of 
the developments or events” (para. 2.ii). When information does not refer to the health 
of persons, it does not seem mandatory to inform the data subject.
Another problematic aspect is represented by so-called “unexpected findings”, that is, 
information that was not expected to be found during research or diagnostic practices, 
such as information on ongoing diseases or predispositions to diseases, or information 
concerning biological parenthood, and so on.
For example, the general authorisation no. 8/2012 of the Italian Garante mandates that 
the individual, before any genetic testing, must also be informed on the possible results 
of such testing, especially “with regard to unexpected findings” (para. 5.b). This caution 
should not be necessary in the processing of other kinds of sensitive data (as with political 
opinions). It is not clear what happens if information on a health situation or other infor-
mation (for example concerning filiation or paternity) arises from research activities. Prob-
ably, in these cases, the data subject has to be requested to give her or his authorisation to 
be informed, including about any unexpected findings. However, if such authorisation was 
not requested, or could not be acquired (on the ground of some above-mentioned rules), 
the problem remains whether researchers have an obligation to inform the concerned per-
sons. No obligation in this regard seems to be provided for by legislation, even if the im-
portance of health would suggest the prudence of informing the affected individuals at least 
on the existence of findings concerning diseases, and in particular about treatment options.
B) The problem of anonymisation.
Recital no. 26 of the General Data Protection Regulation clearly states that “This 
Regulation does not therefore concern the processing of such anonymous information”,47 
including for statistical or research purposes. Thus, if data might not be associated with 
a specific person, it is outside the protection of the legislation and it can be processed 
without the consent of the data subject.
Personal data may be collected in a non-anonymous way and be anonymised subse-
quently. Data “are anonymised if all identifying elements have been eliminated from a set 
of personal data. No element may be left in the information which could, by exercising 
reasonable effort, serve to re-identify the person(s) concerned”.48
47 Data are considered anonymous taking into account “means reasonably likely to be used, such as 
singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or 
indirectly. To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the natural person, 
account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required 
for identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the processing 
and technological developments” (see 26th recital of Regulation (EU) 2016/679). 
48 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Handbook on European data protection law, Lux-
embourg, 2014, p. 44.
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In addition, Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)6 of the Committee of Ministers on re-
search on biological materials of human origin supports the use of anonymisation. In fact, 
the recommendation states that “non-identifiable biological materials” (see the definition 
under Article 3, according to which they are “those biological materials which, alone or 
in combination with data, do not allow, with reasonable efforts, the identification of the 
persons from whom the materials have been removed”) “may be used in a research project 
provided that such use does not violate any restrictions defined by the person concerned 
before the materials have been rendered non-identifiable and subject to authorisation 
provided for by law” (Article 21, para. 4) and “Biological materials previously removed 
for another purpose and already non-identifiable may be stored for future research subject 
to authorisation provided for by law” (Article 11, para. 3). 
In respect to the specific case of genetic information, the Declaration of UNESCo 
states that genetic data when “collected for the purposes of scientific research should not 
normally be linked to an identifiable person. Even when such data or biological samples 
are unlinked to an identifiable person, the necessary precautions should be taken to en-
sure the security of the data or biological samples” (Article 14c).
otherwise, European law considers the alternative technique of pseudonymisation 
(see Article 4, no. 5 Regulation (EU) no. 2106/679). This occurs when the identifiers 
are replaced by pseudonyms, and the data cannot be identifiable without possession of a 
decryption key.49
Tissue and Cells Directive no. 2004/23/EC obligates member states to take all nec-
essary measures to ensure that all data, including genetic data, have been rendered anon-
ymous so that neither donors nor recipients remain identifiable (see Article 14, para. 1).
According to the General Data Protection Regulation, anonymisation and pseudony-
misation are considered ordinary measures to protect personal information in research 
activities (see Article 89). 
Additionally, the Appendix to Recommendation R(97) of the Committee of Minis-
ters considers that “Whenever possible, medical data used for scientific research purposes 
should be anonymous” and that “Professional and scientific organisations as well as public 
authorities should promote the development of techniques and procedures securing an-
onymity” (see para. 12.1).
However, the option of anonymisation, as an alternative to consent, may encoun-
ter some problems in the case of genetic information. First, anonymisation is never the 
better option from a scientific viewpoint. As shown by legal sources (see for example the 
Declaration of UNESCo on genetic data), the link to an identifiable person may be 
acceptable “if necessary to carry out the research and provided that the privacy of the in-
dividual and the confidentiality of the data or biological samples concerned are protected 
in accordance with domestic law” (Article 14d) and for a period that does not exceed the 
time needed for achieving the purposes for which they were collected or subsequently 
processed (Article 14.e).
Complete anonymisation implies some serious consequences: both data subject and 
49 See Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Convention for the Protection of Individuals 
with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Article 42. 
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researcher will lose important information and will not be able to yield follow-up results,50 
often fundamental to optimal performance of a research project.
Second, anonymity is always relative because of technical reasons. The anonymisation 
processes are likely reversible, and in principle any anonymised genetic data can be linked 
to a person. A fortiori, the situation might also occur in the case of pseudonymisation.51  
As underlined within the scientific community, “No responsible scientist can guaran-
tee absolute privacy” and “Privacy and confidentiality are important principles. But being 
identifiable has some benefits, and being anonymous has some costs; science will be better 
off when it acknowledges this reality.”52
According to some authorities, the risk of re-identification posed by genetic data 
would be considered low. As stated by Article 29 of the Working Party, treating the mat-
ter of pseudonymisation, “In that case, although data protection rules apply, the risks 
at stake for the individuals with regard to the processing of such indirectly identifiable 
information will most often be low, so that the application of these rules will justifiably 
be more flexible than if information on directly identifiable individuals were processed.”53 
However, this interpretation refers to the current state of the technique and does 
not take into consideration that it is possible to establish an association between the ge-
netic information and other pieces of information, in a way leading to identification of 
a person. As demonstrated by a study published in Science,54 it is possible, through the 
sequencing of genetic data without identifiers, to recover surnames of the data subjects 
by profiling short tandem repeats on the Y chromosome and querying genetic genealogy 
databases (as for example www.ysearch.org and www.smgf.org). Then, a specific person 
can be targeted by combining the surname with other types of metadata, such as age and 
state, easily and freely available in Internet resources. 
Therefore, it is possible, at least, to provide practical suggestions, such as those in-
cluded in para. 4.2 of Authorisation no. 8 of the Italian Privacy Authority, which states 
that where the genetic information arises from biological samples and the “temporary” 
identification of the subject is necessary, specific measures should be adopted to keep 
identification data separated from biological samples and genetic information at the time 
of collection, unless this is impossible due to the particular characteristics of the treatment 
or to the necessity to use manifestly disproportionate means. 
50 MACILoTTI M., Izzo U., PASCUzzI G. and BARBARESCHI M., “La disciplina giuridica 
delle biobanche (The Legal Aspect of Biobanks)”, in Pathologica, 2008, v. 100, pp. 86–108, particu-
larly p. 87.
51 Article 29, Data Protection Working Party, opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data, adopt-
ed on 20th June 2007, p. 18, stating that “Retraceably pseudonymised data may be considered as 
information on individuals which are indirectly identifiable. Indeed, using a pseudonym means that 
it is possible to backtrack to the individual, so that the individual’s identity can be discovered, but 
then only under predefined circumstances.”
52 ANGRIST M., “Genetic privacy needs a more nuanced approach”, in Nature, 7 February 2013, vol. 
494, p. 7.
53 Article 29, Data Protection Working Party, opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data, ref.
54 See GYMREk M. et al., “Identifying Personal Genomes by Surname Inference”, in Science, ref.
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C) Rights of other subjects.
As mentioned above, genetic information belongs not only to a specific person, but it 
is shared among persons of the same genetic group. According to Article 14 of Regulation 
(EU) 2016/679, the data subject also has the right to receive information from the con-
troller (or his/her representative) when the data have not been obtained from the afore-
said data subject. In consequence, a physician or other health professional, who found a 
risk of a genetic disease while examining the biological material of a person, might face 
the following dilemma: on the one hand he/she could be bound by the obligation of se-
crecy, as well as the right to not inform the individual. on the other hand, he/she could 
be obliged under Article 11 to provide information to the data subjects, who include 
relatives sharing the same genetic line.
There is not a clear answer to that question, neither within the discipline concerning 
privacy nor in the supranational and international legal sources. According to Article 18 
of the Additional Protocol to the Convention of oviedo on genetic testing, “Where the 
results of a genetic test undertaken on a person can be relevant to the health of other 
family members, the person tested shall be informed.” 
However, the consequences and conditions arising from that information are not 
clear. According to the above-mentioned working document on privacy, at least two sce-
narios may be imagined: “one is that other family members could also be considered as 
‘data subjects’ with all the rights that follow from this. Another option is that other family 
members would have a right of information of a different character, based on the fact that 
their personal interests may be directly affected.”
At the national level, legislation is focused on the protection of the personal data sub-
ject’s privacy, requiring his or her consent to disclose the information to relatives.55 Within 
Europe, an interesting solution is provided by French law, even if it does not directly refer to 
scientific activities. Before the last version of the law concerning bioethics (Law 814-2011), 
the legislation previously in force already established a procedure for communicating the 
results of genetic testing to family members (s. Article L. 1131-1, para. 5 CSP), without 
providing any consequence in case the person had not informed her/his relatives.56
Such an exclusion of liability appeared in conflict with constitutional principles.57 
Thus, the Conseil d’Etat in its document on the review of law concerning bioethics pro-
posed to make explicit the responsibility to inform family members about genetic abnor-
malities, while respecting medical confidentiality.58 Therefore, Article 1 of the new law 
55 GoDARD B., HURLIMANN T., LETERNDRE M. and ÉGALITÉ, “INHERIT BRCAs, Guide-
lines for disclosing genetic information to family members: From development to use”, in Familial 
Cancer, 2006, 5, pp. 103–116.
56 See BINET J.R., “Le nouveau droit de la bioéthique: Commentaire et analyse de la loi n° 2004-800 
du 6 août 2004 relative à la bioéthique”, LexisNexis, Paris, 2005, p. 30 ss.
57 See the judgement of the Conseil constitutionnel n. 82-144 DC of 22 october 1982, in www.con-
seil-constitutionnel.fr. As affirmed by the Constitutional Council, “le droit français ne comporte, en 
aucune matière, de régime soustrayant à toute réparation les dommages résultant de fautes civiles imput-
ables à des personnes physiques ou morales de droit privé, quelle que soit la gravité de ces fautes.”
58 Conseil d’État, La révision des lois de bioéthique, Paris, 2009, Cap. IV “Examen des caractéristiques 
génétiques: respecter la volonté des personnes et renforcer leur information.” According to the Conseil, 
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adds Article L.1131-1-1 to the Code de la santé publique, which states a specific duty of 
the physician to inform the person of the risks for family members in cases of diagnosis 
of a serious disease, if they were not properly informed (para. 1).
The disposition also states the duty of the person concerned to prevent the conse-
quences of genetic abnormalities for her/his relatives, when measures of prevention can be 
adopted (para. 3). The person may also decide not to be informed about the results of the 
diagnosis. In this case, if the persons concerned do not feel able to make the communica-
tion, the physician is requested to inform the relatives (para. 4). However, the doctor will 
not reveal either the name of the patient or the genetic abnormality, or the risk associated 
with it. Basically, the physician has to invite family members to take a genetic test, if he/
she envisages the existence of a potential risk.
8. Ethical principles and freedom of research on genetic information. According to the legal 
sources quoted within the previous sub-paragraphs, processing of personal data, in par-
ticular genetic information, for scientific purposes implies an exception to the discipline 
of protection of personal data. This situation is due to the characteristics of the scientific 
activities and depends on the position of science within the legal systems.
However, as a fundamental right, freedom of research also cannot be considered as ab-
solute, and therefore it must be subject to legislative limitations,59 in order to protect other 
fundamental rights. Such limitations are provided for by national constitutions (normally 
those most recent or recently amended, such as Article 118b of the Swiss Constitution; 
Article 29 of the Constitution of Bulgaria; Article 18 of the Constitution of Slovenia; and 
Article 23 of the Constitution of Croatia), and by supranational fundamental legal texts.
The Declaration of UNESCo of 1997 affirms the “responsibility” of researchers and 
their obligation to comply with principles of primary importance (such as meticulous-
ness, caution, intellectual honesty, and integrity in carrying out their research as well as in 
the presentation and utilization of their findings; see Article 13), taking into considera-
tion particular attention to research on the human genome. on the other hand, it affirms 
that states “should take appropriate steps to provide the framework for the free exercise of 
Research on the human genome with due regard for the principles set out in this Decla-
ration, in order to safeguard respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and human 
dignity and to protect public health. They should seek to ensure that research results are 
not used for non-peaceful purposes” (Article 15). 
At the continental level, the need to face the potential collision between research free-
dom and other fundamental rights can be found within the preambles of the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights as well as the Convention of oviedo. Furthermore, Article 26 
of the Convention of oviedo permits restrictions to the right to consent in biomedical 
research, if such restrictions are provided for by law and if they constitute necessary meas-
the Swiss approach—allowing the physician to be authorised by the public authorities to contact 
the relatives if the patient refuses to inform them—might affect the trust relationship between the 
professional and the patient.
59 See the Italian Corte costituzionale, judgment 4 June 1958, n. 36.
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ures, in a democratic society, for public safety, prevention of criminal offenses, protection 
of public health, or of the rights and freedoms of others.60 Such limits to freedom of 
research have to be applicable also in case of research on genetic information. 
According to Article 89 of Regulation 2016/679, both EU and national laws shall 
provide “safeguards” in order to implement exceptions due to “public interest, scientific 
or historical research purposes or statistical purposes” (see also recital no. 34 of Directive 
96/46/EC). The apparently wide derogations from privacy law, justified by scientific pur-
poses, have to be implemented on the basis of “ethics principles”, which are those rules 
aimed at making freedom of research consistent with the protection of other fundamental 
interests of the society, such as the principles of necessity, proportionality, and precaution.
In application of the principle of necessity, derogation from the law concerning data 
privacy is acceptable only when such rights likely render impossible or seriously impair 
the achievement of the objectives of the processing (see Article 14, para. 5.b; 13, para. 
3.d; 89, para. 2, Regulation (EU) 2016/679). More in general, processing of genetic data 
is allowed only when their protection is guaranteed (see recital no. 52 of Regulation no. 
2016/679) and where it respects “the essence of the right to data protection and provide 
for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and the interests of 
the data subject” (see Article 9, para. 2, let. j).
Article 9 of the regulation implicitly quotes Article 52s, para. 1 of the EU Charter, 
which, indeed, states that limitations to the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised 
by the charter must be provided for by law and must be necessary. In respect to the pro-
tection of personal data, this principle is affirmed in the case law of the Court of Justice, 
such as in the judgement Tele2 Sverige AB (see in particular para. 100).61
With reference to biomedical research, necessity entails that there is no alternative to 
involving persons (especially vulnerable ones) in research activities (see Article 16 of the 
Convention of oviedo, points iv and v). Also, the principles of necessity imply that the 
actual benefits have to be evident, taking into account that “the very nature of biomedical 
research means that it is uncertain whether an individual will benefit from research par-
ticipation and any benefit to the person is not the main purpose of research.”62
(per evitare ripetizione con “in the case” qllq riga sotto) In any case, the conditions of 
absence of alternatives and evidence of benefits should be applicable only in the case of 
60 ANDoRNo R., “The right not to know: an autonomy based approach”, in Journal of Medical 
Ethics, 2004,30, pp. 435–440, especially p. 437. In regard to the conditions and limitations of hu-
man rights, see also ÁLVEREz LEDESMA M. I., “La libertad de expresión en el sistema electoral 
mexicano desde una perspectiva jurídica”, in MoNTIEL G. L. and TAMÉS MUNoz E. (edit by), 
Libertad de expresión en el proceso electoral 2012, México, PNDU/oNU, 2013.
61 In that judgment the court points out that “terrorism may depend to a great extent on the use of 
modern investigation techniques, such an objective of general interest, however fundamental it may 
be, cannot in itself justify that national legislation providing for the general and indiscriminate re-
tention of all traffic and location data should be considered to be necessary for the purposes of that 
fight (see, by analogy, in relation to Directive 2006/24, the Digital Rights judgment, paragraph 51).”
62 Council of Europe, Steering Committee on Bioethics, Guide for Research Ethics Committee Mem-
bers, January 2012.
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medical interventions,63 due to the particular position of vulnerability of the patient. In 
other cases, those conditions are not essential, or their respect should be ascertained with 
less rigor. Furthermore, Article 52, para. 1, EU Charter allows limitation of fundamental 
rights, such as privacy, subject to the respect of proportionality,64 which is another prima-
ry principle of the EU legal system.65 This is true, in particular, when personal life must 
be protected, including personal data.66
In respect to the considered matter, the principle of proportionality imposes a mini-
misation of the quantity of gathered and processed data (see Article 89, para. 1, Regula-
tion 2016/679).67 Such data must be relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation 
to the purposes allowed by law (see Article 5, para. 1, c). This principle also constitutes a 
limitation on the length of data storage (see Article 5, para. 1, let. e).
Furthermore, an evaluation in respect to proportionality and legitimacy is necessary, 
taking into account the principle of precaution,68 i.e., risks for the protection of fun-
damental rights and freedoms of individuals and notably whether or not the intended 
purpose could be achieved in a less intrusive way. 
63 Biomedical research is defined by the Additional Protocol to the Convention of oviedo of 2005 as 
“research activities in the health field involving interventions on human beings”, and also as research 
concerning genetic information. Use of genetic information for research activities not linked to 
medical interventions should be prohibited by the discipline of the Convention of oviedo and its 
additional protocols (see Article 2, para. 2.b, Additional Protocol concerning Genetic Testing for 
Health Purposes). However, we can observe the tendency to mitigate the link between data and 
medical intervention, considering health data “all personal data concerning the physical or mental 
health of an individual, including the provision of healthcare services, which reveals information 
about this person’s health” (Article 3 of the draft Recommendation on the Protection of Health-Re-
lated Data).
64 See ECJ, jud. 15 February 2016, J. N./ Staatssecretaris voor Veiligheid en Justitie, C-601/15 PPU, 
EU:C:2016:84, paragraph 50. In general, on principle of proportionality ECJ, judg. 9 November 
2010, C-92/09 y C-93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke y Eifert, ECLI:EU:C:2010:662.
65 The principle of proportionality is also used by the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights. See, in particular, ECHR, judg. Gillow vs. UK, 24 November 1986, series A nº 109, para. 
55, y the ECJ, judg. 20 May 2003, Österreichischer Rundfunk and others, C-465/00, C-138/01 
and C-139/01, EU:C:2003:294, para. 83)
66 See ECJ, judg. 16 December 2008, Satakunnan Markkinapörssi and Satamedia, C-73/07, 
EU:C:2008:727, para. 56; Id., judg. 9 November 2010, Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert, 
C-92/09 and C-93/09, EU:C:2010:662, para. 77; Id., judg. 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland 
Ltd, joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/1, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, para. 52; Id., judg. 6 october 
2015, Schrems, C-362/14, EU:C:2015:650, para. 92.
67 According to Authorisation no. 8 of the Italian Authority for Privacy (par. 4.1), the collection of 
genetic data for carrying out genetic testing and screening is limited to personal and family informa-
tion which is strictly necessary for the performance of the analysis.
68 According to the principle of precaution in science and technology, see for example ANDoRNo 
R., “The Precautionary Principle: A New Legal Standard for a Technological Age”, in Journal of In-
ternational Biotechnology Law, Vol 1, I, 2004, pp. 11–19; CoLCELLI V., “Precautionary Principle 
Liability in the Food Industry: the search of a general regime in vertical and horizontal Liability”, 
in Rainer Arnold and Valentina Colcelli, (eds), Europeanization through private law instruments, 
Regensburg, Universitätsverlag, 2016,  pp. 249 ff.
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In the specific field of research, the application of the principle of precaution implies a 
risk assessment and a comparison with direct or indirect benefits: As a matter of fact: “Al-
though the anticipated overall benefits of the research project must clearly be higher than 
the potential risks, the research may not be considered justified if there is a particularly 
high risk of serious harm.”69 Research activities must also observe other principles such 
as “distributive justice”. As stated, “In biomedical research involving human beings, this 
implies that the distribution of risk and burden on the one hand and benefit on the other 
be fair—a principle known as distributive justice”. Such a principle should be applied for 
example to the research participants, who should be those who actually may benefit from 
experimentation.70
9. Consent and the balance between freedom of research and rights concerning genetic infor-
mation. As mentioned above, research activity is considered as a lawful reason to deviate 
from privacy concerns, especially in respect to consent. Such deviations have to be im-
plemented in compliance with ethics principles that work in order to put in equilibrium 
freedom of research and other interests protected by the legal system. 
However, to achieve a balance between interests, the idea that privacy is an absolute 
value should be subjected to revision. Legislation about privacy derives from a “proprie-
tary”71 logic concerning the whole human body and its parts, including genetic data. As a 
matter of fact, propriety is at the base of the meaning of “privacy” itself, since the origin of 
the notion can be found in the famous work of Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, “The 
Right to Privacy”, published in the Harvard Law Review in 1890. In that paper, the no-
tion of privacy was drawn up within the proprietary paradigm, even if from a “spiritual” 
and not a “physical” viewpoint.
According to European law, we can observe the tendency to overprotect privacy in 
comparison with other interests. The Court of Justice may be considered as the guardian 
of this tendency. For example, in regard to the “right to be forgotten”, in a leading case 
regarding Google Spain,72 the Court of Luxemburg held that the fundamental rights rec-
ognised by Articles 7 and 8 (i.e., protection of personal data) of the EU Charter “override, 
as a rule, not only the economic interest of the operator of the search engine but also 
the interest of the general public” (para. 97 of the judgement). According to the Court 
of Justice, the public interest should be “preponderant” in order to overtake individual 
rights arising from the protection of personal data. In contrast, legislation seems to be 
less demanding when a deviation from the right to erase requires the existence of “public 
interest” (see Regulation (EU) 2016/679, recital no. 65).
69 Guide for Research Ethics Committee Members, issued by the Steering Committee of the Council 
of Europe on January 2012.
70 Guide for Research Ethics Committee Members, ref.
71 See for example DE WITTE J. and TEN HAVE H., “ownership of genetic material and infor-
mation”, in Social Science & Medicine, 45(1), August 1997, pp. 51–60. See also CIPPITANI R., 
“Property paradigm” and protection of rights concerning genetic information, in Diritto e processo/
Derecho y Proceso/Right and Remedies, 2016, pp. 261–288.
72 ECJ, judg. of 13 May 2014, Google Spain SL Google Inc., C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317.
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This approach is justified by the attempt to protect persons from the great risks aris-
ing from the massive use of techno-science, and in particular of the ITC or biomedical 
technologies. Nevertheless, as stated “In the European Convention on Bio-medicine as 
well as in the Universal Declaration on Human Genome, the approach to protecting 
data confidentiality would appear to be based on an individualistic concept” (Working 
Party, Working Document on Genetic Data, p. 8). Indeed, it was also stated that “If 
we protect privacy effectively, we will not reduce ethics to autonomy, and autonomy to 
data ownership. Reducing ethics to ownership comes at a high price: ethics that care 
only about ownership and consented transfers are, by exclusion, indifferent to distribu-
tional justice and optimizing social outcomes.”73 
Privacy should be coordinated with other important freedoms or rights recognised 
by constitutional norms, such as freedom of research (see, for example, the above-men-
tioned Article 13 of the Charter of the Fundamental Right of the European Union).74 
The Court of Justice itself, in the above-mentioned judgement regarding Google Spain, 
seems to consider scientific purposes adequate per se to deviate from the rights of the 
data subject (see paras. 72 and 92 of the judgement). The features of genetic data, and 
the specificity of science from a legal viewpoint, have as a consequence that research 
on genetic information cannot be reduced to a question of privacy. In particular, as 
stated above, legal techniques to provide free and informed consent or anonymisation 
do not always represent solutions to problems arising from the processing and storage 
of genetic data. 
The relevance of scientific activities for society—especially, but not exclusively, for 
therapeutic reasons—should lead to a different approach. It would be advisable, also in 
respect to the balance of different interests in so complex a field, to put in place various 
strategies and new instruments.75
on the one hand is the idea that consent serves only as an instrument to prevent 
external invasions, without taking into consideration the reasons or the interests at 
the base of such an intervention. As a matter of fact, “The core of both ‘privacy’ and 
‘property’ involves the same abstract right: the right to exclude unwanted interference 
by third parties. The only real difference between the two concepts is the kind of re-
lationship that is protected from interference: ‘property’ principally protects market 
relationships while ‘privacy’ protects more spiritual ones”.76 
Consent may be conceived as a set of legal instruments for participating in activities 
which may concern not only the interests of the “data subject”, but also those of third 
parties and of the community. It should not be considered an instantaneous act, but 
rather a continuous process, useful for establishing a trusted link among data subject, 
73 TAYLoR P., “When consent gets in the way”, in Nature, 6 November 2008, vol. 456, pp. 32–33.
74 See MoLINA DEL Pozo F. and ARCHoNTAkI C., “Libertad de artes y de Investigación 
Científica”, Libertad de Cátedra, … ref.
75 See VILLANI L., “Biobanche e test rivelatori di informazioni genetiche: spunti di riflessione per un 
nuovo consenso informato”, in Responsabilità civile, 2010, 2, pp. 140 ff.
76 See ACkERMAN B., “Liberating Abstraction”, in University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 59, 
1992, pp. 317–348,  in particular p. 347.
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researcher, and the institutions.77 The consent could also include the decision to volun-
tarily share information as a common good.78
As stated above, scientific activities need a model of consent which is different from 
the specific one, in particular a broad-based approach. However, it would be consist-
ent with a unilateral and asymmetric logic of consent. A bilateral approach should be 
elaborated, according to which, for example, consentors are constantly informed on the 
follow-up of the research, so that they may participate in other research and be invited 
to events or to participate in associations. on the other hand, the centrality of consent 
should not be carried to extremes. In order to achieve a balance among the different 
types of interests, including those related to the data subject, consent may not be con-
sidered either as a sufficient or a necessary condition. In many cases, not all personal 
data have the same value or importance for the individual.
The following aspects should also be stressed: the procedural aspect of the consent, the 
quantity and quality of information to be provided, the time to make the decision, and 
the kinds of decisions to be taken should be adequate to the situations.79
For example, the International Bioethics Committee of UNESCo, in its document 
Human Genetic Data: Preliminary Study by the IBC on its Collection, Processing, Stor-
age and Use of 15 May 2002, affirms that “Many tests which reveal genetic information 
will not have a great deal of significance for the person tested (…). other tests, however, 
will have major implications, both for the individual and for relatives. The principle stat-
ed above sets out the consent requirements. For practical reasons, it would be unrealistic 
and unnecessary to require that there be specific consent to the genetic component in any 
test unless the consequences of this are sufficiently serious enough to justify this” (para. 
59 p. 15).80 Consent, considered alone, could be not sufficient.
77 AzzINI S., “Biobanche, consenso e fonti del diritto: un caso di eccezionale disordine?”, 2010, 
available at http://www.biodiritto.eu/sito/images/stories/azziniforum2010papersito.pdf. 
78 See the document Ethical, legal and social aspects of genetic testing: research, development and 
clinical applications, ref., p. 41 ff., especially p. 42.
79 See BUNNIk E.M., CECILE A., JANSSENS J.W. and SCHERMER M. H.N., “Informed Con-
sent in Direct-to-Consumer Personal Genome Testing: The outline of a Model Between Specif-
ic and Generic Consent”, in Bioethics, 2012, pp. 1–9. The paper, in respect to personal genome 
testing, uses a “combined tiered-layered-staged model for informed consent”, which may be more 
suitable. This combination “is tiered to provide consumers with options, so as to enable them to 
choose what types of information on what (categories of ) diseases they wish to receive, and especially 
to opt out of receiving information they do not wish to receive. Layering of information will help 
limit the otherwise overwhelming quantity of information offered to all consumers in the first layer 
of the consent process, while it also strives for an ‘individual consumer-based’ consent, as it offers 
additional information for those who need that information in order to consent. Finally, a staged 
set-up of the pre-test information provision process can serve educational purposes and improve the 
quality of consent. Moreover, subsequent renewal of consent will be required as new test outcomes 
become available as a result of ongoing genomics research. A combined tiered-layered-staged model 
for informed consent in PGT would allow for relevant information provision that is both sufficient-
ly complete and sufficiently understandable.”
80 As affirmed by the Uk Human Genetics Commission, “the difficulties involved in tracing and se-
curing re-consent for different forms of medical research may make obtaining fresh consent imprac-
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When issues arising from research reach a general dimension, it would be advisable to 
define consent of the members of a group and techniques to involve communities and to 
establish a sort of “collective consent” instead of the individual one. This is the case for 
the establishment of the program called “deCoDE Genetics”, approved by the Icelandic 
state, to gather the genetic profile of all Icelandic citizens.81
Furthermore, consent is not sufficient because of the vulnerability of the individual in 
respect to professionals and/or institutions carrying out research or other activities con-
cerning personal data, or because it is necessary to access the research activities in order 
to make them consistent with the ethical principles and with legal rules. In those cases, 
consent in itself is not sufficient to ensure proper protection of individual interests82 and 
therefore needs further tools to integrate its effectiveness.
Another important instrument to face the ethical problems concerning the use of 
genetic information is the control carried out by ethics committees or other third parties. 
For example, documents dealing with genetic screening for the recruitment of employ-
ees recommend requiring the prior assent of the appropriate labour organisation and a 
specific ad hoc authorisation by an independent committee. Indeed, the person may be 
compelled to consent to the screening in order to be recruited by the employer.83
According to some legal authorities in the field of health, such as the discipline of 
clinical trials, the expression of consent has to be subject to independent bodies’ control, 
through ethical committees, agencies, or other bodies that allow the evaluation of the 
activity (see Article 6, para 3, Directive 2001/20/EC). The role of the ethics committee 
is affirmed by many documents of the Council of Europe in critical situations, such as 
when health data cannot be anonymised for technical reasons (see para. 12.2, Appendix 
to Recommendation (97), mentioned above), which normally is the case for genetic data; 
or if it is not possible, with a reasonable effort, to contact the person who has not given 
her/his consent to carry out research activities concerning biological material (see Article 
21.2, Recommendation (CM/Rec(2016)6). In those cases, the scientific purposes togeth-
er with an external and independent evaluation carried out by an ethics committee allows 
for the research institution to overcome the lack of consent.
In this respect, we can also see the draft Recommendation on the Protection of 
Health-Related Data, which establishes that “The conditions in which health-related data 
are processed for scientific research must be assessed, where necessary, by the body or 
tical and would seriously limit the usefulness of large-scale population databases” (Human Genetics 
Commission Inside Information, May 2002).
81 See ÁRNASoN V. and ÁRNASoN G., “Informed Democratic Consent? The Case of the Icelandic 
Database”, in Trames, 2004, vol. 8/12.
82 oTLoWSkI M., “Developing an appropriate Consent Model for Biobanks: In Defence of ‘Broad’ 
Consent”, in kAYE J. and STRANGER M. (eds), Principles and Practice in Biobank Governance, 
Surrey, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009, Chapter 5, pp 79–92.
83 See the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technology in its opinion no. 18 concern-
ing “Ethical Aspects of Genetic Testing in the Workplace” of 2003, para. 2; see also the document 
“Ethical, legal and social aspects of genetic testing: research, development and clinical applications” 
of 2004, elaborated for the General Directorate of Research Commission by a group of independent 
experts. 
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bodies designated by domestic law” (Article 16.6).84 For example, Italian law provides for 
situations when consent is not necessary if research activity is established explicitly by law 
or when the processing is foreseen in a biomedical research programme approved on the 
ground of Article 12-bis Legislative Decree no. 502 of 30 December 1992 and referred 
to the Authority of Privacy (see Article 110, para. 1, Legislative Decree no. 196/2006).
Another possible solution to achieve a balance of interests involved could be drafting 
a code of conduct (see Article 40 Regulation (EU) no 2016/679),85 as highlighted by the 
General Data Regulation, according to which it is necessary to “calibrate the obligations 
of controllers and processors, taking into account the risk likely to result from the pro-
cessing for the rights and freedoms of natural persons” (see Recital no. 98).
EU discipline encourages the adoption of other instruments arising from private au-
tonomy, although it is subject to the control of authorities, such as standard contractual 
clauses between controllers and processors and between processors, technical standards, 
and mechanisms for certification (see Recital no. 167). 
other instruments for ensuring accountability and the quality of the institutions and 
professionals dealing with genetic information need to be refined and developed.86 
More generally, it is necessary that the consent process be part of a governance frame-
work of “trust, responsibility and accountability”, in which the involvement of institu-
tional review boards would be essential.87
84 With respect to the position of independent authorities, in the judgement Tele2 Sverige AB et 
oth. of 21 December 2016 (in Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15), the exceptions due to the 
justification to fight crime are admissible only where they will be reviewed by an independent ad-
ministrative authority (see para. 120 and 125; see, by analogy, Directive 2006/24, the Digital Rights 
judgement, paragraph 62; see also, by analogy, Article 8 of the ECHR, ECtHR, 12 January 2016, 
Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, CE:ECHR:2016:0112JUD003713814, §§ 77 and 80).
85 See, for example, United kingdom Information Commissioner’s office (2012), Anonymisation:man-
aging data protection risk. Code of practice, available at www.ico.org.uk/ for_organisations/data_pro-
tection/topic_guides/anonymisation.
86 Article 5 of the Additional Protocol to the oviedo Convention concerning Genetic Testing for 
Health, adopted in Strasbourg on 27 November 2008, already stipulates that states must ensure 
that “a)  genetic tests meet generally accepted criteria of scientific validity and clinical validity; b) a 
quality assurance programme is implemented in each laboratory and that laboratories are subject to 
regular monitoring; c) persons providing genetic services have appropriate qualifications to enable 
them to perform their role in accordance with professional obligations and standards.”
87 CAULFIELD T., UPSHUR R.E.G. and DAAR A., “DNA databanks and consent: A suggested 
policy option involving an authorization model”, in BMC Medical Ethics, 2003, 4:1.
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Information on Access and Benefit Sharing regarding
the Utilisation of Genetic Resources
under the European Union Legal Regulation
Valentina Colcelli
1. Introduction. The chapter aims to analyse how, in the European legal system, “Access 
and Benefit-Sharing information” are exchanged and this could help the implementation 
of the Nagoya Protocol and its goals, whether data flow could be controlled and whether 
legal consequences for infringement of rules on information exchange and storage would 
be more well-defined and reinforced. ‘The EU law defines positive duties of behaviours 
with a focus on information’.1 However, for genetic resources or associated traditional 
knowledge which have not been accessed following applicable access and benefit-sharing 
legislation or regulatory requirements at a national or international level, this ‘is not a 
straightforward prohibition of utilization’.2
The Nagoya Protocol is an international agreement, which aims at sharing the benefits 
arising from the utilisation of genetic resources in a fair and equitable way. 
Before the Nagoya Protocol, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) was the 
most widely applied rules for ‘Access and Benefit Sharing’ (ABS). The Nagoya Protocol 
on access to genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resourc-
es complies with Art. 15 of the CBD, which concerns the fair and equitable sharing of 
benefits (monetary and non-monetary) arising from the utilisation and commercialisa-
tion of genetic resources. Such benefits should accrue to the holders of genetic resources 
and traditional knowledge, particularly indigenous and local communities, from whence 
the genetic resources have been obtained. Emphasis is also placed on capacity building, 
particularly in developing countries with a priority on capacity building for women. This 
may also involve technology transfer. The Nagoya Protocol is therefore relevant to both 
the private and public sectors, in which it is incumbent upon these organisations to un-
dertake due diligence regarding their own activities relating to genetic resources. D. A. 
Posey recalls that already before 1990, trading of products made by indigenous person’s 
knowledge and in low-income countries cost around 43 million dollars.3
1 GoDT G., “The Multi-Level Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol in the European Union”, 
in CooLSAET B., BATUR F., BRoGGIATo A., PITSEYS J. AND DEDEURWAERDERE T., 
(eds.), Implementing the Nagoya Protocol Comparing Access and Benefit-sharing Regimes in Eu-
rope, Brill, 2015, Leiden Netherlands, p. 319.
2 Ibidem.
3 PoSEY D.A., “Intellectual Property rights and Just Compensation for Indigenous knowledge, Am-
azonia and Siberia: Legal Aspects of the preservation of the Environment and Development in the 
Last open Spaces”, in Anthropology Today, 6, 1993, 4, p. 287.
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The Multinational enterprises full use of genetic resources and associated traditional 
knowledge, but the local community and indigenous persons usually did not provide 
consent and not have a decent remuneration by Multinational beneficiaries of their 
knowledge. A storm of protest arose from this complex situation (see f.i. Vandana Shiva’s 
movement): the notion of bio piracy emerged to explain - lato sensu - the not remuner-
ative appropriation by the Multinational enterprises of biologic and genetic resources 
and the traditional knowledge mainly in the Southern hemisphere. This situation is 
new-colonialism economic approach in the Southern hemisphere.4 
As a matter of fact, the approach inside the abusive exploitation of the genetic re-
sources and associated traditional knowledge is unfair, and not ethically correct. This 
inequity approach is amplified by multinational firms’ ability to obtain patent protec-
tion or other forms of intellectual property rights (trademark, utility model, short term 
patent, plant variety right) starting from genetic resources and associated traditional 
knowledge.5
The ABS measure is correlated with distributive justice and the principle of solidar-
ity,6 that in the specific case of the framework of the European Union, the former prin-
ciple underpins the General Principles of European Union law.7 Within the European 
Union (EU), the Nagoya Protocol has been spelled out in Regulation (EU) n. 2014/511 
and 2015/1866 through which the mechanisms for establishing access and benefit shar-
ing are laid down. In particular, they describe the means by which access to genetic 
resources and the benefit of their utilisation and commercialisation may be shared. 
In the ABS system, those involved in any aspect of utilising genetic resources (includ-
ing plant, animal, microbial or other origin containing functional units of heredity but 
excluding human genetics), the information exchanged and stored by Access and Bene-
fit-sharing Clearing-house (ABSCH) tries to realise the legal certainty and transparency 
on procedures for access and benefit sharing.
Through a ABSCH may deposit information and connect users and providers of 
genetic resources and/or traditional knowledge. The ABSCH permits storing and trans-
ferring knowledge in which a description is provided along with the source of the ge-
netic resource and whether there are rights and obligations regarding access and benefit 
sharing. A platform was created for monitoring the utilisation of genetic resources along 
the value chain, including the internationally recognised certificate of compliance. In 
the EU legal framework, through the system called Declare, the data and information 
are submitted to ABSCH. 
4 VEzzANI S., “Il Primo Protocollo alla Convezione europea dei diritti umani e la tutela della pro-
prietà intellettuale di popoli indigeni e comunità locali”, in Diritti Umani e Diritto Internazionale, 
2007, 1, p. 305-342.
5 SANDBERG A., “Property rights and ecosystem properties”, in Land Use Policy, 2007, 24, p. 613-
623. 
6 CIPPITANI R., La solidarietà giuridica tra pubblico e privato, Iseg srl, 2011, Roma-Perugia-Mexico.
7 CoLCELLI V., “The Solidarity Principle in New EU Member States”, in PERUGINI C., PoMPEI 
F. (eds.), Inequalities during and after transition in Central and Eastern Europe, Palgrave, 2015, 
Basingstoke, p. 247-265.
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Each Member State shall designate one or more competent authorities to be re-
sponsible for the application of EU Law implementing the Nagoya Protocol(see next 
paragraph 7).8 ‘The competent authorities shall transmit the information received (….) 
to the Access and Benefit-Sharing Clearing House, established under Art. 14(1) of the 
Nagoya Protocol, to the Commission and, where appropriate, to the competent nation-
al authorities referred to in Art. 13(2) of the Nagoya Protocol. The national competent 
authorities shall cooperate with the Access and Benefit-Sharing Clearing House to en-
sure the exchange of the information listed in Art. 17(2) of the Nagoya Protocol for 
monitoring the compliance of users’.9 
However, despite the central function assigned by the Nagoya Protocol to the in-
formation on ABS, the system realised does not establish assured legal consequences 
for the user of genetic resources10 that does not comply with the rules on informa-
tion exchanging and storing. The development and implementation of ABS regulatory 
frameworks at the national level will need to ensure that legislative, administrative or 
policy measures taken are consistent and mutually supportive of other existing ABS 
instruments. This means that each State has rules on this matter. 
In the EU framework, the ABS system is running, but at the moment it is not com-
pletely clear what can be done in the case of infringement of the rules on information 
exchange and storage. 
The EU legal system currently does not have a working administrative point for con-
trol on information exchange and storage. There are uncertain judicial claims at the EU 
level and at the national level. Not all the EU Member States who signed the Nagoya 
Protocol have the legislative, administrative or policy measures necessary for implement-
ing the Protocol. 
Thus, to analyse how, in the European legal system, access and benefit-sharing infor-
mation are exchanged and how this could help the implementation of the Nagoya Proto-
col, this chapter will be organised as follows: section 2 describes how the Nagoya Protocol 
or others International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture apply 
to genetic resources over which States exercise sovereign rights. Section 3 introduces the 
EU legal framework implementing the Nagoya Protocol. The meaning of Due Diligence 
in the contest of the EU law on “Access and Benefit Sharing” is analysed in section 4. Sec-
tion 5 examines how the relationship between genetic resources and associated traditional 
knowledge and their utilisation could be addressed by contracts and contractual clauses. 
Section 6 describes the information flow for ABSCH and its function, as well as the sys-
tem for storing and transmitting data according to Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014. Section 
7 examines when due diligence declaration needs to be requested by national competent 
authorities, by the European Commission or by the public administrations of Member 
States in the case of request for market approval or placing products on the market, and 
the legal consequences for the infringement of the obligation for ABS information. Sec-
8 Art. 6 Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014.
9 Art. 7 Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014.
10 Art. 4 Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014, Point 4: ‘user’ means a natural or legal person that utilises 
genetic resources or traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources.
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tion 8 concludes how it is possible to have rather good control of the flow of information 
in the EU legal system, if all the public administrations or agencies involved check the 
ABS due diligence fulfilment.
2. Benefit sharing: Multilateral international system and the Nagoya Protocol approach.The 
genetic resources over which States exercise sovereign rights falls within the scope of 
Art. 15 of the CBD. Art. 15 of the CBD recognizes ‘the sovereign rights of States over 
their natural resources, the authority to determine access to genetic resources rests with 
the national governments and is subject to national legislation. (…) Each Contracting 
Party shall endeavour to create conditions to facilitate access to genetic resources for 
environmentally sound uses by other Contracting Parties and not to impose restrictions 
that run counter to the objectives of this Convention (…)’.11
The Nagoya Protocol does not extend to the full jurisdictional scope of Art. 4 of 
the CBD.12 ‘In addition to the CBD itself, the Nagoya Protocol will become a bind-
ing set of norms setting detailed rules on how ABS can be implemented in national 
legislation’.13 ‘The fact that the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol are two different legal 
instruments. (…) Art. 4 of the Nagoya Protocol on the relationship between Nagoya 
Protocol and other instruments only applies in that context and not to the general rules 
provided by the CBD. Thus the relationship between the CBD and other instruments 
of international will not be solved directly by the new rules introduced in Art. 4 of the 
Nagoya Protocol’.14 
That is why an interface between the Nagoya Protocol on ABS and the Interna-
tional Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture of the United Na-
tions Food and Agriculture organization (ITPGRFA) at the international level exits. 
The Nagoya Protocol applies to genetic resources, over which States exercise sovereign 
rights. However, the Nagoya Protocol gives priority enforcement to the specialized legal 
instruments if they are limited and qualified. This is the case of ITGRFA, just for to the 
genetic resources covered and for its the purpose.15
Annex 1 to the ITPGRFA lists crops and forages under the multilateral system for 
ABS (see next paragraph n. 5). ‘Plant genetic resources for food and agriculture’ (PGR-
11 Art. 15 CBD.
12 See CBD, Art. 4 Jurisdictional Scope: Subject to the rights of other States, and except as otherwise 
expressly provided in this Convention, the provisions of this Convention apply, in relation to each 
Contracting Party: (a) In the case of components of biological diversity, in areas within the limits 
of its national jurisdiction; and (b) In the case of processes and activities, regardless of where their 
effects occur, carried out under its jurisdiction or control, within the area of its national jurisdiction 
or beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
13 PERRoN F., FREEDoM kAI PHLLIPS J. M., “The Interface between the Nagoya Protocol on 
ABS and the ITPGRFA at the International Level Potential Issues for Consideration in Supporting 
Mutually Supportive Implementation at the National Level Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI)”, in 
Rep. No. FNI Report 1/2011, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 2013, Lysaker, Norway, pp. 1-71.
14 Ibidem.
15 See Art. 4 (4) Nagoya Protocol.
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FA) means any genetic material of plant origin of actual or potential value for food and 
agriculture. The list in Annex 1 refers to different taxonomic levels and biology is not a 
static science. However, ‘the list in the Annex gives some legal certainty for which crops 
are covered, the extent to which wild relatives of cultivated crops are covered intro-
duces a certain level of uncertainty’.16 Nevertheless, parties to the Nagoya Protocol, in 
the exercise of their sovereign rights, could decide that certain PGRFA falls within the 
scope of ITRGFA management and control, even though they are not listed in Annex 
I to the ITPGRFA. 
As a matter of fact, ‘with few exceptions there has not been legislation which differ-
entiates between the treatment of genetic resources for food and agriculture and those 
of other genetic resources’.17 If a country realised the choice above mentioned the access 
to plant genetic resources will be realized according to ITGRFA Multilateral System 
and its Standard Material Transfer Agreement (sMTA), not according to Nagoya Pro-
tocol. 
3. Implementing the Nagoya Protocol in the EU legal system. During 2011, the European 
Commission adopted the EU biodiversity strategy for 2020, to halt the loss of biodi-
versity and ecosystem services by 2020. This document is an integral part of the Europe 
2020 strategy and the 7th Environmental Action Programme. This implements EU 
commitments under the CBD.
During 2014, the EU adopted the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources 
and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits arising from the utilization in the Eu-
ropean Union, by Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014. The Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014 
rules on ‘Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits’. It 
dictates how the Nagoya Protocol is enforced in the EU legal system. 
Though, just in the second part of 2015, Art.s 4, 7 and 9 of the Regulation (EU) n. 
511/2014 were enforced. The Art.s mentioned above respectively concern the ‘obliga-
tions of Users’, ‘Monitoring user compliance’ and checking user compliance. ‘Users,’ 
according to Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014, include the natural/legal persons that uti-
lise genetic resources or traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources.
Thus, the Nagoya Protocol is a freestanding legal obligation expressed in the EU 
legal system by Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014 and the Commission Implementing Reg-
ulation (EU) n. 2015/1866 passed on 13 october 2015 laying down detailed rules for 
the implementation of Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014 regarding registering collections, 
monitoring user compliance and best practices. The development and implementation 
of ABS regulatory frameworks at the national level will need to ensure that legislative, 
administrative or policy measures taken are consistent and mutually supportive with 
other existing ABS instruments.
16 PERRoN F., FREEDoM kAI PHLLIPS J. M., “The Interface between the Nagoya Protocol on 
ABS and the ITPGRFA at the International Level Potential Issues for Consideration in Supporting 
Mutually Supportive Implementation at the National Level Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI), cit.
17 Ibidem.
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As above mentioned, ITPGRFA constitutes a specialised international access and 
benefit-sharing instrument within the meaning of Art. 4 (4) of the Nagoya Protocol,18 
also in the EU legal system (see previous paragraph 2). As matter of fact, in the frame-
work of the EU legal system, ‘users acquiring Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture (PGRFA) in a country that is a Party to the Nagoya Protocol which has de-
termined that PGRFA under its management and control and in the public domain, not 
contained in Annex I to the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture (ITPGRFA), will also be subject to the terms and conditions of the 
standard material transfer agreement (sMTA) for the purposes set out under the ITP-
GRFA, shall be considered to have exercised due diligence in accordance with paragraph 
3 of this Art.’19 (see next paragraph 5).
‘The Multilateral international system (MLS) is highly relevant for ABS because it is 
the first sectorial approach to ABS, and could provide useful lessons for the implementa-
tion of ABS, including whether and if so, how, sectorial ABS can be dealt with to meet 
the objectives of the CBD’.20
4. The due diligence in the context of ABS. In the EU legal system, the information flow 
on genetic resources accessed, the time and place of access and the ways in which the re-
source may be used are some of the circumstances for complying with the due diligence 
requirements in Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014 to ascertain the genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge associated with them.
Due diligence can be defined as an investigation prior to signing a contract, or cer-
tain standards of care applying to an act. In tort law, the standard of care is the only 
degree of prudence and caution required of an individual who is under a duty of care. 
In the context of ABS, due diligence means that you did your very best to establish 
which access and benefit-sharing conditions apply to the genetic resources you wish to 
access and that you have taken care to meet these conditions.21
The users exercise due diligence in their own activities linked with genetic resources 
prior to obtaining ‘internationally-recognised certificates of compliance as evidence that 
the genetic resources covered were legally accessed and that mutually agreed terms were 
established for the user and the utilisation specified therein’,22 and also national author-
ities reckoned them. Transferring, keeping, etc. of genetic resources, also for food and 
agriculture not contained under Annex I of the ITPGRFA, require an internationally 
recognised certificate of compliance.23
18 See, Point 12, Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014.
19 Art. 4 (4) Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014.
20 PERRoN F., FREEDoM kAI PHLLIPS J. M., “The Interface between the Nagoya Protocol on 
ABS and the ITPGRFA at the International Level Potential Issues for Consideration in Supporting 
Mutually Supportive Implementation at the National Level Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI), cit.
21 Art. 3, (4), Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014.
22 Point 21 of the Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014.
23 Art. 4 Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014.
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According to point 21 of Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014, ‘genetic resources have been 
accessed by applicable legal or regulatory requirements and to ensure that, where rele-
vant, benefits are fairly and equitably shared’. 
If internationally-recognised certificates of compliance are not present, the user has 
to comply with the minimum information required by Art. 17 (4) of the Nagoya Pro-
tocol, as specified in Art. 4(3) (b) of Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014. Where no interna-
tional certificate exists, documents and information have to be verified by the users.24 
Also, the regulation states that users have to declare and provide evidence that they have 
exercised due diligence when requested. 
The requirements of the standard are closely dependent on circumstances. Users 
obtaining a genetic resource from a collection included in the register of collections 
within the EU shall be considered to have exercised their obligation of due diligence.25 
A collection that is registered under EU Regulation n. 511/2014 applies standardised 
procedures for exchanging samples of genetic resources and related information with 
other collections, and for supplying samples of genetic resources and related information 
to third parties for their utilisation in line with the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol; the 
collection supplies genetic resources and related information to third persons for their 
utilisation only with documentation providing evidence that the genetic resources and 
the related information were accessed in accordance with applicable ABS legislation or 
regulatory requirements and, where relevant, under mutually agreed terms. The request 
for inclusion of a collection or a part thereof in the register, referred to in Art. 5(2) of 
Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014, shall contain the information specified in Annex I to 
Regulation (EU) n. 1866/2015.
5. Access to genetic resources and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from their 
utilisation addressed by contracts and contractual arrangements. The relationship between 
genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge and their utilisation could be 
addressed in contracts and contractual clauses. The Nagoya Protocol uses contracts to 
have mutually agreed terms for sharing benefits with the provider of genetic resources 
or of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources. These kinds of contracts 
– mainly Material Transfer agreements (MTA) – have to set out specific conditions for 
the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilisation of genetic resources 
or of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources. In the EU legal system, 
according to Art. 3 of Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014, they have also included further 
conditions and terms for such utilisation as well as subsequent applications and com-
mercialisation.
Fundamentally, ‘Material Transfer agreement (MTA) is a bailment, that is, a transfer of 
tangible property without transfer of title. Under such an agreement, the provider could 
maintain ownership of the property transferred. Transferred property is held by the receiv-
ing party according to terms stipulated in a legally binding contract. The contract, there-
24 Art. 4 Regulation (EU) 511/2014.
25 See Point 9, Reg. (EU) 1866/2014.
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fore, governs the transfer of tangible biological materials between two or more parties. In 
addition to the tangible property rights being owned by the provider, the material(s) may 
be the subject of a patent or patent application. In this case, the MTA may need to account 
for the transfer of Intellectually Property rights as well as the transfer of tangible material’.26 
The user shall share fairly and equitably the benefits arising from their utilisation 
of the genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources, its 
progeny or derivatives in accordance with the CBD. A non-exhaustive list of non-mone-
tary and monetary benefits is given in the Annex to the Nagoya Protocol.
Mutually Agreed Terms (MAT) are defined also at the EU level by Regulation (EU) 
n. 511/2014 as ‘the contractual arrangements concluded between a provider of genetic 
resources, or of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources, and a user, that 
set out specific conditions for the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the 
utilisation of genetic resources or of traditional knowledge associated with genetic re-
sources, and that may also include further conditions and terms for such utilisation as 
well as subsequent applications and commercialisation’.
Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014 identifies a set of criteria using the identification of 
the area (country, region, etc.) from which the genetic material used for developing new 
varieties comes. These criteria will reflect the enforcement of legal rights, the rate of en-
trepreneurship, the structure of the higher education system, etc. of partner countries of 
the Nagoya Protocol.
Firstly, contractual arrangements (MAT) should guarantee the effectiveness of legal 
contracts and technology transfer agreements once the biotech research activity is com-
pleted. Second, they have to contribute to develop potential market value of new varieties. 
Measurement of returns – mainly monetary – from commercialising innovation will 
be crucial to identify a fair price to which the new varieties could be sold with particular 
attention to local communities. one of these criteria is a provision for sharing benefits 
with the provider of the genetic resources or of traditional knowledge within the contract 
made for utilisation, subsequent applications and commercialisation of products derived 
by genetic resources or by traditional knowledge associated with them. 
Competent authorities of Member States should check whether users comply with the 
obligations27: this means fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilisation 
of genetic resources and traditional knowledge. 
Competent authorities could also refer to the Judge of the National and European 
Union Courts28: through the jurisdictional control of the contract for utilisation, subse-
quent applications and commercialisation of genetic resources and traditional knowledge 
linked with them, it will be possible to fulfil the goals of Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014. 
In this case and to better understand what kind of juridical control there could be over 
26 https://www.cbd.int/doc/press/2015/pr-2015-10-07-abs-en.pdf.
27 See Point 29, Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014.
28 CoLCELLI V., “A Critic Lecture of the EU Two Faced Approach to Biodiversity: Equal Guaranty 
or Multinational Bioraid? The Importance of a Self-Reconsideration of EU Politics in Biodiversity”, 
in CERRINA FERoNI G., FRoSINI L. MEzzETTI T. E, PETRILLo P. L. (eds.), Environ-
ment, Energy, Food Comparative Legal Models For Sustainable Development, Cesifim, 2016, 1, I, 
Roma, p. 41-53.
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the contracts and mutually agreed terms, it relevant settling the nature of the remedies for 
not fair and equitable contractual arrangements (nullity, voidable etc.), but still now it is 
not so clear. This situation is intertwined and takes different contours depending on the 
nature of the interests to be protected. The infringement of EU rules regarding not setting 
out specific conditions for the fair and equitable sharing of benefits from the utilisation 
of genetic resources or of associated traditional knowledge in the contract could mean 
nullity of the MTA.29
6. ABSCH: information exchange and storage for facilitating the implementation of the Nago-
ya Protocol. The ABSCH is the platform for exchanging information on access and benefit 
sharing established by Art. 14 of the Protocol, as part of the clearing house established 
under Art. 18, paragraph 3 of the CBD. By hosting relevant information regarding ABS, 
the ABSCH offers opportunities by connecting users and providers of genetic resources 
and associated traditional knowledge.
on 1 october 2015, the first internationally recognised certificate of compliance was 
issued under the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing. The permit was issued 
by India’s National Biodiversity Authority, the competent national authority under the 
Nagoya Protocol. The certificate through the ABSCH serves as evidence of the decision 
by India to grant access to ethno-medicinal knowledge of the Siddi community from Gu-
jarat to a researcher affiliated with the University of kent in the United kingdom. Thus, 
the researcher can demonstrate that s/he has respected the ABS requirements of India 
when using this knowledge.
Where an internationally recognised certificate of compliance is not available, other 
relevant information provided in accordance with Art. 17 (4) of the Nagoya Protocol, as 
specified in Art. 4(3)(b) of Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014, should be submitted by the 
due diligence declaration.
In the case of Art. 17(4) of the Nagoya Protocol, the researcher will need in any case 
provide the following information required by the treaty as a minimum: (a) Issuing au-
thority; (b) Date of issuance; (c) The provider; (d) Unique identifier of the certificate; (e) 
The person or entity to whom prior informed consent was granted; (f ) Subject-matter or 
genetic resources covered by the certificate; (g) Confirmation that mutually agreed terms 
were established; (h) Confirmation that prior informed consent was obtained; and (i) 
Commercial and/or non-commercial use.
According to Art. 17 mentioned above, EU Regulation 511/2014, Art. 4, paragraph 
3 where no internationally-recognised certificate of compliance is available, the following 
information and relevant documents are required: 
(i) the date and place of access of genetic resources or of traditional knowledge asso-
ciated with genetic resources; 
(ii) the description of the genetic resources or of traditional knowledge associated 
with genetic resources utilised; 
(iii) the source from which the genetic resources or traditional knowledge associated 
29 Ibidem.
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with genetic resources were directly obtained, as well as subsequent users of ge-
netic resources or traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources; 
(iv) the presence or absence of rights and obligations relating to access and benefit 
sharing including rights and obligations regarding subsequent applications and 
commercialisation; 
(v) access permits, where applicable;
(vi) mutually agreed terms, including benefit-sharing arrangements, where applica-
ble.
However, according to the CBD, an ABS National Focal Point contains information 
that is relevant to all public institutes, companies and individuals using genetic resources 
for research and development. It shall provide basic guidance for users seeking access to 
genetic resources as well as background information on the relevant international agree-
ments, and explains various terms that are often used.
6.1. Declare system and transmission data in the EU legal framework. A due diligence 
declaration is required (only) for genetic resources or traditional knowledge associated 
with genetic resources obtained from a party to the Nagoya Protocol that has established 
relevant access and benefit-sharing legislation or regulatory requirements pursuant to Art. 
6 (1) and Art. 7 of Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014. In the EU legal framework, through 
the system called Declare,30 users request access to the system, submit due diligence 
declarations and review submitted declarations. Thus, through the Declare system, the 
competent authority of the EU Member State, approves new submitting organisations, 
submitted declarations and transmits data to ABSCH. The declaration of due diligence is 
submitted to the competent authority of the Member State where the recipient of fund-
ing is established.
It is relevant to underline point 25 of Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014 which affirms 
that one suitable point for such a declaration is when research funds are received, and also 
at the final stage of utilisation. This means at the stage of final development of a product 
before requesting market approval for a product developed via the utilisation of genetic 
resources or traditional knowledge associated with such resources, or, where market ap-
proval is not required, at the stage of final development of a product before first placing 
it on the Union market.
Annex II and III of Regulation (EU) n. 1866/2015 are both templates for a due dil-
igence declaration to be submitted at the stage of research funding pursuant to Art. 5(2) 
mentioned above. Annex II regards the declaration to be submitted at the stage of research 
funding pursuant to Art. 5(2). The second one (Annex III) is the template for a due dili-
gence declaration to be submitted at the stage of final development of a product pursuant 
to Art. 6(1). 
The time of submission of such declaration may be further specified by the national 
authorities.31 Annex II shall be made after the first instalment of funding has been re-
30 Log-in with ECAS (http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/funding/about-grants/how-apply-grant/appli-
cant-registration-pador/ecas-registration_en).
31 Art. 5 of Regulation (EU) n. 1866/2015.
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ceived and all the genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources that are utilised in the funded research have been obtained, but no later than at 
the time of the final report, or in absence of such report, at the project end. 
A single declaration may also be made by several users jointly conducting research 
involving the utilisation of genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with 
genetic resources funded by one grant. In this context, a special role should be given to 
the project coordinator, who should be responsible for submitting the declarations on 
behalf of the users concerned.32 
The due diligence declaration of Annex III shall only be made once, prior to the first 
of the following events occurring: 
(a) market approval or authorisation is sought for a product developed via the utilisation 
of genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources; 
(b) a notification required prior to placing, for the first time on the Union market, a 
product developed via the utilisation of genetic resources and traditional knowl-
edge associated with genetic resources; 
(c) placing on the Union market for the first time a product developed via the utilisa-
tion of genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resourc-
es for which no market approval, authorisation or notification is required; 
(d) the result of the utilisation is sold or transferred in any other way to a natural or 
legal person within the Union in order for that person to carry out one of the ac-
tivities referred to in points (a), (b) and (c); 
(e) the utilisation in the Union has ended and its outcome is sold or transferred in any 
other way to a natural or legal person outside the Union.
Under Art. 7(2) of Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014, the final stage of utilisation, mean-
ing the stage of final development of a product, should be determined. The stage of final 
development of a product can be identified with legal certainty as having been completed 
at the time when either market approval or authorisation is sought or a notification re-
quired prior to placing for the first time on the Union market is made or, where neither 
market approval or authorisation nor a notification is required, at the time of placing for 
the first time on the Union market.
over the non-confidential data upload in the Declare system by the genetic resource, 
data will be under the access from the European Commission, that overviews also of the 
submitting organisation.
The information provided in the due diligence declarations (that are confidential) is 
to be submitted by the competent authorities to the ABSCH pursuant to Art. 7(3) of 
Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014.
7. Where and who performs the checking on due diligence fulfilment. As described above, 
Art. 4 of Regulation (EU) 511/2014 explains which users must comply and fulfil ‘due 
diligence’ in their activities linked with genetic resources ascertained. Among them, Art. 4 
describes which information users need to seek, keep and transfer to comply with the due 
32 See Point 8 Regulation (EU) n. 1866/2014.
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diligence obligation. The latter includes formal documentation from the country where 
you acquired the genetic resources and information about the genetic resources accessed, 
the time and place of access and the ways in which the resource may be used. Users shall 
keep the information relevant to access and benefit sharing for 20 years after the end of 
the period of utilisation. 
There are three moments for prior checking on ‘due diligence’ and whether or not it 
was fulfilled by the user: a) in the first instalment of research funding involving the uti-
lisation of genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources, 
or no later than at the time of the final report, or in absence of such report, at the project 
end; b) in the event of a request for market approval or c) the placing on the market of 
products deriving from the utilisation of a genetic resource (see previous paragraph 6.1).
As a matter of fact, according to Art. 5 of Regulation (EU) n. 2015/1866, ‘a recipient 
of funding for research involving the utilisation of genetic resources and traditional knowl-
edge associated with genetic resources shall make the due diligence declaration requested 
pursuant to Art. 7(1) of Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014 to the competent authority of the 
Member State in which the recipient is established’. If the recipient is not established in 
the EU and the research is carried out in the EU, the due diligence declaration shall be 
made to the competent authority of the Member State in which the research is carried out.
Furthermore, many products in the EU legal system need a request of authorisation 
for market approval or the placing of products on the market. Anyway, f.i. for placing 
on the market of plant protection products an authorisation is required. The Regulation 
for placing Plant Protection Products on the market (1107/2009) lays down harmonised 
rules for  the authorisation of plant protection products in commercial form and for their 
placing on the market, use and control within the EU.
Food and feed derived from genetically modified organisms are authorised and super-
vised by a competent authority in the relevant EU country and by the European Food 
and Safety Authority (EFSA). Regulation (EC) n. 1829/2003 on genetically modified 
food and feed, lays down rules on how genetically modified organisms (GMos) and on 
how genetically modified food and animal feed are labelled. In general, also medicinal 
products are under a market approval or authorisation.33 The marketing authorisation 
holder should submit an application to the competent authorities of each Member State 
and in the centralised procedure, the applicant applies to the European Agency for the 
Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA) for marketing authorisation. 
In the case for notification required prior to placing for the first time on the Union 
market, f. i. about food supplements, Member States may require the manufacturer or 
the person placing the product on the market in their territory to notify the competent 
authority of placing on the market by forwarding it a model of the label.34
33 See, among the others, Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 
November 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use; Regulation 
(EC) n. 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 laying down 
community procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human and 
veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines Agency.  
34 Directive 2002/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 June 2002 on the 
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to food supplements.
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A further moment for a prior checking could before European Union Intellectual 
Property office, or Community Plant Variety office or Intellectual Property offices of the 
EU Member States, despite a coordination between the Regulation itself and the system 
for the protection of plant variety rights established by European Union legislation is still 
not present. 
Regulation (EC) n. 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 on Community plant variety rights, 
Regulation (EC) n. 1238/95 of 31 May 1995 that establishes rules for the application of 
the fees payable to the Community Plant Variety and Regulation (EC) n. 1768/95 of 24 
July 1995 for implementing rules on the agricultural exemption built the system for the 
protection of plant variety rights established by the EU. Anyway, the compliance with 
EU legislative framework on ABS allows intellectual property rights, valid throughout the 
EU, to be granted for plant varieties. As a matter of fact, disclosure requirements mean 
patent (and perhaps also other forms of intellectual property rights) applicants should 
disclose several categories of information concerning genetic resources, such as the source 
or origin and evidence of prior informed consent and benefit sharing, when these genetic 
resources are used in developing the innovation claimed in a patent application.
Due diligence obligation and an internationally-recognised certificate for compliance, 
as well as full information on genetic material and resources address how to apply for a 
vegetable patent under the aims of Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014. Without waiting for 
the Commission implementation how to apply for the vegetable patent under the light 
of the purposes of the Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014 and Nagoya Protocol, the ABS goals 
could be realised whether the plant patent is granted if the due diligence is not demon-
strable through documentation required for applying for vegetable plants patents. 
7.1. Breaching the due diligence obligation: weighing the impacts for users and pro-
viders of the lack of ABS information and its formal documents. As a consequence of 
infringement of paragraphs 3 or 5, Art. 4 of Regulation (EU) 511/2014, the utilisation 
of genetic resources or associated traditional knowledge shall be discontinued.35 When 
the information is insufficient, or uncertainties about the legality of access and utilisation 
persist, users shall obtain an access permit or its equivalent and establish mutually agreed 
terms, or discontinue utilisation.36
In the absence of prior informed consent having been obtained in a timely manner, 
mutually agreed terms having been established, and until an agreement is reached with 
the provider country concerned, no exclusive rights of any kind will be claimed by an user 
for any developments made via the use of genetic resources, that is determined to be, or 
is identified as likely to be, the causing pathogen of a present or imminent public health 
emergency of international concern. The meaning of health crisis falls under the scope 
of International Health Regulations (2005), or of a serious cross-border threat to health 
as defined in Decision n. 1082/2013/EU of the European Parliament and the Council.37
35 Art. 4, (2) of the Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014.
36 Art. 4, (5) (6) of the Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014.
37 Art. 4, (8) of the Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014.
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In my opinion, with a lack of information, recipients of research funding38 and user 
patenting will pay the consequences, over then, of course, the disadvantage for discon-
tinuing on the utilisation of genetic resources or associated traditional knowledge.39 For 
instance, on one hand, for EU research funds, we have to take into consideration that 
‘Sharing the benefits with disadvantaged populations, especially if the research is being 
carried out in developing countries’ is, among the others, one of the main ethical princi-
ples established by the EU legal framework related to Horizon 2020. According to Art. 
34 (1) of the H2020 Grant agreement, the beneficiaries of an EU project must carry out 
the action in compliance with: a) ethical principles (including the highest standards of 
research integrity) and b) applicable international, EU and national law. Thus, non-com-
pliance with the ethical principles, the Nagoya Protocol and Reg. 511/2014, for the grant 
beneficiaries, means that the grant may be reduced,40 and the agreement or participation 
of the beneficiary may be terminated.41 on the other hand, the lack of information and 
formal documents applying for the vegetable patent would produce a nullity of the bad 
patent if granted, not taking into consideration information requirements by the Regu-
lation (EU) 511/2014.
8. Conclusions. Art. 7(1) of the Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014 makes it clear that a due 
diligence declaration needs to be requested by the Member States (competent authorities 
responsible for the application of EU Law implementing the Nagoya Protocol42), the 
European Commission if the money is provided by EU funds and the EU offices or the 
public administrations of Member States in the case of request for market approval or 
placing products on the market. Nevertheless, the agencies for ABS control are not in 
charge of market approval.
It is possible to affirm that rather good control over the flow information is possible 
in the EU legal system, if all the public administrations or agencies involved check ABS 
due diligence fulfilment. only a crossing flow of information and data among the public 
bodies involved could build a working system in the EU framework. However, not all 
the products stemming from research and developing by genetic resources, or associated 
traditional knowledge are subjected to market approval or authorisation, or they derive 
from research activity using EU funds. 
At the moment, in which the Declare system still does not established, it seems that 
the providers, the owners of genetic resources and the consumers are not in a position 
to know who is using research and developing activities43 before market approval or at 
38 Point (25) Reg. (EU) n. 511/2014 /Art. 5 Reg. (EU) 2015/1866.
39 GoDT G., “The Multi-Level Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol in the European Union”, 
in CooLSAET B., BATUR F., BRoGGIATo A., PITSEYS J. AND DEDEURWAERDERE T., 
(eds.), Implementing the Nagoya Protocol Comparing Access and Benefit-sharing Regimes in Eu-
rope, Brill, 2015, Leiden Netherlands, p. 319, where the author talks about “piggy-back” procedures.
40 See Art.s 34 (4) and 43 Model Grant Agreement.
41 See Art.s 34 (4) and 50 Model Grant Agreement.
42 Art. 6, 9 and 11 Regulation (EU) n. 511/2014.
43 VoN kRIES C., G. WINTER G., “Defining commercial and non-commercial research and devel-
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the final stage of utilisation of the product (see paragraph 6.1). As a matter of fact, the 
declaration is not public, as well as data that shall be transmitted by the ABS competent 
authorities to ABSCH.
It seems that the main mission of the ABSCH provides stronger support for users, than 
providers. Furthermore, Art. 14 (2) of the Nagoya Protocol describes making mandatory 
information available in the ABSCH platform: (a) Legislative, administrative and policy 
measures on access and benefit sharing; (b) Information on the national focal point and 
competent national authority or authorities (CNA); (c) Permits or their equivalent issued 
at the time of access as evidence of the decision to grant prior informed consent (PIC) and 
of the establishment of mutually agreed terms (MAT). Also, according to Art. 12 (2), Art. 
17, (1) (a) (iii) and Art. 22 (6) of the Nagoya Protocol other information made available 
includes: (a) Measures to inform potential users of traditional knowledge associated with 
genetic resources about their obligations for access to and fair and equitable sharing of 
benefits arising from the utilisation of such knowledge; (b) Information provided to des-
ignated checkpoints that collect or receive, as appropriate, relevant information related to 
prior informed consent, the source of the genetic resource, the establishment of mutually 
agreed terms, and/or the utilisation of genetic resources, including from internationally 
recognised certificates of compliance (IRCC), where they are available; (c) Information 
on capacity-building and development initiatives at national, regional and international 
levels that should be shared through the ABSCH with a view to promoting synergy and 
coordination on capacity-building and development for access and benefit sharing. 
The flow of information available in the ABSCH platform seems to converse with the 
users more than with providers, stakeholders and consumers and appears to kindly invite 
the users to respect the ABS system. Providers, stakeholders and consumers, as well as the 
states that have the sovereign of the genetic resources used, have the possibility to discover 
the illegal utilisation of genetic resources only accidentally, after products are placed on 
the market. In this case, the only instruments for contesting the use of the illegal prod-
uct will be the judicial claim. In EU legal system, thanks to the EU multilevel guaranty 
system,44 a number of instances for providers, stakeholders and consumers and others 
private or public persons can bring ‘direct action, where appropriate, before the Court 
of Justice, (…) not intended to create new remedies in the national courts to ensure the 
observance of Community law other than those already laid down by national law’,45 
also if not all the members states still now have ruled the legal measure to comply with 
Nagoya Protocol. 
As a matter of fact, with regard to the EU legal system, individual rights can be ef-
fectively protected only if they are used in actions before national courts.46 It is for ‘the 
legal system of each Member State to determine which court has jurisdiction to hear 
opment under the Nagoya Protocol and in other context”, in E. CHEGE kAMAU E., G. WINTER 
G., SToLL P.T., (eds.) Research and Development on Genetic Resources. Public domain approach-
es in implementing the Nagoya Protocol, Routledge, 2015, London-New York, pp.125-147.
44 FoRSBERG T., “Normative Power Europe, once Again: A Conceptual Analysis of an Ideal Type”, 
in JCMS, vol. 49, n. 6, 2011, pp. 1183-1204. 
45 Rewe v Hauptzollamt kiel (C- 158/80), [1981] ECR, 1805.
46 Theresa Emmot v Minister for Social Welfare, (C-208/90) [1991] ECR, I-4269.
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disputes involving individual rights derived from Community law, but at the same time 
the Member States are responsible for ensuring that those rights are effectively protected 
in each case’.47
When the national system of protection cannot guarantee community rights suffi-
ciently, the equipment provided by the EU legal system comes into action. In the sys-
tem, a uniform network of safeguards for community individual rights (e.g., liability of 
a Member State, recovery of sums paid but not due, disapplication and obligation to 
interpret national law in conformity with community law) is provided when the judiciary 
of a Member State does not safeguard the effectiveness of the protection of community 
rights. The system does not envision specific or special protection for individual rights but 
provisions by Member States for effective national legal protection.
47 Ibidem.
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Legal approach for informed consent
and donation of biological samples
to biobanks for biomedical research: a glance to Spain1
Francisco Miguel Bombillar Sáenz
1. Biobanks and European Union Law: in varietate concordia. This paper aims to ad-
dress the legal approach for informed consent and the donation of biological samples to 
a biobank for biomedical research under Spanish regulation2 – one of the most advanced 
and complete of the European continent. I argue that it is not possible to hide in consents 
full of lawless and indeterminate terms for elaborating a kind of blank cheque in order to 
carry out any research based on biological samples.
To date, there is no international or European regulatory framework (in other words, 
of supranational nature) that controls in any uniform way3 the singular phenomenon of 
biobanks.4 These are public service structures organised for science progress and inno-
vation on health,5 which, if mismanaged, could damage the main fundamental rights 
regarding people’s dignity, privacy and physical integrity. 
The European Union Law has been unable to answer (beyond the implementation 
of community regulation in terms of data protection) the challenges6 that face European 
1 The opinions expressed here are exclusively the author’s responsibility and they do not necessarily 
represent the majority opinion of the Comité Coordinador de Ética de la Investigación Biomédica de 
Andalucía, of which he is a member. 
2 See the brilliant paper of ARIAS-DÍAz J., MARTÍN-ARRIBAS M.C., GARCÍA DEL Pozo J. 
and ALoNSo C., “Spanish regulatory approach for Biobanking”, in European Journal of Human 
Genetics, 2013, 21, p. 708-712.
3 This is inherent to all problems within the framework of the bioethics field. In this sense, we could 
think of the different legislative solutions adopted in the field of voluntary pregnancy termination, 
the patient’s rights at the end of his/her life or gestational surrogacy or posthumous fertilisation after 
the death of the husband. 
4 M.G. MIGLIAzzo already warned us about this in “Biobanche e diritti fondamentali: un feno-
meno da diagnosticare. Italia e Spagna a confronto” in Pérez Miras A., Teruel Lozano G.M. and 
Raffiotta E.C. (Edit by), Desafíos para los derechos de la persona ante el siglo XXI: Vida y Ciencia, 
Thomson-Aranzadi, 2013, Navarra, p. 240 ff.
5 For the Comité de Bioética de España, biobanks are ‘a fundamental institution in the exercise of 
research action in the field of biomedicine’. See ‘Informe del Comité de Bioética de España sobre el 
Proyecto de Decreto por el que se regula la Autorización, organización y Registro de los Biobancos 
en la Región de Murcia’, 2014, p. 3. 
6 See European Commission, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, ‘Biobanks for Eu-
rope. A challenge for governance’. Report of the Expert Group on Dealing with Ethical and Regu-
latory Challenges of International Biobank, 2012. 
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citizens regarding this particular scientific-technical sector – that has only been briefly 
legally explored (although it has been present for over two decades now7).
In any case, after reading the regulation enacted in this regard by the different Mem-
ber States of the European Economic Area8 (the case of Estonia,9 Iceland,10 Norway,11 
Portugal,12 Sweden13 or Spain) we can characterise biobanks14 as physical establishments15 
(usually part of a network16) that contain with unlimited nature17 (or limited in time18) an 
organised collection19 of biological samples with cession purposes to third parties (their 
main asset). Those samples possess associated information (description of the state of 
health, genealogy, genetic data and other information that could reveal the patient’s iden-
tity) that require special management in terms of data protection. 
Many biological samples are stored in these public service establishments in order 
to promote and advance biomedical research20 (on which this paper is based), health-
care assistance [with diagnostic21 and therapeutic purposes (highlighting blood and 
7 It is believed that was in the work of LoFT S. and PoULSEN H.E., “Cancer risk and oxidate DNA 
damage in man”, published in the Journal of Molecular Medicine, 1996, 6, where these establishments 
were mentioned for the first time in writing in the scientific literature.
8 See BRINCEIRo MoRAIA L et al, “A comparative analysis of the requirements for the use of data 
in biobanks based in Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the United kingdom”, in 
Medical Law International, March 2015, 14(4).
9 Human Genes Research Act (2000).
10 Act on Biobanks (2000).
11 Act relating to Biobanks (2003).
12 Lei n.º 12/2005, de 26 de Janeiro – informação genética pessoal e informação de saúde (DR no. 18, of 
26th January 2005).
13 Biobanks in Medical Care Act (2002).
14 MALANDA S. R.  provides a legal concept of biobank and oRFAo DE MAToS A. a technical 
concept, under the voice ‘Biobanco’, in CASABoNA R. C.Mª (Edit by), Enciclopedia de Biodere-
cho y Bioética, Comares, 2011, Granada, vol. I, respectively, in p. 131-146 and 129-131. In line 
with this, see also the work of RoMEo MALANDA S., “El régimen jurídico de la obtención y 
utilización de muestras biológicas humanas con fines de investigación biomédica en el ordenami-
ento jurídico español”, in Estudios de Deusto. Revista de la Universidad de Deusto, 2011, 59 (1), 
p. 183-228.
15 Portugal speaks of ‘repositories’. 
16 The term biobank ‘it refers not only to the physical facilities of the Biobank but, above all, to the 
management of the samples stored under that label, and particularly to the requirements for their 
cession’. ARIAS-DÍAz J. et al, “Spanish regulatory approach for Biobanking”, cit., p. 709.
17 Iceland or Spain.
18 Sweden or Portugal.
19 According with the dispositions of the Committee of Ministers of the European Council’s Recom-
mendation no. 4 (2006) on research on biological materials of human origin.
20 These biobanks are a very useful tool to promote biomedical research, ensure the availability of 
samples, prevent illicit traffic of biological materials and centralise the management of informed 
consent. RoMEo MALANDA S., “Biobanco”, cit., p. 142.
21 In fact, we can locate the origin of biobanks in the biological samples collections coming from diag-
nostic procedures (for example, biopsies or blood samples from newborns) that used to be stored in 
the anatomical pathology departments.
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tissue banks and, specially, cord blood banks22)], without dismissing forensic research. 
But, traditionally, it has been the therapeutic and forensic use, as opposed to that of 
biomedical research, which has found a greater normative development in the Spanish 
legislation.23
In Spain, as we will see in the following section, there is a detailed and advanced reg-
ulation, not without gaps,24 of legal (from 2007) and implementing nature (from 2011) 
regarding the gathering, storage or preservation and use of biological samples of human 
origin in a biobank for the purposes of biomedical research. It is precisely the aim of this 
paper to shed some light on this normative framework. other authors25 already faced this 
challenge with great solvency. 
In other countries, like Italy,26 there is no regulatory framework of generic nature 
on this matter, but is only partially addressed with the decisions from the Comitato 
Nazionale per la Bioetica, the orientations of the Società Italiana di Genetica Umana and 
the doctrine in the Garante per la protezione dei dati personali,27 on the authorisations 
issued on the application of the most important rule in terms of data protection,28 as 
well as by the specific dispositions enacted in the umbilical cord stem cells29 and the 
fight against terrorism and criminality fields, by creating DNA databases through the 
Treaty of Prüm.30 
22 See LARIoS RISCo D., “Donación y uso privativo de la sangre de cordón umbilical: aspectos 
jurídicos”, in Derecho y Salud, July-December 2007, 15 (2), p. 181-215.
23 As a sample, and without entering into the regulatory development of each of these Acts, take into 
account the Ley 30/1979, de 27 de octubre, sobre extracción y trasplante de órganos (BOE no. 266, of 
6th November 1979); the Ley 14/2006, de 26 de mayo, sobre técnicas de reproducción humana asistida 
(BOE no. 126, of 27th May 2006); the Ley 29/1980, de 21 de junio, de Autopsias Clínicas (BOE of 27th 
June 1980), as well as the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal, in the case of forensic or judicial autopsies; 
or the Ley Orgánica 10/2007, de 8 de octubre, reguladora de la base de datos policial sobre identificadores 
obtenidos a partir del ADN (BOE no. 242, of 9th october 2007).
24 Some of these shortcomings have recently been highlighted by DE ABAJo F.J. and RoDRÍGUEz-
MIGUEL A. in “Ley de Investigación Biomédica, diez años después: carencias y propuestas”, in ICB 
digital, March 2017, online in the URL: http://se-fc.org/gestor/images/icbdigital/101aarticulo.pdf 
[consulted on 17th April 2017].
25 For this reason, I highlight the studies carried out in this respect from the Inter-University Chair in 
Law and Human Genome, by professor Romeo and other collaborators as Pilar Nicolás Jiménez or 
Sergio Romeo Malanda.
26 MIGLIAzzo M.G., “Biobanche e diritti fondamentali...” cit., p. 244. 
27 MARRANI D, “Investigación biomédica y consentimiento informado para el tratamiento de datos 
genéticos”, in ADoRNo R. and IVoNE V. (Edit by.), Casos de Bioética y Derecho, G. Giappi-
chelli Editore-Tirant lo Blanch, 2015, Torino-Valencia, p. 117-118.
28 Decreto legislativo 30 giugno 2003, n. 196, Codice in materia di protezione dei dati personali (GU Serie 
Generale no. 174, of 29th July 2003. ordinary supplement no. 123). 
29 Ordinanza del Ministro della Salute 4 Maggio 2007 n.110, Misure urgenti in materia di cellule stami-
nali da cordone ombelicale (GU Serie Generale no. 110, of 14th May 2007).
30 Legge 30 giugno 2009, n. 85, “Adesione della Repubblica italiana al Trattato concluso il 27 maggio 2005 
tra il Regno del Belgio, la Repubblica federale di Germania, il Regno di Spagna, la Repubblica francese, 
il Granducato di Lussemburgo, il Regno dei Paesi Bassi e la Repubblica d’Austria, relativo all’appro-
fondimento della cooperazione transfrontaliera, in particolare allo scopo di contrastare il terrorismo, la 
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It is only through regulation on data protection that the European Union Law has 
emerged in this domain. one more evidence of the important role that data protection 
regulation have in the field of health. In fact, shortly, all national legislations – also in 
relation to biobanks – shall adapt to the provisions of the new General Data Protection 
Regulation of the European Union (GDPR), as they previously did regarding the Di-
rective of 1995.31 The personal data regarding health, as expected, is subject to special 
protection by this regulation32 (under the legal approach of Arts. 6 or 9 of GDPR), 
whether in healthcare assistance33 or the biomedical research field.34 Thus, among all 
health-related data mentioned here, the information obtained from tests or exams of a 
body part or a body substance, including the information from genetic data35 and bio-
logical samples (recital 35 in connection with Art. 4, sections 13, 14 and 15 of GDPR) 
are also included. 
At the European Union level, it is also relevant to view, along with other instru-
ments and regulatory acts (specially directives36), the role of the Charter of Fundamental 
criminalità transfrontaliera e la migrazione illegale (Trattato di Prum). Istituzione della banca dati na-
zionale del DNA e del laboratorio centrale per la banca dati nazionale del DNA. Delega al Governo per 
l’istituzione dei ruoli tecnici del Corpo di polizia penitenziaria. Modifiche al codice di procedura penale 
in materia di accertamenti tecnici idonei ad incidere sulla libertà personale” (GU no. 160, of 13th July 
2009. ordinary supplement no. 108). 
About the Treaty of Prüm, see the work of GÓMEz SÁNCHEz Y., “Los datos genéticos en el 
Tratado de Prüm”, in Revista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo, 2007, 7, p. 137-166. In relation 
to genetics, data protection and police databases, I refer to the doctoral thesis of BoBo RUIz J., 
“Intervención y gestión en la genética humana: el ámbito sanitario, la protección de datos y la inve-
stigación”, Universidad de Granada, 2005.
31 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27th April 2016 on 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (OJ L 119/1, of 4th May 2016). 
In this regard, it would also be appropriate to point out Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union and the Convention for the protection of individuals with regard 
to automatic processing of personal data no. 108 of the Council of Europe of 28th January 1981.
32 The RGPR is analyzed by BELTRÁN AGUIRRE J.L., “Tratamiento de datos personales de salud: 
incidencia del Reglamento General de Protección de Datos”, in Pérez Gálvez J.F. (Edit by), Salud 
electrónica. Perspectiva y realidad, Tirant lo Blanch, 2017, Valencia, p. 97-134; and SARRIÓN 
ESTEVE in his chapter on this monograph.
33 See, among others, SARRIÓN ESTEVE J. and BENLLoCH DoMÈNECH C., “Protección de los 
datos clínicos relativos a la propia salud”, in Fernández-Coronado González A. and Pérez Alvarez S. 
(Edit by), La protección de la salud en tiempos de crisis: nuevos retos del bioderecho en una sociedad 
plural, 2014, p. 331-359.
34 The community regulation considers specific guarantees and exceptions that can be applied to per-
sonal data processing with scientific research purposes in Article 89 of GDPR.
35 I refer to the work of GÓMEz SÁNCHEz Y., “La protección de los datos genéticos: el derecho a la 
autodeterminación informativa”, in Derecho y salud, 2008, 16 (1), p. 59-78; or NICoLÁS JIMÉ-
NEz P., “La protección jurídica de los datos genéticos de carácter personal”, Comares, 2006, Granada.
36 In the fields of high technology medicinal products commercialisation, particularly those obtained 
through biotechnology; of the legal protection of biotechnological inventions; or of the intentional 
release of genetically modified organisms in the environment.
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Rights,37 whose Article 3, section 2, declares the right to integrity regarding biomedical 
research and, among other aspects, establishes as a premise the previous free and informed 
consent of the source subject, the focus of this paper, and prohibits making the human 
body or its parts a source of financial gain (prohibiting therefore the commercialisation 
of biological samples). 
At the European supranational level, but out of the European Union, it is worth 
mentioning the works of the Council of Europe and, especially, the endorsement of the 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (oviedo Convention)38 and its addi-
tional Protocols on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings, on Transplantation of 
organs and Tissues of Human origin (2002), and on Biomedical Research (2004). It 
is also worth mentioning here the contributions of the three UNESCo declarations on 
aspects regarding biomedicine and human rights.39
And obviously I have to mention the Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)6 of the 
Committee of Ministers to member States on research on biological materials of human 
origin (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 11th May 2016) and the previous one 
Recommendation of March 2006.
In this context, the legal system on the management of biological samples in Spain 
is set out in Ley 14/2007, de 3 de julio, de Investigación biomédica40 (LIB, for its initials 
in Spanish), Title V [in particular in Chapters III (‘Utilización de muestras biológicas 
humanas con fines de investigación biomédica’) and IV (‘Biobancos’)], and in the Real 
Decreto 1716/2011, de 18 de noviembre, por el que se establecen los requisitos básicos de 
autorización y funcionamiento de los biobancos con fines de investigación biomédica y del 
tratamiento de las muestras biológicas de origen humano, y se regula el funcionamiento y or-
ganización del Registro Nacional de Biobancos para investigación biomédica41 (RDB, for its 
initials in Spanish).
In the same way, in Spain, in general we should follow the Ley Orgánica 15/1999, de 
13 del diciembre de Protección de datos de carácter personal42 (LoPD, for its initials in Spa-
nish), the Real Decreto 1720/2007, de 21 de diciembre, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento 
de desarrollo de la Ley Orgánica 15/1999, de 13 del diciembre, del protección de datos de 
carácter personal43 (RDLoPD, for its initials in Spanish), the Ley 41/2002, de 14 noviem-
bre, básica reguladora de la autonomía del paciente y de derechos y obligaciones en materia de 
37 OJ L 326, of 26th october 2012.
38 Instrument of Ratification of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of 
the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine (Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine), made in oviedo on the 4th April 1997 (BOE no. 251, of 20th october 
1990).
39 on this matter, see, among other works, the work directed by GRoS ESPIELL H. and GÓMEz 
SÁNCHEz Y., “La Declaración Universal sobre Bioética y Derechos Humanos de la UNESCo”, 
Comares, 2006, Granada.
40 BoE no. 159, of 4th July 2007 Article 3.b defines the treatment of biological samples as ‘operations 
and procedures for the collection, conservation, use and disposal of [···] biological samples’.
41 BoE no. 290, of 2nd December 2011.
42 BoE no. 298, of 14th December 1999.
43 BoE no. 17, of 19th January 2008.
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información y documentación clínica44 (LAP, for its initials in Spanish) and the remaining 
related regulation at the European, national and autonomous levels.
All these regulatory instruments, as well as others ones of ethical nature that we 
could mention here,45 concern biomedical research without losing sight of its close 
connection and implications with the ensemble of all fundamental rights. The ad-
vance of science and knowledge and health innovation should not warrant, in any 
case, a decrease in the exercise of fundamental rights. In sum, we cannot conceive 
the right to research, to freedom of creation and scientific production (GÓMEz 
SÁNCHEz),46 as absolute; its defence cannot protect damaging dignity, autonomy 
of the will, intimacy or corporal integrity of a person. Contrary to what Machiavelli 
proposed, the end does not justify the means, no matter how laudable the objectives 
to be achieved.47
This is the core idea of this work, on which we will pay special attention to the role of 
consent from the source subject in the donation of biological samples to a biobank48 and 
the requirements that must be met by institutions and researchers who deal with them. 
Specifically, this paper responds to the different scenarios that can be presented here, and 
in particular, the use of biological samples for purposes other than those authorised at the 
time by the source subject. 
In the next sections, we will argue that it is not possible to hide behind lawless and in-
44 BOE no. 274, of 15th November 2002. Application of a supplementary character by the second final 
provision of the LIB.
45 Think of the International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects 
of the Council for International organizations of Medical Sciences (CIoMS) in collaboration with 
the World Health organization; the Medical Deontological Code of the Spanish Medical Colleges 
organization; or the Declaration of Helsinki of the World Medical Association, whose last modifi-
cation took place in the 64th General Assembly, in Fortaleza, in 2013. 
46 on the legal nature of the right to research, among others, we refer to the work of GÓMEz 
SÁNCHEz Y., “La libertad de creación y producción científica: especial referencia a la Ley de Inves-
tigación Biomédica”, in Revista de Derecho Político, May-December 2009, 75-76, p. 489-514. 
47 Regarding the limits of the right to free scientific and technical production, the following pronounce-
ment by the Superior Court of Justice of Galicia is very enlightening and conclusive, although in the 
field of clinical trials: ‘This sacred right cannot be considered absolute when its exercise must be in 
close relation with the most sacred right to life and to the physical integrity of patients who undergo 
these tests. Broad, but not unlimited, must be the field of clinical research and hence its subjection 
to the ethical and deontological control of committees born for this purpose, given that the right 
to free scientific and technical production, as intended the recurrent, serious consequences could 
be followed for humanity by justifying the success of science all kinds of practices, even the most 
despicable, about the human being’. In the third legal ground in fine of the Judgment of the TSJ of 
Galicia (Contentious-Administrative Room, Section 1st), no. 251/2001 of 28th February.
48 Already in 2005, before the promulgation of the Law of Biomedical Research (of 2007), some au-
thors had the opportunity to pronounce in this respect as CASABoNA R. C.Mª, “Utilización de 
muestras biológicas y bancos para la investigación biomédica”, in IV Congreso Mundial de Bioética. 
Ponencias y comunicaciones, Sociedad Internacional de Bioética, 2005, Gijón, p. 79 a 104; or 
MARTÍN URANGA A., MARTÍN-ARRIBAS MªC., DI DoNATo J-H. and PoSADA DE LA 
PAz M., ‘Las cuestiones ético-jurídicas más relevantes en relación con los biobancos’, Instituto de 
Salud Carlos III-Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo, 2005, Madrid.
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determinate terms for elaborating a kind of blank cheque in order to carry out any research 
based on biological samples. This consent model would disobey the ethical and legal 
provisions ruling this sector. Previous consent is claimable, and not only for the inherent 
risks of the sample extraction itself, but mostly for the right of all humans to decide on 
their own body integrity and on the destination of their biological samples.
2. Storage of biological samples in a biobank, collection and a specific research project in Spain. 
After having delineated the field, let us proceed to analyse the legal regime that affects the 
treatment of human biological samples49 for biomedical research purposes stored in bio-
banks in light of the LIB and the RDB in Spain. In accordance with the regulatory frame-
work mentioned, the biological samples of human origin for biomedical research (Art. 22.1 
RDB) could be: 1) stored in a biobank, 2) preserved for use on a specific research project, or 
3) stored as a collection for biomedical research purposes in light of the organisational scope 
of a biobank.50 The legal system that could be applied in every case is different depending 
on where it is based and the purpose that justifies the gathering and preservation of samples. 
In this regard, the RDB includes the following definitions51:
- Biobank with biomedical research purposes: ‘public or private non-profit establish-
ment that holds one or several collections of biological samples of human origin 
with biomedical research purposes, organised as a technical unit with quality, or-
der and destination criteria, regardless of whether or not it holds other samples 
with other purposes’52 [Art. 2. b)].
- Collection of biological samples of human origin: ‘Permanent and organised ensem-
ble of biological samples of human origin, preserved out of the organisational 
scope of a biobank’ [Art. 2.f )].53 
- Biological samples of human origin preserved for use in a research project: ‘biological 
samples of human origin that are preserved in light of the organisational scope of a 
49 See the contributions of NICoLÁS JIMÉNEz P., among others, “Donación y utilización de material 
biológico humano con fines de investigación biomédica”, in LARIoS RISCo D., GoNzÁLEz 
GARCÍA L. AND DE MoNTALVo JääSkELäINEN F., PALoMAR oLMEDA A. AND 
CANTERo MARTÍNEz J. (Edit by), Tratado de Derecho Sanitario, vol. 2, Thomson Reuters-Aran-
zadi, 2013, Madrid, p. 939-967; or “El régimen legal de la utilización de muestras biológicas humanas 
en el marco de los bio-bancos para investigación biomédica”, in Comunicaciones en propiedad indus-
trial y derecho de la competencia, 2012, 66, p. 253-276.
50 ARIAS-DÍAz J. et al, “Spanish regulatory approach for Biobanking”, cit., p. 708-709.
51 I would like to remark that all the quotes collected in this paper have been unofficially translated 
from Spanish to English. 
52 In this regard, we could think, for example, of the biobank of the Public Health System of An-
dalusia. Regulated by the Decreto 1/2013 de 8 de enero, por el que se regula la autorización para la 
constitución y funcionamiento de Biobancos con fines de investigación en Andalucía y se crea el Biobanco 
del Sistema Sanitario Público de Andalucía (BOJA no. 7, of 10th January 2013).
53 This excludes, obviously, the biological samples of human origin that are exclusively preser ved for use 
in a specific research project, ‘provided that its preservation is not extended beyond the final date of the 
project and they are not going to be transferred’ [Art. 2.f ) in fine].
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biobank, exclusively for use in a specific research project, provided that its preser-
vation is not extended beyond the final date of the project and they are not going 
to be transferred’ [Art. 2.i)].
The legal treatment of biological samples of human origin preserved for use in a re-
search project does not present major interpretative problems a priori. The informed 
consent signed for this purpose will expressly dictate that those samples of the source 
subject can only be used by that specific researcher and, exclusively, within that specific 
investigation.
The legal treatment of the storage of these samples in a collection or in a biobank is 
worth more attention. The biological samples deposited in biobanks in Spain are regu-
lated by the provisions of Articles 58 and following in Chapter III, Title V of the LIB, 
regarding the gathering, previous information, consent, confidentiality, cession, preserva-
tion of data and samples, access to data and right to not be informed.
The incorporation of a collection of biological samples to a biobank could imply 
that these samples will be at the disposal of other researchers,54 unrelated to the one 
with which the source subject initially consented. The aim of cession to a third party is 
precisely what characterizes it. This would never be possible within a collection, since the 
samples –although they could be used in different research areas, in light of the signed 
consents – would always be in charge of the concrete researcher that the patient expressly 
authorised.
To this end, Article 70.2 of the LIB states that: ‘the biological samples incorporated 
by biobanks could be used for any biomedical research, in the terms described in this law, 
provided that the source subject or, if applicable, his/her legal representatives, have given 
their consent in these terms’. 
According to this rule and considering the highlighted purpose of public service ad-
vocated by biobanks, it is possible to transfer biological samples to a third party (other 
researchers) from these establishments, provided that this would have been duly informed 
to the source subject in the corresponding informed consent – although more general, 
but not blank cheque – agreed to that effect and that the samples are going to be used 
within the research area (they do not need to be related to a unique and specific research) 
authorised by the source subject. In these cases, as a consequence, it will not be necessary 
to request a new informed consent for every cession of biological samples that takes place 
in the context of the biobank and in terms of the informed consent subscribed to that 
effect by the subject source. 
But when the cession of biological samples is used in research projects that are com-
pletely different than the research area foreseen in the original cession informed consent 
that was signed by the source subject, it would be necessary to grant a new specific con-
sent (ex Art. 60.2 of the LIB). This provision of the LIB provides that ‘specific consent 
54 It is possible that the internal regulation of the biobank foresees some kind of cession priority to 
researchers or groups that provide samples more actively to the biobank, particularly in the case of 
special interest samples or limited in quantity. Instituto de Salud Carlos III, ‘Respuestas a las pre-
guntas más comunes sobre el Real Decreto 1716 / 2011 sobre Biobancos’ (Version of 15th November 
2012). Answer to question no. 22, in p. 9.
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may provide for the use of the sample for other lines of research related to the one initially 
proposed, including those made by third parties. If this were not the case [in line with 
Art. 58.2 LIB], the subject shall be requested to grant, if he or she deems it appropriate, 
new consent’.
As a result, according with the given consent, if the cession is intended for a non-au-
thorised research area by the source subject at that moment, it would be necessary to 
obtain a new consent. The opposite, besides being a breach of data protection regulation, 
would also mean to leave without implementation the basic framework of rights that 
assists all persons participating in biomedical studies. 
Moreover, the revocation of that initial consent is also possible here, that is, the 
source subject disavows that primitive assignment to third parties or other research ar-
eas. In fact, the GDPR guarantees that there is always consent that explicitly foresees 
the use of samples for research areas different from the original one, as well as the actual 
possibility that the donor rejects that ‘extended cession’, whether initially or later, in 
accordance with the consolidated ARCo (acronym of the rights of Access, Rectification, 
Cancellation and opposition) rights.
I am taking for granted a univocal concept of research area and related research 
area.55 Something that is not true in the Spanish legal system. I am facing with an inde-
terminate legal concept. It is therefore up to the Research Ethics Committees (REC) to 
determine when we are dealing with a research area related.56
Therefore, the legal approach that affects the cession of samples to a biobank seems 
to be more flexible – there is a thin and controversial separating line – than the one fore-
seen for the samples stored in a collection, where the samples are not depleted at the end 
of the research project that motivated their gathering but they cannot be transferred to 
third parties (a researcher, natural person,57 different from the original in charge of the 
collection), even though the research in question has similar characteristics. This means 
55 See SEoNE J.A. and CASADo DA RoCHA A., “Consentimiento, biobancos y Ley de Investi-
gación Biomédica”, in Revista de Derecho y Genoma Humano, July-Dicember 2008, 29, p. 131-
148, in esp., p. 144.
56 See DE LECUoNA I., “Los Comités de Ética como mecanismos de protección en investigación 
biomédica: Análisis del Régimen Jurídico Español”, Thomson Reuters-Civitas, 2011, Navarra, p. 
160 ff.
57 Given the case where the collection is decided to not be incorporated into a biobank, besides the 
project evaluation on which they will be used by the corresponding Research Ethics Committee 
(REC), the main researcher is compelled to communicate its storage and use to the centre, and also 
to register that collection (provided that is not anonymised) in the National Registry of Biobanks, 
with the purpose to inform other researchers and members of RECs of the existence of this collection. 
Respuestas a las preguntas más comunes sobre el Real Decreto 1716 / 2011 sobre Biobancos…, cit. Answer 
to question no. 25, in p. 10. In order to register a collection in this National Registry it is necessary 
that a natural person appears in the application as person in charge of the collection, and under no 
circumstances, can this be a corporation. The definition of collection itself is linked to a specific 
purpose, that appears in the consent document which was given to a specific researcher (natu ral 
person), unlike biobanks, which are structured as physical establishments with cession purposes 
to third parties. ‘Respuestas a las preguntas más comunes sobre el Real Decreto 1716/2011 sobre 
Biobancos…’, cit. Answer to question no. 42, in p. 17.
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that the source subject needs to authorise every cession to third parties, since its link is 
solely and exclusively with that researcher and the research areas that he or she proposed 
to him or her. 
To many authors, this is the main difference between a biobank and a collection: 
the biobank’s purpose is the cession to third parties, it is not a reservoir or a stationary 
structure, its raison d’être is the exchange of samples with other researchers. Therefore, 
for these authors, to require a specific informed consent to protect every cession would 
make biobank management a huge complex task. In RoMEo MALANDA’s words, ‘The 
truth is that the possibility to obtain a generic consent for biomedical research has been 
widely accepted in all fields (doctrine, public opinion, bioethics committees, legislators), 
and nowadays is an usual practice in most countries. The requirement to request the 
source subject’s consent for every specific use of the sample would be economically 
impracticable, as it forces the biobank to keep a continuous communication with every 
source subject and to regularly interfere in their lives, which could be extremely annoying 
and even, painful’.58 
3. The consent for gathering, storage or preservation and use of biological samples of 
human origin in a biobank in Spain. Article 4.1.I of the LIB – and Articles 45 and 
60.1 of the LIB regarding the treatment of biological specimens – states that ‘the free 
autonomy of persons who may participate in biomedical research or who may provide 
their biological samples will be respected, for which they must have previously given 
their express written consent after receiving the appropriate information’, which will be 
detailed by the researcher not only in writing59 but also orally to the subject who is going 
to participate in the research.
Thus, the gathering of samples, storage or preservation and subsequent use would 
require the corresponding previous written consent60 by the source subject, indicating the 
purpose (or purposes) that justifies its gathering and previous information of the conse-
quences and risks for health that could be involved in this extraction. We do not want 
the information provided to the source subject to be too technical or complex, which 
may even be counterproductive, away from the objective pursued (the protection of their 
rights, not the interests of the researcher), but is adequate to make him or her understand 
the real implications of his/her participation in the study, so that in the exercise of his/her 
autonomy opts for what he/she deems most appropriate in this regard.
58 RoMEo MALANDA S., “Biobanco”, cit., p. 144. of the same opinion NICoLÁS JIMÉNEz P., 
“Donación y utilización de material biológico humano con fines de investigación biomédica”, cit., 
p. 949.
59 obviously, if the subject of the investigation could not write or read (for example, a visual impair-
ment), consent may be provided by any means allowed by law to allow a record of their will (Art. 
4.1.IV LIB). The principles of universal accessibility and design for all included in the International 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (which in the case of the previous example 
would lead to the documents being drafted in Braille) must be taken into account here.
60 Article 6.2 Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights.
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In any case, with respect to this right of self-determination, the faculty of the source 
subject to give his/her consent must be guaranteed for every purpose separately61 (Art. 
23.1 RDB in connection with Art. 58.1 LIB). Remember that, according to Article 60.2 
of the LIB, the specific consent could foresee the use of the sample for other research 
lines related with the one proposed originally, including those performed by third parties. 
otherwise, the consent of the source subject will be necessary provided that these samples 
are intended to be used for a different purpose (Art. 58.2 LIB). The consent on the use 
of the biological sample will be given at the moment of the sample extraction or later 
(when its possible use for research purposes at the time of obtaining was not foreseen), 
in a specific way for a given research (Art. 60.1 LIB). In the latter case, it will be the 
researcher’s task – despite the inconveniences, also economic, that this can mean for the 
study – to contact these subjects again to obtain the appropriate consent.
Either because that sample is a part of the human body, and therefore, property62 of 
the source subject, or because it is a personal information support, which implies pro-
cessing of sensitive personal data that needs to be protected, it is always necessary to have 
the explicit consent of the source subject, even though it is of generic nature63 (with the 
nuances that we will expose).
Furthermore, it is not possible to use only one consent to participate in the study in 
question and to donate the samples to the biobank. The participation in a study cannot be 
subject to the cession of samples to a biobank, because that could lead to understanding 
that the principal aim pursued is not to carry out the study but to obtain a collection of 
samples. The patient can always participate in the study without having to give the excess 
of his/her samples to a biobank. Therefore, a single consent cannot be used to participate 
in the specific study and to donate the samples to the biobank. We are faced with two 
different realities.
Moreover, for Romeo Malanda, even if both consents can be given at the same time, 
the consent that protects the use of a sample in research must be independent of the one 
that is allowed to authorise its extraction.64 
In particular, when this request for samples takes place within the framework of a care 
process, further precautions should be taken to banish any hint of coercion to the source 
61 Article 22 Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with 
regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedi-
cine.
62 In ARIAS-DÍAz’s words: ‘While most countries are reluctant to grant donors property rights of 
the samples, in Spain, Germany, and Portugal donors maintain actual ownership of their samples. 
The role of a Biobank would be to act as a custodian or depositary trustee of the samples ensuring a 
proper use according to the will of the donor’. ARIAS-DÍAz J. et al, “Spanish regulatory approach 
for Biobanking”, cit., p. 711.
63 According to what CASABoNA R. C.Mª pointed out in ‘Utilización de muestras biológicas hu-
manas con fines de investigación biomédica y regulación de biobancos’, in SÁNCHEz CARo J. and 
ABELLÁN F. (Edit by), Investigación biomédica en España: aspectos bioéticos, jurídicos y científicos, 
Comares, 2007, Granada; and the content of the Committee of Ministers of the European Council’s 
Recommendation no. 3 (1992) on genetic testing and screening for healthcare purposes. 
64 See RoMEo MALANDA S., “El régimen jurídico de la obtención y utilización de muestras bi-
ológicas humanas…”, cit., p. 189.
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subject for the assignment of the samples. Consequently, ‘the patient must be made aware 
that allowing the research with his/her biological sample has nothing to do with clinical 
use of it’.65 This is in line with Article 6 of the LIB, which states that a person cannot 
be discriminated against because of his/her refusal to ‘give consent to participate in bio-
medical research or to donate biological materials, with the medical assistance provided 
to him/her’.66
Also, in connection with the provisions of LIB in Article 61, given the case that the 
samples are preserved (in compliance with the principles of necessity and sufficiency, only 
if they are necessary for the purposes that justified their gathering, unless the source sub-
ject has given his/her explicit consent for other subsequent uses), the source subject will 
be informed in writing of the preservation conditions, aims, future uses, cession to third 
parties and conditions for their withdrawal or to request their destruction. All of this 
must be considering that the identification data of the sample has not been anonymised, 
according with the LIB.
on a different matter, appropriately enough, this consent could be revoked complete-
ly or for certain purposes, at any time (Art. 23.5 RDB). When the revocation refers to any 
use of the sample, it will be immediately destroyed, without prejudice to the preservation 
of the resulting data from the studies that were carried out previously (Art. 60.3 LIB). The 
corresponding documentary evidence of all this should be kept.67
In the scenarios mentioned, the role assigned by the LIB to the REC plays a 
prominent role, as guarantors of respect for the ethical-legal framework that must prevail 
in biomedical research. Hence, Article 66.1 of the LIB provides for the obligation of 
any biobank to have an external REC,68 which, among other things, is responsible for 
assessing the criteria for obtaining the samples. Accordingly, in light of Articles 12.2.e 
and 62,69 prior to the collection of the samples, the RECs (where appropriate) shall report 
any biomedical research involving the collection and use of biological samples. Thus, a 
research project of this nature cannot be started without the previous and prescriptive 
favourable report of the corresponding REC.
65 Ibidem, p. 207. This is the reason why this author pleads for obtaining in these cases the consent in 
two different processes and in different documents.
66 Neither is there any discrimination because of its genetic characteristics (Art. 6 ab initio LIB). This 
connects with Article 58.6 of the LIB, which states that ‘in genetic diversity studies, local and eth-
nic traditions will always be respected, while avoiding practices of stigma and discrimination’. See 
RoMEo MALANDA S., “El régimen jurídico de la obtención y utilización de muestras biológicas 
humanas…”, cit., p. 224 ff.
67 The document with the consent of the source subject for the gathering and use of his/her biological 
samples will be issued in triplicate: one for him/her, one will be kept at the centre were the sample 
was extracted and the third will be kept by the biobank or the person in charge of the collection or 
the research, as appropriate (Art. 23.4 RDB).
68 The biobank of the Public Health System of Andalusia is the Comité Coordinador de Ética de la 
Investigación Biomédica de Andalucía. 
69 In this respect, it is of interest to consult the document issued by the Grupo para el uso de muestras 
biológicas para investigación biomédica, ‘Guía práctica para la utilización de muestras biológicas en 
investigación biomédica’, Instituto Roche, 2006, Madrid, p. 133 ff.
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Informed consent is a fundamental human right (STC 37/2011),70 consequence or 
explanation of the classic rights to life, physical integrity and freedom of conscience. It is 
not a simple formality, a mere cause of liability exoneration (although, obviously, it has 
logical consequences in this field71). It finds its foundation and support in the Spanish 
Constitution itself (Arts. 9.2 and 10.1), in the exaltation of the person’s dignity (Art. 
10.1) and in freedom (Art. 1.1), recognising the autonomy of the individual to choose 
according to his/her own interests and preferences (in this case, if he/she wants his/her 
samples to be subject to biomedical research and under what parameters).72 
In short, the source subject’s consent will always be necessary for biomedical research 
purposes when the biological samples were extracted for a different purpose, anonymised 
or not. 
Therefore, I think that a kind of presumed consent, of a legal presumption by which 
biological samples obtained for diagnostic and therapeutic purposes can be used for the 
purposes of biomedical research, is not completely correct, as pointed out in Article 
36.2 of Law 8/2003, of 8 April, of Castilla y León, on the rights and duties of persons 
in relation to health, with the following statement: ‘within the framework of applicable 
legislation, and provided that there is no opposition on the part of the interested party, 
centres, services and establishments subject to this Law may retain and use biological 
tissues or samples for lawful purposes other than those which gave rise to biopsy or 
extraction’.73
70 To that effect, the Spanish Constitutional Court Judgement 37/2011 already stated that the in-
formed consent is built ‘as a guaranteed procedure or mechanism for effectiveness of the patient’s 
will autonomy principle and, therefore, of the constitutional rules that recognise the fundamental 
rights that could be concerned in medical acts, and, distinctly, an implied and mandatory conse-
quence of the guarantee of the right to physical and moral integrity, reaching in this way a constitu-
tional relevance that determines that its neglect or defective performance could entail a damage of 
the fundamental right itself ’.
71 Which refers us, among others, to the system of responsibility that configures Article 18 of the 
LIB. For DÍAz MARTÍNEz, this provision ‘only applies to personal injury caused by invasive 
procedures used to obtain biological samples assigned for those purposes. It is a rigorous regime of 
strict liability, with reversal of the burden of proof in relation to causal link, limited temporarily to 
damages suffered during the investigation and in the year following its termination, accompanied 
by the compulsory subscription of insurance and of the determination of those responsible (jointly 
and severally) in case, for different reasons, the insurance did not cover the loss’. DÍAz MARTÍNEz 
A., “Daños causados en la investigación biomédica y la realización de estudios genéticos: conductas 
y omisiones determinantes de responsabilidad y resarcimiento”, in Diario La Ley, September 2007, 
4, p. 1671-1679, in esp., p. 1677.
72 The informed consent or the prohibition of experimentation in humans without previous and in-
formed consent has even passed as part of the articulation of the Constitutions of countries like Hun-
gary, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland or Bulgaria. Among others, in this respect, see the work of GÓMEz 
SÁNCHEz Y., “El derecho de autodeterminación física como derecho de cuarta generación”, in Brena 
Sesma I. (Edit by), Panorama Internacional en Salud y Derecho, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, 
UNAM, 2007, México, p. 205 ff.
73 See RoMEo MALANDA S., “El régimen jurídico de la obtención y utilización de muestras bi-
ológicas humanas…”, cit., p. 211.
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Having established this, the truth is that the LIB also considers, although as an 
exception, the processing of codified or identified samples with biomedical research 
purposes without the source subject’s consent, when the acquirement of that consent 
is not possible or represents an unreasonable effort74 (Art. 58.2 LIB, in connection with 
Art. 3.i) LIB). In these cases, whether or not the anonymisation of the samples (ex. Art. 
58.2.I LIB), that is, anonymisation does not exempt this procedure (anonymisation is 
not a sort of carte blanche to circumvent ethical and legal controls, to obviate the right to 
self-determination of the source subject75), would be necessary the favourable opinion of 
the corresponding Research ethics committee (REC),76 that committees should consider, 
at least, the following requirements:
a) That the research is of general interest.
b) That the research is carried out by the same institution (concept broader than that 
of ‘centre’) that requested the consent for the gathering of samples (which prevents 
it from being transferred to third parties outside the institution without the prior 
consent of the source subject).
c) That the research would be less effective or not possible without the identity infor-
mation of the source subject.
d) That there is no explicit objection from the source subject.
e) That the confidentiality of the personal information is guaranteed.
In line with this particular scenario, another exceptional assumption that we could name 
here is the one that refers to obtaining biological samples from deceased persons. our legal 
system77 seems to opt for this sampling whenever there is no prior opposition from the 
deceased (which in practice also implies express consent in this regard to his/her relatives), 
there is a clear interest for biomedical research, the data are anonymised and all this is en-
dorsed by the relevant REC. If we have questions regarding the position of the deceased or 
we cannot locate his/her relatives, it is recommended not to take the samples.78
74 In line with the dictates of Council of Europe Recommendation no. 4 (2006) that contemplates this 
supposition as an exception, in Article 2.1.ii.
75 See JoLY Y., kNoPPERS B.M. and NGUYEN M.T., “Stored tissue simples: through the confiden-
tiality maze”, in The Pharmacogenomics Journal, 2005, 5, p. 4.
76 Here it would be appropriate to use a process of pseudonymisation, with reversible encryption, 
in line with the dispositions of the new European Regulation. This implies the exemption of the 
researcher for requesting the consent of the patients from who the samples come from, without pre-
venting him/her from access to their identity information, protecting the ethical order to commu-
nicate to the patients any relevant finding, as provided in Article 4.5 of the LAP.
77 This is what we can gather from the reading of Article 48.2 of the LIB, which provides that ‘samples 
of deceased persons may be obtained and analysed whenever it may be of interest for the protection 
of health, unless the deceased expressly forbade it in life and so accredited’, as well as Article 13 of the 
Council of Europe Recommendation no. 4 (2006), on research with biological materials of human 
origin, and Article 5.2 of Law 30/1979, regarding the extraction of organs or other anatomical pieces 
of the deceased. NICoLÁS JIMÉNEz P., “Donación y utilización de material biológico humano 
con fines de investigación biomédica”, cit., p. 962 ff.
78 RoMEo MALANDA S., “El régimen jurídico de la obtención y utilización de muestras biológicas 
humanas…”, cit., p. 195-197.
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Regardless of the particularities exposed, the consent document for the gathering, 
storage or preservation and use of biological samples of human origin with biomedical 
research purposes will include, at least, according to the provisions of the second section 
of Article 23 of RDB (in connection with Art. 59 of the LIB and the regulation in terms 
of personal data protection), the following information for the source subject:
a) Description of the research project on which the sample is going to be used or the 
studies or research lines for which he/she gives consent.
b) Identity of the person in charge of the research, if applicable.79
c) Indication that the donated sample can only be used, as specified in the consent, 
for its storage in a biobank, for its preservation as a collection with biomedical research 
purposes or for its preservation for use in a specific research project.
d) Indication that the biobank and the person in charge of the collection or research 
project will have at the disposal of the donor all the information on the research projects 
on which the sample is used and that the external ethical committee of the biobank or 
the REC that evaluated the research project, will decide which cases will be indispensable 
that the information needs to be sent individually.
e) Expected benefits from the research project or the biobank (for the source subject 
and for society). Article 15.2.h itself states that ‘any future potential use, including 
commercial use, of the results of the investigation80’ shall be reported, which also implies 
the possibility of a patent application.81
f ) Possible inconveniences related to the donation and gathering of the sample, in-
cluding the possibility to contact the source subject in order to gather information 
or additional samples, to provide him/her the information foreseen in paragraph 
i) or other justified reasons, for this purpose, information could be requested re-
garding the way to do it, as well as his/her faculty to take position to that effect.
g) Place of analysis and destination of the sample at the end of the research. If these 
particulars are unknown at that moment, the commitment to inform about them 
when they are known82 will be established.
h) Indication that the sample or part of it and its related clinical details or linked with 
the future of it, will be held and, if applicable, transferred to third parties with 
biomedical research purposes in the terms foreseen in the LIB and the RDB.
i) The possibility to obtain information regarding his/her health or from his/her 
relatives, originating from the genetic analysis carried out with his/her biological 
sample, as well as on his/her faculty to make a decision regarding its communica-
tion (in the exercise, if applicable, of the right to not know83).
79 RoMEo MALANDA also includes here timely contact information so that the participants can 
resolve any doubts that arise. Ibidem, p. 201.
80 See Comité de Bioética de Cataluña, ‘Problemas éticos en el almacenamiento y la utilización de 
muestras biológicas’, 2004, Barcelona, p. 94 ff.
81 I agree to what they indicate in this sense MARTÍN URANGA A., et al in “Las cuestiones ético-ju-
rídicas más relevantes en relación con los biobancos”, cit., p. 63.
82 What is known as two-part consent.
83 NICoLÁS JIMÉNEz P., “Donación y utilización de material biológico humano con fines de inves-
tigación biomédica”, cit., p. 965 ff.
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j) Mechanisms to guarantee the confidentiality of the information obtained, 
indicating the identity of the persons who will have access to the source subject’s 
personal information that is not intended to be anonymised.
k) Right to revoke the consent, totally or partially, at any time, and its effect, including 
the possibility of destruction or anonymisation of the sample and that those effects 
will not spread to the resulting data from studies that were already carried out.84
l) Possibility to include some restrictions on the use of the samples.
m) Waiver of any right of economic, patrimonial or discretionary nature on the results 
or potential benefits that may originate, directly or indirectly, from the studies 
carried out with the donated sample for research purposes, in connection with 
Article 7 of the LIB.85 
The possibility that volunteers receive benefits for the results or commercialisa-
tion of products originating from the mentioned biomedical research86 –the ben-
efit-sharing87 – is not supported; although it is true that without the donated 
samples and their direct participation, the scientific process would not have been 
possible.88 
However, according to Article 58.3 of the LIB, and without prejudice to what was 
stated in Article 7 of the LIB, ‘an economic benefit could be fixed for the physical 
inconveniences, costs and other inconveniences that could originate from the ex-
traction of the sample’.89 
84 Anonymisation does not mean destruction of the sample.
85 Article 44.4 of the LIB repeats that gratuitousness principle: ‘during all the donation process, ces-
sion, storage and use of biological samples both for source subjects and for depositors, without 
prejudice to the compensation of costs’.
86 In the United States, the payment to voluntary subjects for their participation in studies or for the 
cession of biological material is envisaged. Actually, in the Moore vs. Regents of University of California 
case, the Supreme Court of California recognised the property right of a person on his/her cells. The 
Supreme Court revoked this Decision, but not because Moore was devoid of this right, but because 
in the signed consent benefit-sharing was not considered. Y. GÓMEz SÁNCHEz talks about all 
of this in “Reflexiones sobre la participación de voluntarios en la investigación”, in PÉREz MIRAS 
A., TERUEL LozANo G.M. and RAFFIoTTA E.C. (Edit by), Desafíos para los derechos de la 
persona ante el siglo XXI: Vida y ciencia, Thomson-Aranzadi, 2013, Navarra, p. 261 ff.
87 See IBC, “Report of the IBC on the Principle of the Sharing of Benefits’, 2nd october 2015. Analy-
zed by DE LECUoNA I., “Análisis de la Declaración Universal sobre Bioética y Derechos Humanos 
de la UNESCo: un referente en bioética y en investigación (e innovación responsable) en seres 
humanos”, in Revista de Derecho y Genoma Humano, 2016, 45, p. 181-209, in esp., p. 109-201. 
88 Moreover, what happens when these biological samples are used to, for example, test the operation 
of a machine and that it can obtain the CE marking? Here we would not be talking about biomedical 
research properly. Can we understand this use as encompassed by the generic consent that the source 
subject signed in his day? Should this person be also deprived of access to any kind of economic 
benefit? This is another element for the debate.
89 The regulation on clinical trials is articulated in this same line. Therefore, according with Article 
3.1 h) of the Real Decreto 1090/2015, de 4 de diciembre, por el que se regulan los ensayos clínicos con 
medicamentos, los Comités de Ética de la Investigación con medicamentos y el Registro Español de Es-
tudios Clínicos (BOE no. 307, of 24th December 2015), ‘the persons participating in trials with the 
possibility to receive a direct potential benefit for the research subject or his/her legal representatives, 
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n) In the case of minors’ samples storage,90 the guarantee of the minors to access to 
the information of the sample indicated in Article 32 of the RDB when they reach 
full legal age.91 
o) In the event that the biobank closes or the authorisation for its constitution and 
operation is revoked (in the cases considered in Art. 71 of the LIB), the informa-
tion on the destination of the samples will be at his/her disposal in the National 
Registry of Biobanks for biomedical research so he/she can express his/her agree-
ment or disagreement with the foreseen destination of the samples, all of this with-
out prejudice to the information that the source subject should receive in writing 
before giving his/her consent for the gathering and use of the sample.92
could receive from the promoter the reimbursement of the extraordinary costs and productivity loss 
originating from the participation of that person in the trial. In special situations, the RCE could in-
form favourably of the compensation to trial subjects for the inconveniences originating from their 
participation on it, provided that the said compensation does not have an influence on the subject’s 
decision to participate in the study’.
90 The gathering of biological samples from minors and disabled people with biomedical research pur-
poses, is subject to the conditions included in Article 58.5 of the LIB, which are: a) The adoption of 
all required measures to guarantee that the risk of intervention is the minimum possible for them; b) 
The possibility to obtain from the research relevant knowledge on the disease or situation that is of 
crucial importance to understand, palliate or cure it; c) That this knowledge cannot be obtained in 
any other way; d) To have the authorisation of his/her legal representatives or, if applicable, there are 
guarantees for his/her appropriate consent, for which it would be necessary that the information is 
provided in an adequate format according to his/her capacity and personal circumstances (following 
the guidelines marked regarding persons with functional disabilities, from the universal accessibility 
and design principles for everyone included in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disa-
bilities). NICoLÁS JIMÉNEz P., “Donación y utilización de material biológico humano con fines 
de investigación biomédica”, cit., p. 960 ff.
It is the researcher who is called to value, first, the ability of the subjects involved in the research. 
The problem arises with those elderly people who may be incapable, even temporarily (because they 
are in a coma or under the effects of a particular medical treatment), but are not incapacitated by a 
judicial sentence. About this and other issues, it is interesting to bear in mind not only the related 
written legislation, but also the provisions of, among others, the ‘Guías Éticas de Investigación 
en Biomedicina’ of the Comité de Ética del Instituto de Investigación de Enfermedades Raras of the 
Instituto de Salud Carlos III, from 2009; and RoMEo MALANDA S., “El régimen jurídico de la 
obtención y utilización de muestras biológicas humanas…”, cit., p. 193-195.
91 Without prejudice to the information that the source subject should receive in writing before giving 
his/her consent for the gathering and use of the sample, information regarding the use of his/her 
sample by third parties shall be provided, unless the information has been anonymised, and particu-
larly: a) Exact purpose of the research or studies for which the sample was used; b) Benefits expected 
and reached; c) Identity of the person in charge of the research; d) Genetic data duly validated and 
relevant for health that were obtained from the analysis of the samples donated; e) Mechanisms to 
guarantee the confidentiality of the information obtained; f ) Identity of the persons who accessed 
the source subject’s personal information that has not been dissociated or anonymised.
92 Article 28 of the RDB provides that the persons in charge of the sample collections for biomedical 
research purposes preserved out of the organisational scope of a biobank and who preserve biological 
samples for its use in a specific research project should communicate the date regarding the collec-
tions and samples to the establishment where they are preserved.
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p) In the case of samples used in specific research projects, and of collections for 
biomedical research purposes preserved out of the organisational scope of a bio-
bank, the source subject will be informed of the options, among the possible ones, 
regarding the destination of his/her sample at the end of the project or research.
According to the provisions of Article 23.4 of the RDB, when the samples are 
anonymised,93 only the information mentioned in paragraphs a), b), c), e) and f ) will be 
needed. Even in this case, it is also necessary to comply with six of the obligations in terms 
of information that Article 23 RDB points.94 
It should be remembered, in greater detail, that this last subsection of the RDB is in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 58.2.1 LIB, which provides that ‘The consent 
of the source subject will always be necessary when biological samples are to be used 
for biomedical research purposes, obtained for a different purpose, whether or not their 
anonymisation is carried out’.
The ensemble of the legal system, as well as the ethical and deontological rules 
applicable here, is unanimous, both in writing and in spirit, when requesting the previous 
consent, in the terms indicated, from the source subject for the extraction of biological 
samples for biomedical research. This previous consent is claimable, and not only for 
the inherent risks of the sample extraction itself (which may be minimal: consider, as an 
extreme example, those biological samples present in sanitary waste), but mostly for the 
right of all humans to decide on their own body integrity and on the destination of their 
biological samples. 
As praiseworthy as the pursued aim of this research might be, it could never be 
justified to leave without effect and, therefore, breach the ethical and legal framework 
to which the biomedical research is meant to be subject to. In this respect, the oviedo 
Convention already spoke about this in Article 2: ‘The interests and welfare of the human 
being shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science’ and, in this same line, Article 
2.b of the LIB. 
Hence, it is not acceptable to have a model of informed consent with no references 
to the study that it intends to serve (normally the donations to the biobanks take place 
93 When, for health reasons, the source subject or his/her family needs it, they could use the samples, 
provided that they are available and are not anonymised (Art. 58.4 of the LIB). This rule would 
not, however, apply to biological samples obtained for diagnostic purposes in order to proceed to 
a second diagnosis in another centre. This is clear from the jurisprudential study of NICoLÁS 
JIMÉNEz P., “The rights of patients on their biological sample: different jurisprudential opinions”, 
in Revista Derecho y Genoma Humano, 2003, 19, p. 207 ff., In relation to the SAP of Vizcaya of 
21st July 2000 (Rapporteur: María de los Reyes Castresana García) and the STSJ of Cantabria of 16th 
May 2001 (Rapporteur: María Josefa Artaza Bilbao). It starts here from the idea, erroneous, that the 
subject lacks a possible property right on the sample, as we defend here.
94 In any case, with RoMEo MALANDA (although he refers to Art. 59 LIB), we should not consider 
this long list as a numerus clausus. This author indicates that the source subject is also informed in 
relation to the source of funding that underpins the concrete research project. RoMEo MALANDA 
S., “El régimen jurídico de la obtención y utilización de muestras biológicas humanas…”, cit., p. 203.
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in the context of a specific research project),95 that does not inform the source subject of 
the studies to be made with his/her biological samples (not even of the possible research 
lines that could be carried out with them) or of the person or persons in charge of these 
studies (indicating, for example, if the samples are going to be transferred to researchers 
outside of Spain96). A model of informed consent of these characteristics would not be 
suitable for the ethical and legal parameters that govern the biomedical research in our 
country. That lack of information is a very serious breach of the legal-ethical framework 
that these studies are meant to respect. The source subject of the research must know at 
the moment of the donation of his/her samples to whom he/she is donating them and for 
what (although it is in generic terms, but never a blank cession). 
I repeat, there are no informed consent documents that are completely decontextualised 
from the study (or studies) to which it is supposed to serve. The gathering of samples 
for generic use of clinical details and biological material in order to carry out future 
biomedical research studies are not supported under standard informed consents. It is not 
possible to hide behind lawless and indeterminate terms for elaborating a kind of blank 
cheque in order to carry out any research based on samples. 
knowing the interest and opportunity that a study supported by that kind of consent 
could have, the truth is that this consent model would disobey the provisions of the LIB 
and the RDB. In order that the biological samples incorporated into a biobank could be 
used for any biomedical research, in the terms disposed in the LIB, it is necessary that the 
source subject (or, if applicable, his/her legal representatives), has given his/her consent97 
in these terms, complying with the dispositions of the referred Article 23 of the RDB. 
I share with Romeo Malanda and Nicolás Jiménez the opinion that generic consents 
(that is, specific but broad; which authorise the cession of samples to third parties to be 
used in different research lines) could be considered in our legal system on account of the 
right to self-determination (although we could also claim, as he states, that without com-
95 Neither is it logically feasible, as we have already pointed out in this work, that the participation in 
a study is linked to the transfer of samples to a biobank.
96 Article 11 of the LIB states in this respect the following: ‘The intra-Community and extra-Commu-
nity entry and exit of biological samples of human origin for the purposes of biomedical research 
referred to in this Law shall be governed by the provisions established by regulation. In the case of 
biological samples from biobanks, the conditions of assignment and security established in Title V 
of this Law shall also be observed’. We have to put this in connection with the provisions of Article 
16 of the Council of Europe Recommendation no. 4 (2006), which states that ‘biological materials 
and personal data associated therewith should only be transferred to another State if that State 
ensures an adequate level of protection’. one problem that may arise here is that different ways of 
assessing the value of the informed consent of the source subject (counterposing specific consents 
to lax consent) can be found between the biobanks of one and the other country when proceeding 
with the assignment of samples between them. In greater detail, see RoMEo MALANDA S., “El 
régimen jurídico de la obtención y utilización de muestras biológicas humanas…”, cit., p. 223; and 
NICoLÁS JIMÉNEz P., “Donación y utilización de material biológico humano con fines de inves-
tigación biomédica”, cit., p. 958 ff.
97 For the sake of completeness, see CAPLAN A.L, “Consent and anonymization in research invol-
ving biobanks”, in embo Reports, 2006, 7. 
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plete information98 it is not possible to give consent to future studies that are unknown 
at that moment). 
However, what is important, therefore, is to know the concrete terms in which 
the appropriate consent was signed to authorise these assignments. The diction of this 
model of consent, on the other hand, will have to be validated by the competent ethical 
committee of investigation.
Furthermore, we conclude with Romeo Malanda that we should not discard the 
possibility to include some kind of restriction in these consents, meaning that there is no 
place for blank cheques or denying the possibility to establish some limits to avoid these 
consents from becoming too lawless. We should give the source subject the possibility 
to exclude any kind of research line that causes him/her ethical problems (for example, 
related with the beginning of life).99 More when it is demonstrated than the European 
citizens (67% of the Spanish population) are reluctant to the broad consents.100 
In short, according to Arias Díaz101: “Facing the issue of the extent of the donor 
informed consent, the Spanish approach has been to define a particular regime for 
biobanks, allowing a certain degree of flexibility to the possible use of the samples, 
without implying, however, that the informed consent has been given as a ‘blank’ consent. 
Instead, the donor gives consent for the storage of the sample in an authorized Biobank, 
considered to be a somewhat ‘controlled’ place”. 
In the same way, the Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)6 of the Committee of 
Ministers to member States on research on biological materials of human origin says: 
‘Prior to consent to or authorisation for the storage of biological materials for future 
research, the person concerned should be provided with comprehensible information 
that is as precise as possible with regard to: the nature of any envisaged research use 
and the possible choices that he or she could exercise; the conditions applicable to the 
storage of the materials, including access and possible transfer policies; and any relevant 
conditions governing the use of the materials, including re-contact and feedback’ (Art. 
10.1).
98 In the case that a sample is transferred to a biobank with a more generic consent (including one or 
several research lines), the key point of the debate would be what information about those lines is 
required in that generic consent. For example, would it be enough to note that the sample is trans-
ferred for future studies on genomics and cancer? or would it be necessary to amplify this informa-
tion (including the line’s general aims) or making it more specific (requiring the type of cancer or 
genetic tests)? This is a required debate that even today does not have a consensus. 
99 RoMEo MALANDA S., “Biobanco”, cit., p. 144.
100 In the European Commission’s words: ‘Interestingly, attitudes in Europe towards broad consent 
are also shaped by levels of information: the more people know about biobanks, the more they are 
ready to give broad forms of consent, whereas the less they know the less likely are they to partici-
pate’. In fact, ‘Given the lack of awareness about biobanks and the concerns about privacy and data 
protection, the European stake-holders in biobank research need to work hard to develop efficient 
mechanisms for informing European citizens about biobank research, why it is there, and what it is 
doing’. In “Biobanks for Europe. A challenge for governance”, cit., p. 27.
101 ARIAS-DÍAz J et al, “Spanish regulatory approach for Biobanking”, cit., p. 711.
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on a different matter, the fact that in research healthy subjects or volunteers not 
affected by any kind of pathology could participate, does not lead us to lower our guard 
in the need to obey the guarantees indicated.102 
4. Special regulation of cession and gathering of biological samples of human origin with 
biomedical research purposes by biobanks in Spain. Although this contribution has focused 
on analysing informed consent, before finalising these thoughts, I would like to outline 
some of the legal peculiarities of the assignment and collection of biological samples of 
human origin for biomedical research by biobanks. 
In Spain, biobanks and persons in charge of collections could gather biological sam-
ples of human origin through cession, gathering from corpses103 or from living subjects, 
always under the LIB and RDB provisions (Art. 33.1 RDB).104
The cession of samples or collections of samples to biobanks and persons in charge 
of collections should be performed through a previous written agreement105 (Art. 22.2 
RDB). This agreement shall be signed between the title holder of the biobank or the 
person in charge of the collection of destination, and the title holder of the biobank or 
the person in charge of the collection of origin of the samples.106 
The biobank or the person responsible for a collection could transfer the samples 
102 This matter was already addressed by Y. GÓMEz SÁNCHEz, in “Reflexiones sobre la participación 
de voluntarios en la investigación”, in Desafíos para los derechos de la persona ante el siglo XXI: 
Vida y ciencia, cit., p. 259-274. 
Currently, the Andalusian Parliament is discussing a Proposición no de ley regarding the creation of a 
registry of persons who wish to be included in clinical trials developed in Andalusia 10-16/PNLP-
000053 (BOPA, no. 256, of 24th June 2016). The overall average is positive, but presents some 
problems of an ethical nature that are being taking care of actually. one of the main concerns is, for 
example, the inclusion of healthy volunteers. In any case, this Andalusian regulation does not intend 
–it could not do it anyway, because it is of European and National origin– to modify the actual legal 
framework that controls the clinical trials with medicinal products.
Particularly, regarding the samples field, we also have in Andalusia a Registry of Sample Donors for 
Biomedical Research, an initiative of the Health Department of the Junta de Andalucía in order to 
promote biomedical research among all the population that uses the Public Health System of An-
dalusia (SSPA for its initials in Spanish). Here, it is important to follow the provisions of the Orden 
de 15 de junio de 2015, por la que se crea en el ámbito de la Consejería de Igualdad, Salud y Políticas 
Sociales el fichero de datos de carácter personal denominado ‘Donantes de Muestras para la Investigación 
Biomédica en Andalucía’ (BOJA no. 120, of 23rd June 2015). 
103 In connection with Article 36 of the RDB. 
104 Because of its legal particularities, we will not mention here the legal system that affects the cell lines 
deposit in the National Bank of Cell Lines and their cession for research. Y. GÓMEz SÁNCHEz 
talks about this matter seamlessly in “El Banco Nacional de Líneas Celulares y el depósito y cesión 
de las IPSC”, in BALAGUER CALLEJÓN F. and ARANA GARCÍA E. (Edit by), Libro homenaje 
al profesor Rafael Barranco Vela, vol. 2, Thomson-Civitas, 2014, Madrid, p. 1587-1608.
105 Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 10 and 11 of the RDB on the explicit disposal of the 
destination of the biobank’s stored samples in closing or authorisation revocation decisions for the 
constitution and operation of the biobank.
106 In those cases in which both parts agree it will not be necessary to conclude the agreement.
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(in the minimum quantity needed to carry out the project107) to the person in charge 
of a research project, provided that the source subject has given his/her consent for 
the cession. The cession of samples will only be possible for applications coming from 
research projects that have been scientifically approved (Art. 34.2 RDB).
In the case of biobanks, if the consent document, as we mentioned above, does not 
foresee the use of the sample for the research line, in relation with the one proposed 
originally, that the person in charge of the research, to whom the samples are going to 
be transferred, intends to carry out, it would be necessary that the source subject gives 
a new consent (Art. 34.2 RDB), as it is necessary to prove that the cession have the 
approval of the source subject and does not violate his/her wishes.
As a general rule, the samples and related information will only be transferred 
anonymously or dissociated (Art. 34.3 RDB). In those cases where the nature of the 
research project requires additional clinical information regarding the source subjects, 
the biobank or the person in charge of the collection will coordinate the gathering of this 
information with the centre where the sample was obtained, provided that this has not 
been anonymised. In the sample request application, the specific measures to be applied 
in order to guarantee the confidentiality of personal data that could be attached to the 
cession will be detailed.
The person in charge of the research would need to file an application for the cession, 
which shall include the project in question and the explicit commitment to not use the 
requested material for a different use than the one indicated there, with the favourable 
opinion of the corresponding RCE attached, regarding the project for which the sam-
ples are being requested. In the case that the donor is a biobank, the cession shall be 
informed objectively by the scientific and ethic committees108 and by the title holder of 
the scientific direction, regarding the application filed (Art. 34.3 RDB in connection 
with Art. 69.2 LIB). 
Remember that Article 62 of the LIB indicates that, in any case, the RCE’s favoura-
ble report regarding the centre, for the gathering and use of biological samples for bio-
medical research and biodiversity studies will be necessary, particularly when the use of 
biological samples coming from deceased persons or when planning the incorporation 
of a biological sample to a research line not related with the one for which the consent 
was initially obtained have been foreseen.
Moreover, the application shall be attached with a cession agreement document, 
signed by the person in charge of the research and the biobank or the person in charge 
of the collection, that should include the following (Art. 34. 5 RDB):
a) The obligation of the recipient to ensure the traceability of the sample.
b) Availability guarantee of validated and relevant genetic information for health 
that, if applicable, is gathered from the samples’ analysis.
107 This remark appears repeatedly in LIB and RDB. Article 69.3 in fine provides that ‘the quantity of 
sample transferred will be the minimum needed to carry out the project’.
108 In those cases where the Research Ethics Committee is responsible for delivering the opinion regar-
ding the project is the same ethical committee of the biobank, it will only be necessary to deliver one 
opinion regarding the project.
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c) In the case that the donor is a biobank, the commitment to comply with the inter-
nal regulation of operation of the donor biobank on everything applicable.
d) The commitment to destroy or return to the biobank or to the person in charge of 
the collection the excess material once the project is completed.
The costs for gathering, preservation, manipulation, shipment and other similar costs 
related with the samples could be charged with the cession of every sample (Art. 69.3 
LIB). That is, there is an economic consideration for these concepts in favour of the 
biobank. 
The gathering, transport, storage, manipulation and shipment of samples will be 
performed under biosecurity conditions (Art. 69.4 LIB).
In the case that the donor is a biobank,109 the cession application could be denied 
when any of the external committees of the biobank or the title holder of the scientific 
direction have given unfavourable information, or when the person in charge of the 
research has violated any of the commitments or obligations mentioned in previous 
sections regarding previous cessions of samples from the same biobank.110 The cession 
dismissal shall be reasoned and notified to the applicant (Art. 34.6 RDB in connection 
with Art. 69.5 LIB).
In the case that the biobank is a public body (as is the case in Andalusia), the pro-
cedure for the cession or cession dismissal shall be subject to the provisions of the Ley 
39/2015, de 1 de octubre, del Procedimiento Administrativo Común de las Administraciones 
Públicas, with the possibility to appeal in the terms provided on this Law. 
5. Some conclusions. To date, we do not have an international or European regulatory 
framework (beyond the implementation of the community regulation in terms of data 
protection) that controls in any uniform way the singular phenomenon of biobanks – 
public service structures organised for science progress and innovation on health, which, 
if mismanaged, could damage the main fundamental rights. 
This has forced the different Member States of the European Economic Area to dic-
tate their own internal regulation in this respect. In Spain, we discuss the detailed and 
advanced regulation regarding the gathering, storage or preservation and use of biologi-
cal samples of human origin in a biobank.
All the regulatory instruments, as well as others of ethical nature that we have men-
tioned here, concern biomedical research without losing sight of its close connection 
and implications with the ensemble of all fundamental rights. The advance of science 
and knowledge and health innovation should not warrant, in any case, a decrease in the 
109 The biobank will include in its annual report, the following provisions of Article 34.7 of the RDB, 
a reference to the sample cessions carried out, that shall include the identification of the persons in 
charge of the studies, the centres where the samples are going to be stored and the research projects.
110 Although in the field of clinical trials, there is some connection with this assumption by the ruling 
of the Supreme Court of Madrid (Contentious-Administrative Room, Section 7th), no. 1188/2013, 
of November 7th. It is discussed here the suspension by the CEIC of the Ramón y Cajal University 
Hospital of Madrid of the clinical trial promoted by the recurrent investigator for not meeting the 
requirement of suitability, in view of their repeated previous breaches.
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exercise of fundamental rights. Either because that sample is a part of the human body, 
and therefore, property of the source subject, or because it is support of personal infor-
mation, which implies processing of sensitive personal data that needs to be protected, 
it is always necessary to have the explicit consent of the source subject, even though it 
is of generic nature.
It is not possible to hide behind lawless and indeterminate terms for elaborating a 
kind of blank cheque in order to carry out any research based on samples. knowing the 
interest and opportunity that a study supported by that kind of consent could have, this 
consent model would disobey the ethical and legal provisions ruling this sector. This pre-
vious consent is claimable, and not only for the inherent risks of the sample extraction 
itself, but mostly for the right of all humans to decide on their own body integrity and 
on the destination of their biological samples. 
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Individual rights and property rights
in human genetic databases: a common-law perspective
Maurizio Borghi
1. Introduction. Human genetic databases (HGD) are essential facilities for medical 
research, which attract huge public and private investment worldwide and growing at-
tention at policy and legislative level.1 HGD are large collections of biological samples 
and personal details of individuals belonging to a given regional group or sharing some 
genetic characteristics, aiming at covering a whole group or a significant sample of it.2
For public HGB projects to be successful, broad segments of the population must 
provide access to biological information and other medical and personal data.3 Typically, 
HGB combine genotype data derived from biological samples with other personal infor-
mation about individuals’ medical history, such as clinical data, genealogical data, and 
information on the health, lifestyle and environment of the individuals.4 They may also 
collect research reports, publications and data generated by the use of the database, and 
thus developing into “hubs” of collaborative research and investigation.
Participants in HGB projects may have expectations of collective benefits resulting 
from the use of the samples and information they provide access to. In this connection, 
particular concerns are raised by uses of the resource that are commercial in nature or that 
otherwise involve financial benefits. These uses are typically premised upon the issuance 
of patents on research outputs. 5 However, given the broad range of actual and potential 
uses of HGB, in which often public and private interests conflate in a tangle of shared 
1 See generally RICHARD TUTToN and ooNAGH CoRRIGAN (eds.), “Genetic Databases: So-
cio-ethical issues in the collection and use of DNA”. London and New York, Routledge, 2004; MAT-
TI HäYRY et al., “The Ethics and Governance of Human Genetic Databases. European Perspectives”. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007; BERNICE ELGER “Ethical Issues of Human Genet-
ic Databases: A Challenge to Classical Health” (London and New York: Routledge, 2012).
2 Genetic databases are defined by the Uk Human Genetic Commission as being “collections of 
genetic sequence information, or of human tissue from which such information might be derived 
that are or could be linked to named individuals” House of Lords Select Committee on Science and 
Technology, 2001.
3 BRENDA M. SIMoN, “How to Get a Fair Share: IP Policies for Publicly Supported Biobanks”, 
Stanford Journal of Law, Science and Policy 1 2009, p. 66.
4 Jean V McHale “Regulating genetic databases: some legal and ethical issues”, Medical Law Review 
12 (2004) 70-96, 72. 
5 SIMoN B., “How to Get a Fair Share”, p. 68. For a comprehensive discussion on HGB in relation 
to open access principles, see Roberto Caso and Rossana Ducato “Intellectual Property, open Sci-
ence and Research Biobanks”, Trento Law and Technology Research Group, Research Paper n. 22, 
october 2014.
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interests, it is not always easy to define the boundaries of the legal entitlements of the 
various parties involved. In particular, the question arises as to the legal instruments to 
ensure that the use of HGB delivers collective benefits in line with the expectations of 
participants and the society at large. To answer this question, this chapter will focus on 
the tension between individual rights of participants in HGB projects and proprietary 
rights that arise in relation to the making and use of these resources.
HGB present a tension between individual rights and property rights at three different 
levels.
The first level is the material and information that constitute a HGB as such. This 
typically include biological samples, genotype data extracted from biological material 
(genetic information), medical data and other personal information. While these material 
and information are commonly perceived as individuals’ ownerships, the current legal 
framework is not prepared to recognize property rights at this level. This may create ten-
sions between participants’ expectations and actual use of genetic resources.
The second level is the aggregate collection of those blocks: once collected and ar-
ranged systematically, individuals’ data and information constitute a database, which is 
eligible for protection under either copyright law or other neighbouring rights. The prop-
erty rights that the law creates at this level are a two-edges sword: they can be used to 
secure exclusive use over essential facilities for genomics research (including commercial 
research), but also to exclude, or to otherwise regulate, uses that are commercial in nature 
or involve financial benefits.
The third level is in fact the use of the database and the material and information 
herein contained. The use may generate new information, which in turn may be con-
verted in products and methods derived from this use (e.g. drugs, therapies, diagnostic 
methods). Such new information, products and methods may be eligible to attract other 
intellectual property rights, in particular patents. The chapter will discuss contract-based 
policies recently adopted to regulate ownership at this third layer. It will be shown that 
these policies are a valuable tool to give effect to principles encoded in international law, 
which would otherwise remain dead letter in common-law jurisdictions.
2. Background and international framework. The completion of the Human Genome Pro-
ject at the dawn of 21st Century marked the beginning of the “post-genomic era”,6 which 
promised to change forever the direction of bio-medicine and medical research in general. 
It is in this connection that, even before the sequence of human genome was completed 
in 2003, various initiatives were launched worldwide to create large population databases 
combining genetic information with other personal medical data. Given the many legal 
and ethical implications of the use of information that potentially affects the life of every 
human being, policy makers worldwide addressed possible regulatory instruments and 
principles. In 1997 UNESCo issued the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome 
and Human Rights, preceded by the “Bermuda Principles” set by the Human Genome 
6  TUTToN R. and  CoRRIGAN o.P., “Genetic Databases: Socio-Ethical Issues in the Collection 
and Use of DNA”,  London, Routledge, 2004, p. 1.
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organization in 1996, which declared the human genome “heritage of humanity” and set 
down the fundamental principles for the collection and use of genetic information, such as 
“free and informed consent”,7 confidentiality8 and non-discrimination.9 The Declaration 
sets down also general conditions for the exercise of scientific research10 and, in its art. 4, 
provides that “The human genome in its natural state shall not give rise to financial gains.”
The controversial experience of the Icelandic Biogenetic Project, launched by the Ice-
landic government in 1998 in collaboration with an US private company, proved the 
limited effect of the principles established by the Declaration and prompted for a more 
specific regulatory framework for the use of genetic information.11 The debate that fol-
lowed the early experience with genetic databases resulted in the adoption, in 2003, of 
the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data. In its art. 19, the Declaration 
provides that 
“In accordance with domestic law or policy and international agreements, benefits re-
sulting from the use of human genetic data, human proteomic data or biological samples 
collected for medical and scientific research should be shared with the society as a whole 
and the international community.”12
The provision is followed by an exemplary list of what may constitute a “benefit” for 
the purpose of giving effect to the norm, and this include notably the “provision of new 
diagnostics, facilities for new treatments or drugs stemming from the research”.13
The tem “benefit” is construed broadly, but it is not clear whether it applies also to fi-
nancial gains resulting from the exploitation of those benefits. Compared to art. 4 UDHG 
7 UDHG 1997, art. 5 (b): “In all cases, the prior, free and informed consent of the person concerned 
shall be obtained. If the latter is not in a position to consent, consent or authorization shall be ob-
tained in the manner prescribed by law, guided by the person’s best interest.”
8 UDHG 1997, art. 7: “Genetic data associated with an identifiable person and stored or processed 
for the purposes of research or any other purpose must be held confidential in the conditions set by 
law.”
9 UDHG 1997, art. 6: “No one shall be subjected to discrimination based on genetic characteristics 
that is intended to infringe or has the effect of infringing human rights, fundamental freedoms and 
human dignity.”
10 UDHG 1997, art. 13-16. For a critical discussion of the cultural underpinnings of the UDHG 1997 
see Shawn Harmon “Ethical Rhetoric: Genomics and the Moral Content of UNESCo’s ‘Universal’ 
Declarations”, University of Edinburgh Working Paper Series, no. 2011/27.
11 As part of this project, the Icelandic government gave a private company, deCoDE Genetics, access 
to medical records and genetic data of 270,000 Icelanders (plus around 700,000 deceased people) 
without prior informed consent, based on a Parliament Act. The case raised many controversies and 
was brought before the Supreme Court of Iceland, which declared the Act unconstitutional in 2003 
(Guðmundsdóttir v The State of Iceland, No. 151/2003). The project was discontinued, but deCoDE 
Genetics developed their proprietary database and filed a number of patents applications in the US 
and other jurisdictions. A search on Espacenet (the database for patent search worldwide hosted by 
the European Patent office) returns 617 patents or patent applications with “deCoDE Genetics” as 
applicant. For a critical discussion see Maria Bottis “Iceland and genetic databanks: where ‘consent’ 
to genetic research means patenting a nation’s genes”, paper presented at the ETHICoMP confer-
ence, Sweden, September 12-16, 2005.
12 IDHGD 2003, art. 19.
13 Ibid., art. 19(iii).
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1997, which excludes “financial gains” in relation to human genome “in its natural state”, 
art. 19 IDHGD 2003 does not rule out financial gains resulting from the use of genetic 
data and other genetic material. So, while the benefits resulting from the use of genetic data 
must be “shared with the society as a whole and the international community”, nothing is 
said regarding the financial gains derived from the exploitation of those benefits.
It remains unclear whether, for instance, patenting a drug stemming from research on 
human genetic data would be compatible with art. 19 IDHGD 2003. To be sure, art. 19 
cannot be interpreted as a general limitation to patentability. First of all, the Declaration 
is with no prejudice to international agreements, in particular the WTo Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of 1992, which is recalled 
in the preamble. Art. 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement requires Members countries to make 
patents available “for any inventions […] in all fields of technology”,14 subject to the only 
possible exclusions listed in the subsequent paragraphs. These may cover inventions con-
trary to public morality or ordre public,15 methods of diagnosis, treatment and surgery,16 
biological processes (other than microbiological processes) for the production of plants 
and animals.17 No other exclusions are permitted under the TRIPS Agreement. This 
means that art. 19 IDHGD cannot be construed as extending the scope of the permitted 
exclusions to patentability. In other words, a national country is not allowed to introduce 
in its legislation a general exclusion to patents derived from research on human genome.
on the other side, the requirement of “benefit-sharing” established in art. 19 IDH-
GD is clearly at odds with indiscriminate and uncontrolled “propertization” of human 
genetic data. Patents are the strongest legal form of protection over research findings. 
Whether these findings are “shared” or not, largely depends on the way in which legal 
entitlements over them are handled. In other words, while art. 19 IDHGD does not curb 
the availability of patents and other property rights over products and methods derived 
from the research on human genetic data, it does impose conditions on the exercise of 
those rights. These conditions will be discussed in section 4 below, after having examined 
the conflicts arising between individual rights and property rights at the level of individ-
ual information (section 2) and aggregation of information into databases (section 3).
3. Rights in HGB “building blocks”: biological material, information and data. Genetic 
information is part of the broader spectrum of medical data,18 and it is a well-established 
principles in both civil law and common law jurisdictions that “informed consent” must 
be given for medical data to be used for medical research lawfully.19 The IDHGD 2003 
specifies that such consent must be “free, informed and expressed” and must not be ob-
14 TRIPS Agreement 1992, art. 27(1).
15 Ibid., art. 27(2).
16 Ibid., art. 27(3)(a)
17 Ibid., art. 27(3)(b). A thorough discussion of patentability of human genetic material is outside the 
scope of this chapter. See generally Pozo M. D., “Patenting Genes”, Cheltenham, Elgar, 2017.
18 See IDHGD 2003, Preamble.
19 Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword Consent in the Law (oxford and Portland, oR: Hart 
Publishing, 2007), 245-248.
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tained by the inducement of “financial or other personal gain”.20 This standard applies to 
both consent in having personal information and biological material included in a genetic 
database and consent in making use of information and material for a specific research 
purpose. This latter requirement has proven to be very difficult, if not impossible to meet, 
in the case of HGB. Research in biomedicine and molecular biology evolves speedily and 
new potential uses of the resources included in the databases emerge continually. Hence, 
for instance, information and material initially collected on a small scale for clinical pur-
poses may subsequently merge into a larger database which is used to conduct large scale 
epidemiological research, or it can even become a profitable resource for commercial uses 
by the pharmaceutical industry. obtaining new consent for uses that were not predictable 
at the time the information was released might be too burdensome or even impracticable. 
The 2003 Declaration addresses this problem in art. 16, “Change of purpose”, which 
provides that data “Should not be used for a different purpose that is incompatible with 
the original consent” unless the proposed new use “corresponds to an important public 
interest reason and is consistent with the international law of human rights”,21 or unless 
the data in question is “irretrievably unlinked to an identifiable person”.22 In the latter 
case, the use must only be “in accordance with domestic law” or with the procedures 
established by national ethics committees.23
The standard applied by legislators and regulatory authorities to assess new uses that are 
inconsistent with the original consent may vary significantly, but share some common prin-
ciples. It is presumed that, once an individual has given informed consent to use their data 
to carry on a given research, he or she would give consent to other uses too, insofar as it fits 
in the same objective of promoting public health.24 An approach that has been applied in 
this respect is based on the principle of social solidarity, which broader in scope than “public 
interest”. Social solidarity means that an individual does not only have a presumptive inter-
est, but also a duty to facilitate research and to provide knowledge that could be crucial for 
the health of others.25 Since individuals accept the benefits that flow from medical research, 
they have an obligation in justice to contribute to social practices which produce them.26 
Under this approach, the use of data for research purposes is in principle lawful—even when 
informed consent has been obtained for a more limited purpose, such as clinical use.27
20 IDHGD 2003, art. 8(a).
21 IDHGD 2003, art. 16(a).
22 IDHGD 2003, art. 16(b).
23 Ibid.
24 As the House of Lords Selected Committee on Genetic Databases puts it, “we believe that it can 
generally be presumed that individuals are content for data about them to be used for the common 
good, provided that their personal privacy is protected” (quoted in MCHALE J. “Regulating genetic 
databases”, 82).
25 CHADWICk Ruth and BERG kåre, “Solidarity and Equity. New Ethical Frameworks for Genetic 
Databases”,  in Nature Reviews Genetics, 2 , 2001, p.  318 and 327.
26 See HARRIS J., “Scientific Research and Moral Duty”, in Journal of Medical Ethics, 31 2005, p. 
242.
27 Ibid. However, this “liberal” approach is not endorsed by everyone. See McHALE J., “Regulating 
genetic databases”, p. 81 and 82. others base the “general consent” approach on a more fundamental 
obligation “flowing from the interconnection between bodies and the world from which an individu-
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The doctrine of social solidarity—and associated principles—may limit significantly 
the individual’s control over the use of their genetic information. An even more impor-
tant limitation derives from the rule of “anonymization” of data. As acknowledged in art. 
16(b) IDHGD, once data are “irretrievably unlinked” to an identifiable person, they fall 
outside the scope of individual’s rights. Does this mean that those data can be processed 
for uses that are inconsistent or even at odds with the initial purpose? The common-law 
jurisprudence tends to respond to this question in the affirmative, as exemplified by the 
Source Informatics case.
3.1. Limits on individual’s control over the use of genetic information: the Source Infor-
matics doctrine. Source Informatics is a case on the processing of anonymized information 
for purposes other than those for which the information was initially collected.28 Source 
Informatics Ltd. used information provided by medical doctors and pharmacists to create 
a database of drug prescriptions. The database comprised the doctor’s and patient’s name, 
the date of the prescription, the drug prescribed and the quantity of the dose. This was 
valuable information for pharmaceutical companies to analyse prescribing habits and tar-
get marketing communications to doctors. With the consent of doctors and pharmacists, 
but not of the patients, Source Informatics sold the database purged from the patient’s 
personal details to the pharmaceutical industry. The Department of Health stated in a 
policy document that this conduct was breaching the patients’ confidentiality, despite 
the fact that the information was anonymized. This was on the ground that “the patient 
would not have entrusted the information to the GP or pharmacist for it to be provided 
to the data company”.29 Source Informatics brought an action challenging the policy 
document, which was rejected at first instance. However, the decision was reversed in 
appeal. Here the court ruled that there is no misuse of personal data when there is no risk 
of breach of confidence, and therefore no risk of damage to the patients, irrespective of 
the fact that the patients gave their consent for a specific use only.
The decision of the Court of Appeal has been subject to criticism.30 For the sake of 
our analysis, this case is important insofar as it highlights the narrow approach adopted 
by common-law jurisprudence with respect to individuals’ control over the use of per-
sonal medical information. As Deryck Beyleveld observed, the right of individuals over 
medical information should not be limited to prevent uses that would be detrimental to 
themselves or their own interests. Rather, “individuals have the right to know what will be 
al has benefitted in the past and will benefit in the future” (HERRING J. and CHAU P-L, “My body, 
your body, our bodies”, in Medical Law Review 15 , 2007, p.  34 and 55.), or simply on the notion of 
“gift”: once an individual has given her permission, then she may be regarded has having “donated” 
her DNA and ceded control over it (McHALE J., “Regulating genetic databases”, p. 80).
28 R v Department of Health, ex parte Source Informatics Ltd [2001] FSR 8.
29 Although “[t]he duty of confidence may in some circumstances be outweighed by the public interest 
in disclosure”, the Department maintained that selling information to the pharmaceutical industry 
“could [not] be argued to be in the public interest” (quoted in R. v Department of Health, ex parte 
Source Informatics Ltd [2001] FSR 8, § 7).
30 See LAURIE G., “Genetic Privacy. A challenge to Medico-Legal Norms”,  Cambridge University 
Press, 2000, pp. 224-226.
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done with personal information about themselves and to control how it is used and how 
it is disposed”.31 Criticizing the argument of the Court, Histed and Beyleveld remarked 
that “[p]atients might object to the purpose to which the information, once rendered 
anonymous, is to be put”,32 and conclude that it is incorrect to say that the information 
is no longer “theirs” since they are no longer identifiable. on the contrary, they argue, 
“the information has been obtained from the personal information they provided, and 
would not exist otherwise”.33 Under this approach, the individual’s legal interest not to 
have their medical data used in ways that are contrary to their moral beliefs should not 
be exhausted with the first release of the information, nor should it be completely ruled 
out by the anonymization of the information. As Graeme Laurie observes, when personal 
information is released for a given purpose, there is a “legitimate expectation of use–why 
would we necessarily expect that information given for a perfectly legitimate health pur-
pose could then be used for an entirely unrelated research or marketing purpose?”34
The Source Informatics case sets a precedent for the use of medical data in the com-
mon-law jurisprudence, which founds an obvious application to genetic information in-
cluded in HGB. It can be safely concluded that common law does not preclude the use 
of genetic information for purposes that are entirely unrelated from – or even at odds with 
– the purpose for which the information was initially collected, insofar as the information 
is not linked to an identifiable person.
3.2. Property rights in biological material and data. It is a long established principle at 
common law that property rights cannot subsist in the human body or in parts thereof. 
The principle has been reiterated by the Uk supreme court (the House of Lords) in a 
landmark criminal law decision in 2005.35 The facts of the case are curious: The defendant 
committed a robbery pointing his index finger at the victim from inside his jacket pocket, 
falsely pretending he had a gun in his pocket. He was charged with robbery and with 
“possession of an imitation firearm” in the course of the robbery. Reversing the decision 
of the court of appeal, the House of Lords dismissed the second claim, on the ground that 
the hand or finger is not something that can be “possessed”: 
“one cannot possess something which is not separate and distinct from oneself. An 
unsevered hand or finger is part of oneself. Therefore, one cannot possess it. […] What is 
possessed must under the definition be a thing. A person’s hand or fingers are not a thing.”36
31 BEYLEVELD D., “Law, Ethics and Genomics”, in Business Briefing: PharmaTech, 2001, p. 30.
32 HISTED E. and BEYLEVELD D., “Betrayal of confidence in the Court of Appeal”, in  Medical 
Law International 4(3&4), 2000, 277, p. 295. The authors provide the following examples: “Roman 
Catholics might object to new contraceptive methods being developed from information they have 
provided. Those who disapprove of the policies of some pharmaceutical companies towards devel-
oping countries might object to these companies profiting from their information. The patenting of 
human sequence is integral to the process of the new drug development, but some consider this to 
be immoral” (Ibid.)
33 Ibid.
34 LAURIE G., “Genetic Privacy. A challenge to Medico-Legal Norms”, p. 226.
35 R. v Bentham, [2005] UkHL 18.
36 Ibid., § 7 (per Lord Bingham).
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The possession of material extracted from the body has not been yet tested by courts. 
Case law from the USA suggests that in biological material extracted from the human body. 
The first of this line of cases is Moore v. Regents of the University of California.37 The plaintiff 
was a patient of the Medical Center of the University of California at Los Angeles who un-
derwent a treatment for an uncommon form of leukaemia. In the course of the treatment, 
samples of his body fluids and other biological material where taken, which were later devel-
oped into a cell line that was patented and commercialized. In its majority opinion, the Su-
preme Court of California dismissed Moore’s conversion claim on the patent, among other 
things, on the ground that the plaintiff had no property rights over removed body parts.
In Greenberg v Miami Children’s Hospital38 plaintiffs were a group of parents of chil-
dren affected by Canavan disease, who provided the Hospital with children’s tissues for 
research on the disease, and three non-profit organizations who aided in the identification 
of other affected families and helped developing a confidential database. Researchers of 
the Hospital isolated and patented the gene sequence and developed a genetic screening 
test. The court dismissed several of the plaintiffs’ claims, including lack of informed con-
sent, breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent concealment of the patent, and misappropria-
tion of trade secrets, but it upheld a claim of unjust enrichment made by the donors of 
the tissues. Interestingly, though, the claim was upheld not because the donors had a legal 
entitlement over the tissues, but on the ground that they invested “time and significant 
resources” in the collaboration with the researchers.39
The principle that no ownership subsists in biological material was clearly affirmed 
by the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit in Washington University v Catalona.40 Dr. 
Catalona was an urologist specialist in prostate cancer who was employed by Washington 
University. When he moved to another university he tried to take a biobank of around 
100,000 biological samples with him. He sent a letter to the patients who donated the 
samples asking them to authorize the transfer. Washington asserted that it, not the pa-
tients, own the samples and sued to establish ownership of the biological material. Con-
firming the District Court’s finding, the Appeals Court upheld the claim of Washington 
University: patients who have donated biological samples with valid consent, do not have 
an ownership right and cannot direct, transfer or control their use.
4. Intellectual property rights in aggregated data: the legal protection of databases. Under both 
European and US laws, collections of data attract copyright protection only when the way 
in which content is selected and arranged bears in itself an element of authorial original-
ity or creativity.41 This is normally not the case with “comprehensive” databases, namely 
databases that comprise, or aim at comprising, given factual information related to a 
37 Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 51 Cal. 3d 120 (1990)
38 Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., 208 F. Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
39 “[T]he facts paint a picture of a continuing research collaboration that involved Plaintiffs also invest-
ing time and significant resources.”
40 Washington University v William J. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985 (2006).
41 Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of databases, art. 3(1); Feist Publications v. Rural Tele-
phone Service Co. Inc. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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whole class of subjects. Examples of comprehensive databases are telephone directories, 
where no creativity is involved in the selection and arrangement of the contents.42 Some 
HGB too, like population genetic databases, can lack the necessary element of creativity 
in selection and arrangement to attract copyright protection.
However, under EU law, even databases that do not meet the threshold of copyright 
protection are eligible for a sui generis form of protection. The sui generis database right, 
which was introduced in 1996 by the European Database Directive, affords protection to 
virtually any aggregation of contents, on condition that “substantial investment” has been 
made “in either the obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents”.43 As we will 
see, the condition is not difficult to be met in HGD.
There has been extensive scholarly discussion on the effect of the database right on 
access to information, especially in the context of scientific research and education.44 In 
the Evaluation Report on the Database Directive, issued on 2005, the European Com-
mission acknowledges that “[t]he issue of access to ‘information’ is of concern to various 
categories of users”.45 As Reichman and okediji straightforwardly put it, the regime of 
the sui generis database right “introduced radical new restrictions on access to and use of 
compilations of data that were previously unknown to any intellectual property para-
digm”.46 This is because this regime brings together the proprietary features of copyright 
with those of the industrial property paradigm. Like copyright, the sui generis database 
right arises automatically with no need of entering an examination process or fulfilling 
any formalities. Like patents, however, it gives an extensive control over the “use” of the 
protected subject matter as such and comes with a relatively weak system of exceptions 
and limitations. This combination of copyright-style subsistence and patent-style scope 
creates a hybrid regime with strong proprietary features, is much more effective than legal 
entitlements of individuals as a tool to control the use of HGD.
4.1. The “substantial investment” requirement: which genetic databases are protected? Ar-
ticle 7 of the Database Directive sets forth the unique requirement in order for an aggre-
gation of data to be eligible for protection, namely that a “substantial investment” has 
42 As in Feist v Rural, cit.
43 Directive 96/9/EC, art 7(1).
44  See the seminal article of Jerome REICHMAN H. and SAMUELSoN P., “Intellectual Property 
Rights in Data?”, in  Vanderbilt Law Review, 50, 1997, p. 52. See also DERCLAYE E., “Legal Protec-
tion of Databases. A Comparative Analysis”, Cheltenham, Elgar, 2008 and the literature herein cited.
45 First evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of databases, p. 10. Examples in-
clude: “information in the public domain (eg an electoral register); information where the database 
constitutes the only available source of that information (e.g. a telephone directory); information 
pertaining to academic and scientific research and other public interest users such as consumers, the 
disabled, libraries; information which is ‘created’ independently of any other activities where the 
primary purpose or principal activity is the creation of a database whether using own data or data 
acquired from another source (e.g. an encyclopaedia); information which is generated from ‘spin-off’ 
databases (eg football fixtures lists)”. (Ibid).
46 Jerome REICHMAN H. and  okEDIJI R. L., “When Copyright Law and Science Collide: Em-
powering Digitally Integrated Research Methods on a Global Scale”, in Minnesota Law Review 
96, 2012,  1362, p. 1419.
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been made “in either the obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents”.47 This 
requirement is essentially split into two cumulative conditions, namely that the investment 
made is “substantial” and it is “of the right kind”—i.e. directed towards “either obtaining, 
verification or presentation”, and not to something else. Neither of these conditions is diffi-
cult to meet. As to the “substantiality” requirement, it has been interpreted by the European 
Court as a de minimis rule which should not preclude, for instance, that databases that are 
mere “spin-offs” of other activities attract protection.48 What seems to be relatively more 
challenging is the second condition, namely “towards what” is the investment directed. In a 
series of cases brought before the European Court, the requirement has been developed as 
implying a distinction between expenditure of resources and skills to create the content of 
the database, and investment directed towards the collection of pre-existing content.49 While 
the latter is eligible to attract protection, the former is not. The rationale of this distinction 
is to exclude from protection the so-called “sole source” databases, i.e. databases that con-
tain data or information which are not available elsewhere. Making up data not otherwise 
available leads inevitably to the creation of sole sources databases, and exclusive rights over 
these kind databases would result in a de facto monopolization of facts and information. 
According to the CJEU, this would be contrary to the intention of the European legislator.
In the context of HGB, this distinction in the criteria for eligibility suggests that in-
vestment in generating genotype data does not count towards attracting protection under 
sui generis database right. Although extraction of genotype data from biological samples 
may well represent the main share of investment in a HGB, it is not the only one. Sub-
stantial investment is also needed in other stages of the making of HGB, for instance at 
the stage of collecting data from the population or presenting the data in a workable and 
retrievable format. Given the relatively low threshold of “substantiality”, it is out of ques-
tion that most of the HGB attract protection under sui generis database right in Europe.
Similarly, any aggregation of content that is created in relation to the genetic informa-
tion for purposes of research may be equally protected, since no new data are technically 
created. This could be the case of repositories of scientific resources—including articles, 
abstracts and data—generated through text mining techniques to cover specific genom-
ic research fields.50 Since the sui generis database regime applies, these research-oriented 
resources receive automatically full protection in Europe, even if they are not meant for 
commercial exploitation. 
47 Database Directive, Art. 7(1).
48 “[P]rotection is also possible where the obtaining was initially for the purpose of an activity other than 
the creation of a database. For the Directive also protects the obtaining of data where the data was not 
obtained for the purposes of a database” (The British Horseracing Board Ltd and Others v William Hill Or-
ganization Ltd (Case C-203/02), 9 November 2004 [2005] 1 C.M.L.R. 15; Stix-Hackl Advocate Gener-
al, § 47). For a critique of this approach see DERCLAYE E., “Databases ‘Sui Generis’ Right: Should we 
Adopt the Spin-off Theory?”, European Intellectual Property Review, 2004, 402, pp. 407-408.
49 Fixtures Marketing Ltd v Oy Veikkaus AB, Case C-46/02 [2004] ECR I-10365; Fixtures Marketing 
Ltd v Svenska Spel AB, Case C-338/02 [2004] ECR I-10497; Fixtures Marketing Ltd v Organismos 
Prognostikon Agonon Podosfairou (OPAP), Case C-444/02 [2004] ECR I-10549.
50 REICHMAN H. and  okEDIJI R. L., “When Copyright Law and Science Collide: Empowering 
Digitally Integrated Research Methods on a Global Scale”, p.1367 and 1368.
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4.2. Scope of protection and limitations. The sui generis database regime provides 
for the exclusive right to “prevent extraction and/or re-utilization of the whole or of a 
substantial part”51 of the protected database. “Repeated and systematic extraction and/
or re-utilization of insubstantial parts” is also restricted, insofar as that it implies acts 
“which conflict with the normal exploitation” of the database or “unreasonably preju-
dice the legitimate interests of the maker of the database”.52 “Extraction” is defined as 
the “permanent or temporary transfer of all or a substantial part of the contents of a da-
tabase to another medium by any means or in any form”, while “re-utilization” means 
the “making available to the public” of the database’s content—in whole or in part—by 
distribution, rent, on-line or other forms of transmission.53 In British Horseracing Board 
v William Hill, the CJEU has made clear that both the thresholds of “substantial part” 
and of “repeated extraction of insubstantial parts” can be reached whenever unauthor-
ised acts of extraction or re-utilisation have the result of reconstituting “the whole or 
a substantial part of the contents” of the database and prejudicing the investment of 
the database maker—either by individual action or cumulative effect.54 This practically 
means that every extraction from a database through automated means falls within the 
scope of the sui generis right. In this respect, this right can be understood as preventing 
automated access to a database’s content. In theory, one could speculate on whether 
some of the ‘uses’ of the database’s content made by search engines and knowledge 
discovery tool qualifies as ‘re-utilization’, insofar as they do not make content available 
to the public. However, as we have seen, the sui generis right covers extraction per se, 
even absent re-utilization—as indicated by the use of the double conjunction ‘and/or’ 
in Article 7(1). This makes any examination of the purpose of the secondary use of the 
database’s content largely speculative.
Few exceptions to extraction and re-utilization are available, and the range of per-
missible activities with respect to protected databases is significantly narrow compared 
to copyright. Practically, the only meaningful use that may be carried out on electronic 
databases without authorization is “limited extraction”—but not re-utilization—for the 
non-commercial purpose of “illustration for teaching or scientific research”.55 The excep-
tion has limited value in case of scientific research on HGB, for two reasons. First, most 
of the research carried out in relation to HGB – such as bio-informatics – requires use of 
large amount of data. Second, beneficiary of the exception may be seriously hampered in 
51 Database Directive, Art. 7(1).
52 Ibid, Art. 7(5).
53 Ibid, Art. 7(2).
54 The British Horseracing Board Ltd and Others v William Hill Organization Ltd (Case C-203/02), 9 
November 2004 [2005] 1 CMLR 15, § 95.
55 Database Directive, Art. 9(b). The two other permitted activities are extraction for private use (but 
only for non-electronic databases, Art. 9(a)), and “extraction and/or re-utilization for the purposes 
of public security or an administrative or judicial procedure” (Art. 9(c)). In comparison, the parallel 
exception that applies to copyright-protected databases is broader in scope, since it permits “use” of 
the database for the same purpose, and accordingly it covers also activities that fall under “re-utili-
zation”. Ibid, Art. 6(2)(b). See WALTER M. M. and VoN LEWINSkI S.,  “European Copyright 
Law”, oxford, oxford University Press, 2010, 9.9.10.
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publishing the results of his research, since any partial disclosure of data may amount to 
re-utilization of the database’s content. For this reason, it seems practically very difficult 
if not impossible to lawfully carry out scientific research on an HGB without authori-
zation from the owner. Relying on this strong form of protection, the database owner 
can set the conditions upon which research on HGB is permitted. These may include 
restrictions on patent filing and on the exercise of other intellectual property rights.
5. Regulating the use of HGB by contract-based policies. Many HGB have policies that im-
pose specific conditions on the use of genetic information. These include rules on the use 
of intellectual property rights arising from research on the datasets.56 The Uk Biobank, 
a major charity-supported initiative that recruited 500,000 participants between 2006-
2010, requires all researchers to place results in the public domain after a “reasonable 
period” of confidentiality.57 Although, as stated in the governance policy, the Biobank 
“is not expected in itself to lead to patentable inventions that return significant income”, 
this possibility is not excluded in principle, and commercial companies are allowed to 
access the database “if their proposal falls within the Uk Biobank purpose and complies 
with the usual scientific and ethics requirements”.58
The rules of the Genomics England Clinical Interpretation Partnership (GeCIP) is-
sued in August 2016 are inspired by the same principles, but are much more detailed 
and specific, especially with respect to the management of intellectual property rights.59
Genomics England is the name of a government organization set up by the Uk Na-
tional Health Service (NHS) in 2013 to deliver the 100,000 Genomes Project, aimed at 
sequencing whole genomes from NHS patients with rare diseases, cancers and infectious 
diseases. The organization is part of the Uk Department of Health and, although de-
pending on public money, aims to attract private investments too.60
In order to have access to the dataset of whole genome sequences and clinical data 
arising out of the 100,000 Genomes Project, researchers and companies must sign the 
GeCIP Participation Agreement. Under the Agreement, ownership and use of research 
outputs and intellectual property rights are subject to special conditions. In essence, 
ownership is entirely transferred to Genomics England,61 which grants back to the par-
ticipant a non-exclusive licence to use the outputs for non-commercial research and a 
right to negotiate a “fair and reasonable licence” for the commercialization of those out-
puts.62 The terms and conditions of these licences are subject to the policy on intellectual 
56 VERLINDEN V., MINSSEN T. and  HUYS I. “IPRs in biobanking - risks and opportunities for 
translational research”, in Intellectual Property Quarterly, 2015, 2, p. 106.
57 Uk Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework, Version 3.0 (october 2007), p. 14.
58 Ibid., p. 18.
59 Intellectual Property Principles for 100,000 Genomes Project, August 2010.
60 RAMESH R., “Jeremy Hunt launches genomics body to oversee healthcare revolution”, in The 
Guardian, 5 July 2013.
61 Rules of the Genomics England Clinical Interpretation Partnership (GeCIP), August 2016, § 10.3-4
62 Ibid., § 10.10.
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property rights,63 which specifies the rules for the ownership of intellectual property, the 
protection, management and commercialization of patents and other intellectual prop-
erty rights arising from the 100,000 Genomes Project, and the basis on which access to 
the dataset is granted.
As already mentioned, one of the unique characteristics of GeCIP is that the all IP 
rights arising from the use of the dataset are transferred to the dataset owner, namely 
to Genomics England. The reason for this is to avoid fragmentation of IP rights, which 
may become a hindrance to effective collaboration,64 and to enable the organization to 
have control over the use of IP so that a “socially responsible patent strategy”65 is adopt-
ed. Hence, the “single owner” approach has both an efficiency and ethical rationale.
As a single owner of IP rights, Genomics England commits itself to a strict policy on 
patenting. This covers both patent filing and patent management. Filing patent applica-
tions is limited to inventions that support the primary aims of the project and “consti-
tute a significant development”.66 No claims will be made for isolated gene sequences, or 
for marginal improvements, or that are overly broad or for mere hypothetical methods.67 
As to the management of patent rights, all licenses shall be approved by the Genomics 
England’s Board of directors, and should be time limited, purpose-specific and unen-
forceable by third parties. Moreover, the licence shall include special conditions and 
preferential prices for the use of the invention by the NHS.
The “single owner” policy and the related licensing policies are based on the hypo-
thetical scenario that the participant who is given access to the dataset carries out his 
research entirely within the GeCIP and without using external assets, such as data of his 
own property or owned by a third party. However, the policy document identifies two 
alternative scenarios and specifies the approaches to be adopted in these cases.
The first alternative scenario (“scenario 2”) is when the research is carried out entirely 
within GeCIP but using substantive assets that are not owned by Genomics England.68 
The external asset might be for instance a software algorithm or a collection of genome 
sequences to be analysed in conjunction with the 100,000 Genomes Project dataset. In 
this scenario, to be evaluated on a case by case basis, the policy details the rules to allo-
cate the rights and to avoid joint ownership of results.69 The general principle underlying 
these rules seems to be the “separability” of the assets: if the external asset is logically 
and materially separable from the dataset, then the owner of the external asset retains 
63 Genomics England Intellectual Property Policy, August 2016.
64 Ibid., § 2.1.2-3
65 Ibid., § 2.1.6.
66 Ibid., § 3.1. At the time of writing this chapter, no patent applications on behalf of Genomic Eng-
land appear to have been filed at the major patent offices.
67 Ibid., § 3.2. The provisions of this section should exclude so-called “reach-through” claims (i.e. 
claims that seek to extend patent protection to an indefinite numbers of downstream inventions. 
See Reach-Through Claims in the Age of Biotechnology”, in American University Law Review 51, 
no.4, 2002, 609, pp. 618-19.
68 Ibid., Annex, § 2.
69 Ibid., § 2.2.6.
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its rights over the asset and Genomics England acquires full ownership of the results.70 
By contrast, if the external asset is inseparable, then Genomics England will retains full 
ownership of the results, subject to covering the costs.71
The principle of separability operates also to determine the allocation of ownership 
in scenario 3, namely when the research not only uses external assets, but is also car-
ried out partly outside GeCIP (typically as part of a broader collaborative project). For 
instance, ownership can be allocated according to the technical field in which the col-
laborators operate,72 or according to whether it constitutes an improvement to a parties 
background intellectual property.73 Where inseparable, joint ownership of intellectual 
property rights will apply. The same rules apply in case of collaboration with commercial 
involvement, such as when a commercially entity is given access to the dataset. In this 
case, additional policies applies, whereby the entity is “encouraged” to adopt a “socially 
responsible patent strategy”.74
6. Conclusion. The chapter has illustrated some of the tensions between individual rights 
and property rights in human genetic material and data. Common-law jurisprudence 
presents a paradox in this respect, insofar as property rights are recognized at all levels of 
the construction of a human genetic databases, but not at the level of its “building blocks”. 
In other words, participants to HGB are the only subjects that do not “own” any part of 
the resource that they have contributed to create, and that would not exist at all without 
their contribution. The limits on individuals’ control over biological material extracted 
from their body, and over information extracted from their persona once the information 
can no longer be linked to individuals, result in an almost complete loss of control over 
the use of such material in HGB. This loss of individuals’ power can only be compen-
sated by strong public regulation on the access and use of HGB. Such regulation cannot 
simply reiterate general ethical principles contained in soft-law international instruments, 
but must translate those principles into detailed and binding contractual conditions on 
the ownership of results. In this respect, the experience with highly sophisticated con-
tract-based policies such as that of the GeCIP can set a new standard in the regulation of 
genomics research and its contentious relation to commercial interests.
70 This is for instance the case when a software algorithm is used to analyse the dataset. Ibid., § 2.3.1. 
71 For instance, a collection of whole genome sequences to be integrated to the dataset for the purpose 
of carrying out a particular analysis. Ibid., § 2.3.2.
72 “For example, in a collaboration between a pharmaceutical company and developer of inhalation 
devices to develop a new asthma product, the parties might agree that pharmaceutical company 
will own any arising intellectual property that relates primarily to pharmaceutical compound and 
the inhaler company will own any arising intellectual property that relates primarily to the inhaler 
device.” § 3.2.4.
73 § 3.2.5.
74 § 4.2.
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1. State of the question, justification of the work and objectives. The DNA test, given its 
scientific-technological nature, currently has great potential, but it also has enormous 
limitations. This means of evidence is used in criminal and civil matters at a European 
Union level. Given that DNA testing pursues different purposes for each of these two 
areas, it has evolved (in the legislative sphere) in different ways. 
In the criminal sphere, it is a means of evidence that allows associating two or more 
scenarios of a crime or to identify the holder of an indeterminate DNA sample, which 
may contribute, in the latter case, to the determination of the author of the commission 
of an offense in a national criminal proceeding. Given Member States’ public interest 
in preventing areas of impunity between themselves and tackling serious cross-border 
crimes (mainly organised crime and terrorism), the European Legislator has specifically 
and intensively regulated this means of evidence. In particular, the enforcement of the 
Prüm Treaty in 2005 led to the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, in particular 
in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration, resulting in a turning 
point for European regulation. Although it is a Treaty of International Law, adopted 
outside the EU, it was, fortunately, incorporated three years later into the acquis com-
munautaire through Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping 
up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border 
crime. known as the “Prüm” Decision, the content was similar to the Treaty’s. In this 
way, the exchange of DNA profiles, fingerprints and data from the vehicle registration 
register was, essentially, regulated. Together with the Prüm Decision, Council Deci-
sion 2008/616/JHA on the implementation of Decision 2008/615 was adopted. Both 
norms, the Prüm Decision and the Decision that developed it, regulate the automated 
online consultation and comparison of DNA profiles. The European Legislator, aware 
that the effective exchange of DNA profiles between EU Member States’ databases 
could only be achieved if the fundamental rights affected by such processing of DNA 
data were respected, adopted the Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 Novem-
ber 2008 on the protection of personal data processed within the framework of police 
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. This rule has been repealed by Directive 
2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by competent 
authorities for the purpose of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of 
criminal offenses or the execution of criminal sanctions, and to the free movement of 
such data. 
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With the adoption of these rules on the exchange of DNA profiles and the protection 
of DNA data, the European institutions assumed that there were more issues regarding 
the effective achievement of a cross-border match at an EU level which needed to be 
harmonised in order to obtain evidence that was efficient from a procedural point of 
view. They have therefore adopted Framework Decision 2009/905/JHA of 30 November 
on the accreditation of forensic service providers carrying out laboratory activities, the 
Council Resolution of 30 November 2009 on the exchange of results of DNA analysis 
and, finally, Directive 2014/41, of 3 April, referring to the European order of investiga-
tion in criminal matters. Beyond the norms, in the EU interest regarding DNA testing 
is continuing to increase, as seen on June 9, 2016 when the Council of the European 
Union published its Conclusions and Action Plan on the way forward, with a view to the 
creation of a European Forensic Science area.1 In short, DNA testing has been subject 
to progressive and intense regulation by the European Legislator since 2005, which will 
continue in the future, and as such we will devote greater study to this area. 
In a civilian context, DNA testing provides a means of evidence that can be used to 
determine or challenge filiation in national civil proceedings. In the case of an inter-
subjective or cross-border dispute within the EU, the European Legislator has generally 
ruled that a test can be obtained in one Member State (the requested State) if this 
is necessary to facilitate a legal ruling of a proceeding in another Member State (the 
requesting State). And this, aimed at realising the right to effective judicial protection 
or right of access, which constitutes the constitutional basis for the international legal 
cooperation2 necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market. In view of 
the fact that this purpose is of less public interest than the interest of DNA testing in 
criminal matters, the European Legislator has generally limited itself to regulating the 
cooperation between the courts of the Member States for the taking of evidence in 
civil and commercial matters under Regulation 1206/2001 of 28 May, applicable since 
January 2004.3 Thus, since the European Legislator has not regulated the cross-border 
1 Information on the European Forensic Science Area is available at: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/
doc/document/ST-10128-2016-INIT/en/pdf.
2 VIRGoS SoRIANo M. and GARCIMARTÍN ALFÉREz F.J., “International civil procedural law. 
International litigation”, Madrid 2007, pp. 41-45; DIAGo DIAGo, “Regulation 1206/2001 on 
cooperation between the courts of the Member States in obtaining evidence in civil and commercial 
matters: a study of their mandatory, imperative and exclusive nature. Electronic Journal of Interna-
tional Studies, nº 25, 2013, p. 3; GIL NIEVAS, R., “obtaining evidence” in Cooperation on Civil 
Matters in the European Union: texts and comments, ed., Aranzadi, 2009, p. 455, notes that in the 
matter of  access rights or the right to effective judicial protection, there is also a right to the test 
insofar as the right of defence cannot be fulfilled if the means of evidence required to achieve the 
conviction of the judgement in a certain sense cannot be used.
3 This rule, according to its Art. 21.1 shall take precedence over bilateral or multilateral agreements 
or conventions concluded by the Member States and, especially over The Hague Convention of 1 
March 1954 on Civil Procedure, and over The Hague Convention of 18 March 1970 on the tak-
ing of evidence abroad in civil or commercial matters, within the framework of relations between 
Member States which are party to those Conventions. Specifically, DIAGo DIAGo notes “Regu-
lation 1206/2001,” relative…, op. Cit., P. 4, that in practice there are no problems of compatibility 
between The Hague Convention of 18 March 1970 and Regulation 1206/2001, the Report from 
136
Genetic Information and Individual Rights
obtaining of DNA testing in an intense or specific way, we will devote less attention to 
the study of this issue. 
In both fields, the fundamental rights that may be affected by the taking of this 
means of evidence are those related to personal and family privacy and the protection of 
personal data.4 However, the fact that DNA testing pursues different purposes framed 
within the aims pursued in criminal or civil processes, implies that the legal require-
ments that must be fulfilled in its procurement vary in each field. In particular, it is true 
that the set of requirements that DNA testing has to meet regarding a scientific and 
technological nature in order to ensure it is procured in the most reliable way possible 
are common to both processes. However, certain conditions of a legal nature must be 
observed during the process of DNA testing, which will enable lawful obtainment and 
which differ across each field. For this reason, we will carry out a different study for each 
of the two fields5 in which we will identify and analyse the most controversial points of 
the cross-border procurement of a DNA test (in the requested State), so that they can 
be used in criminal or civil proceedings (in the requesting State). We will focus on the 
requirements of a legal and scientific-technological nature whose compliance allows the 
taking of DNA evidence and for this to be as reliable as possible, respectively. This is be-
cause, with current EU regulations, there are issues that can make it difficult to comply 
with both types of requirements.
2. Obtaining a cross-border dna test in criminal matters. In order to carry out an analysis 
of cross-border procurement, so that the evidence can be used in a national criminal 
proceeding, I will first outline the methodology adopted on a general basis in analysing 
DNA tests in criminal matters. In accordance with this methodological approach, we will 
then identify any weak points, of a scientific and legal nature, in the regulation of the test, 
which hinder the harmonised exchange and protection of DNA data in the EU.
the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social 
Committee of 5 December 2007.
4 CIPPITANI, R. notes, “Consent to the use of genetic information: respect of privacy and protection 
of other fundamental interests”, on which, according to the “Working Document in Genetic Data” 
adopted by “Article 29 on Data Protection Working Party”, there is no doubt that genetic informa-
tion must be considered as personal data.  
5 We consider this subject to be of extraordinary interest from the perspective of the legality and reli-
ability that the DNA test must have, and it will be the object of study in another work.
DNA evidence is also being used in the administrative field, where it can be used by the interested 
party and if necessary, in order to prove the filiation in a family reunification procedure. Council 
Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification lays out common rules on family re-
unification, according to which each Member State has regulated this administrative procedure in 
its national legislation and, in particular, has provided for the exceptional use of DNA evidence to 
prove the filiation. In June 2012, the European Migration Network has prepared a study on Mem-
ber States’ use of DNA evidence, along with other topics, entitled “Misuse of the right to family 
reunification”: http://extranjeros.empleo.gob.es/es/redeuropeamigracion/Estudios_monograficos/
ficheros/REM_Informe_de_Sintesis_Reagrupacion_familiar_ES.pdf. 
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2.1. Methodological approach. In order to carry out the study mentioned above, we 
will take the legal nature of DNA evidence as a starting point, which is to say that it is 
statistical scientific evidence that is progressively collected over three phases. We will then 
further explain this statement, discussing, firstly, what DNA evidence as statistical scien-
tific evidence entails and, secondly, what exactly is meant by being progressively collected 
over three phases.
A) DNA evidence as statistical scientific evidence.
When stating that DNA evidence is statistical scientific evidence, what underlies this 
concept is the idea that it has extraordinary potential but it also has extraordinary limita-
tions. According to the above, one may wonder what it means when DNA testing is said 
to have a scientific nature. The answer is that the DNA test is collected progressively over 
three stages, which includes a stage related to the collection of the DNA sample, an anal-
ysis of the profile, and the treatment of the DNA data on the police database; stages that 
we will explain in more detail in the next point, and that have a scientific-technological 
nature because it is obtained through the use of what we have called ‘technologies for the 
forensic use of DNA’. Like all technologies, those that are used to obtain DNA evidence 
have limitations because such technologies are not infallible. However, even if not infal-
lible, such technologies are very reliable and, in addition, it is possible to quantify how 
reliable they are thanks to probability calculations. Thus, as a consequence of its scientific 
nature, DNA testing is a test that can be expressed in terms of probability.6 In short, we 
can claim that the DNA test is statistical scientific evidence because, being scientific, it 
cannot be infallible. In particular, we can identify two types of limitations of ‘the technol-
ogies for the forensic use of DNA’ which explain that since they are technologies, they are 
not or cannot be infallible.
In the first place, ‘technologies for the forensic use of DNA’ are not infallible because, 
despite its high degree of reliability, there are legal constraints that this type of evidence 
must overcome. Effectively, since the use of these technologies is aimed at being used 
as evidence, and since such evidence must be validly used in criminal proceedings, this 
reliability must be restricted in order to obtain licit evidence. otherwise, among other 
consequences, a procedural penalty would occur, that is, such evidence could not be taken 
into account as it would be prohibited or unlawful evidence.7 
Secondly, ‘technologies for the forensic use of DNA’ are not infallible, since no tech-
nology is. The reliability of such technologies, which include those used for sample col-
lection, laboratory profile analysis and treatment on the police database, has limitations 
6 on its nature as statistical scientific evidence, please see BUTLER, Forensic DNA Typing, 2 ed., 
2005, pp. 497-517.  
7 For a better understanding of what we are exposing, we provide the following example: from a 
scientific-technological point of view, and as hypothesis, it is possible to analyse the ‘complete’ 
profile of the DNA of an individual. If we compared an unidentified ‘complete DNA profile’ with 
an identified ‘complete profile’, the probability that it corresponds with the same individual ‘could 
result in being’ 100% if, and only if, we could affirm the infallibility of the DNA evidence, because 
the technologies used were infallible. But this would be achieved at the expense of a breach of several 
fundamental rights. It would reveal very important genetic information, sensitive data, fundamen-
tally related to health, which would entail an unjustified intrusion of fundamental rights to privacy.
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of a scientific and technological nature, derived from the technologies themselves or from 
human failures in the use of such technologies.
Therefore, according to the two types of limitations set out above, DNA testing can 
be obtained with the greatest possible reliability, with such reliability being the result of 
using the most appropriate technologies, assuming that they have their own limitations 
alongside any possible human error in its use, to the limit set by the requirement to obtain 
licit evidence. In short, the use of ‘technologies for the forensic use of DNA’ will enable 
the obtainment of a licit test as reliable as possible, and just how reliable it is can be quan-
tified through probability calculations.
B) Progressive collection of DNA evidence.
Given that DNA testing is statistical scientific evidence, we are going to add a second 
element –that its production takes place progressively across three phases. These stages 
include the taking of samples, a stage related to a laboratory analysis of the profile, and, 
finally, the data processing stage on the police DNA database.
If we add these two notes, which make up the legal nature of DNA testing, we can 
affirm that DNA testing has to be conducted, thanks to the use of ‘technologies for the 
forensic use of DNA’, as reliably as possible and in a licit form across each of the three 
phases previously mentioned. And to ensure obtaining evidence that is licit and as reli-
able as possible, that is, evidence with a high probative value, it is necessary that this is 
properly regulated in the national legal order. If this is achieved, it will be the first step for 
the expert to be able to correctly present this evidence in terms of probability and for the 
judge to be able to assess it freely.
It is therefore necessary for the national legislator to regulate the requirements for 
the taking of evidence, firstly, as reliably as possible, during the stages of sampling, the 
analysis of its profile and data processing on the police DNA database; and, secondly, that 
it is licit, through these stages just mentioned. However, in this regulation it is necessary 
to achieve an adequate balance between reliability and lawfulness. In fact, each Member 
State differs in their definition of this middle ground, which means there are States that 
are more protective or defenders of fundamental rights and freedoms and States that are 
more vigilant regarding the security and reliability of the evidence. This is due, among 
other factors, to the use of a greater or lesser number of markers that are analysed to ob-
tain a DNA profile, on the greater or lesser inclusion criteria of the profiles or the criteria 
related to the cancellation of profiles on the databases.
In fact, since each Member State places more emphasis on either lawfulness or on 
reliability, and also because European rules do not regulate many of these aspects because 
it refers to the national legislation of each of the EU Member States, there is no harmo-
nisation on these issues, creating distortions that prevent or hinder the effective exchange 
of DNA data between Member States’ databases since what is admitted in one State may 
not be admitted in another State in the same way.8 
8 on the necessary harmonisation, please see SCHNEIDER, P.M., “DNA Databases for offender 
Identification in Europe : The Need for Technical, Legal and Political Harmonization” in https://
www.promega.com/~/media/files/resources/conference%20proceedings/ishi%2002/oral%20pres-
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Thus, according to the legal nature of DNA testing as statistical scientific evidence or 
scientific evidence expressed in terms of probability, that is progressively obtained, thanks 
to the use of what we have called the ‘technologies for the forensic use of DNA’, through-
out the three phases referred to including the taking of the sample, analysing the profile 
and treating the DNA data, we have stressed the fact that regulations on this means of 
evidence have to enable the obtaining of a test that is as reliable and as licit as possible. 
And, within the EU context on which this work is focused, compliance with these two 
requirements, greatest possible reliability and legality across each of the three phases, 
should be regulated in European legislation without reference to domestic law, to the end 
that harmonised legislation is achieved. 
2.2. Lack of legislative harmonisation in the cross-border taking of DNA evidence. 
In order to obtain cross-border DNA testing at an EU level, it is necessary to carry out 
an automated search and comparison between those profiles contained on the respective 
police databases of the Member States in accordance with the provisions of Arts. 3-8 of 
the Prüm Treaty, Arts 3-8 of the “Prüm Decision” 2008/615 and Arts. 3-12 of the Frame-
work Decision 2008/616 on the Implementation of the Prüm Decision. The objective of 
this action is the achievement of a cross-border match between profiles, in a lawful way 
and as reliable as possible. In order to achieve this, it is absolutely necessary that the EU 
regulations make it possible, through the regulation of both conditions in a harmonised 
way. If such a harmonised European regulation is not envisaged, but rather refers to each 
country’s national laws, there is a risk that, as each regulation is different across each 
Member State, the evidence will not be lawful and as reliable as it could be, and therefore 
it cannot be effectively used in the requesting State. So, this harmonisation, which, in any 
case, must ensure the right balance between the legality and the reliability of the evidence, 
is essential, ultimately between freedom and guarantees, on the one hand, and security, 
on the other.
In this sense, at least two conditions should be met for the European legislation to be 
harmonised. From a formal point of view, regulation should be binding for the Mem-
ber States. From a material perspective, such regulation should include all the necessary 
requirements to ensure the legality and the greatest possible reliability of the DNA test. 
The problem, as we will see below, is that the European legislator has not followed its 
purpose to this end, because all the rules that regulate aspects related to a DNA test are 
not binding, and all the requirements necessary to obtain a cross-border test in a licit 
and as reliable as possible way have not been regulated at an EU level. on the contrary, 
essential questions such as the criteria for the inclusion of profiles, the cancellation of 
data, the identification of markers to be analysed, etc. have been left in the hands of the 
internal domestic laws of each Member State. Therefore, I will outline some of these key 
issues next.
entations/11.pdf; SCAFFARDI, L., “Legal Protection and Ethical Management of Genetic Data-
bases: Challenges of the European Process of Harmonization” in http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.
org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/081901.pdf  
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A) Legislative harmonisation to achieving ‘licit’ DNA testing.
In order to achieve cross-border DNA matches that will allow obtaining lawful DNA 
evidence, it is necessary, among other things, for the legislator to properly regulate differ-
ent issues. Listed below are the most relevant ones.
– The analysis of the non-coding part of the DNA.
From the point of view of the lawfulness of the evidence, the analysis of the DNA 
profile must be carried out with maximum respect paid to the fundamental rights of 
those concerned, essentially, the right to privacy. This introduces the question as to 
which part of the DNA sequence should be analysed by the Member States, whether 
it should only be the non-coding sequence, or whether it should include the coding 
sequence as well.
In order to achieve the intended harmonisation on this issue, Decision 2008/615 of 
23 June 2008 limits the analysis of the DNA profile to the non-coding part (Art. 2.2). 
However, Art. 4 of Spanish organic Law 19/2007, of police DNA databases9 does not 
expressly limit the analysis of DNA to the non-coding part, so it can be interpreted 
in a manner that allows the analysis of the coding part of the DNA, which is the one 
that also contains genetic information that reveals other sensitive data, such as those 
relating to the health of a subject. It is true that the preamble of said Spanish law 
expressly prevents the analysis of the coding part of the DNA, but that statement, 
although laudable, is not found in the Articles of the norms and, therefore, lacks 
binding value. In addition, there is no Spanish legislation detailing the markers used 
by the country’s forensic police, as opposed to what is stated in the Council Resolu-
tion of 30 November 2009, which lists in its Annex the markers that could be used by 
EU Member States. The consequence of this is that in Spain we do not know which 
markers are used by the forensic police and even less so those that are used by ‘default’ 
from the non-coding part. on the other hand, the Italian Law of 30 June 2009 on its 
accession to the Prüm Treaty establishes in Art. 11.3 that the systems of analysis apply 
exclusively to DNA sequences that do not allow the identification of diseases that 
may affect the person in question and Art. 12.1 notes that DNA profiles and related 
samples do not contain information that allows for direct identification of the subject 
to which they relate. 
Therefore, if we want this issue to be harmonised at an EU level, it would be necessary 
for national legislations to comply with European legislation as required by Art. 36.1 
of this decision when it states that Member States are to take the necessary measures 
to comply with the provisions of Chapter 2, where is the aforementioned Art. 2.2.
– Criteria for the inclusion of profiles on the police database.
Another key element in achieving legislative harmonisation in the EU is for all Mem-
ber States to use the same criteria to introduce DNA profiles onto the database, and 
9 Art. 4 Lo 10/2007 states that only ‘identifiers obtained from DNA, in the context of a criminal 
investigation, which provide, exclusively, genetic information revealing the identity of the person 
and his/her gender, shall be registered on the database’.
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this, done from two points of view. In the first place, from an objective perspective, 
as to the seriousness of the crimes being investigated and, secondly, from a subjective 
perspective, regarding the degree of imputation of the investigated subject.
Unfortunately, European regulation has not harmonised the aforementioned profile 
inclusion criteria, leaving its regulation to each Member State, who set the point of 
balance between security and freedom wherever they have considered best. By way of 
example, Spain, in Art. 3.1 A) Lo 10/2007,10 stipulates that DNA profiles may be 
incorporated into the investigation of certain ‘serious’ crimes (which according to the 
Spanish penal code are those that carry a sentence exceeding 5 years) and, in any case, 
those that affect life, freedom, indemnity or sexual liberty, integrity of people, assets, 
provided that they are carried out using force or violence or intimidation against 
persons, as well as in cases of organised crime (as set out in Art. 282.bis 4 LECRIM). 
This, from an objective point of view, regards the crime that is being investigated. 
Regarding the subject being investigated, if it is an identified sample, Art. 3.1 a) Lo 
10/2007 establishes that the subject’s condition must be that of ‘a suspect, detainee or 
an accused’, to which it must be added ‘convicted’ under Lo 1/2015 Reform of the 
Criminal Code. The criteria for inclusion of profiles from the objective and subjective 
points of view are different and are set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 respectively in the 
Italian Law of 30 June 2009 on its accession to the Prüm Treaty.
The fact that there is no regulation at an EU-level can lead to mismatches in the 
necessary harmonisation. The seriousness of a criminal offense and the degree of im-
putation are essential requirements of the principle of proportionality that must be 
fulfilled in order for the limitation of a fundamental right not to be deemed unlawful 
and, to prevent that, as a consequence, a disproportionate restriction on a fundamen-
tal right does not lead to unlawful evidence. In conclusion, the need for a European 
standard to harmonise these criteria for the inclusion of profiles on the respective 
police DNA databases of the different Member States should be stressed.
– Criteria for the cancellation of profiles on the police database.
In order to obtain lawful evidence, the Legislative harmonisation at a European level is 
essential regarding the criteria for the cancellation of profiles on police DNA databases.
However, European regulations in Art. 27 and 28 of the Decision 2008/615 do not 
establish a cancellation period that is common to all Member States, but its regulation 
refers to the domestic law of each Member State.11 Thus, in Spain, Art. 9 Lo 10/2007 
10 This precept has been analysed by ETXEBERRÍA GURIDI, J. F., “Lo 10/2007 of october 8 regu-
lating the police database on identifiers obtained from DNA”, La Ley, nº 6901, 2008 in https://www.
administraciondejusticia.gob.es/paj/publico/ciudadano/informacion_institucional/organismos/ins-
tituto_nacional_de_toxicologia_y_ciencias_forenses/cnadn/pleno/ut/p/c5jzDBCoMwEEQ_kau-
J0R4jTclijVaJtV7EQ5FA1R5kv78Rz8buHh8Pzoz0xP08fo04fowyDy_Sko73GmSYpIGAIuM-
JYAzlqdB5ACx2_MF7jjLCqmaMmjMDpE0jS5UDMPjHhp0TXhvzznu4s0VWpUqraxFlN5e-
sERT5BSmwYLM93J_8vi6131yGfl5zP2cH_rrsyn3bHTTQapme5D0zY1qwaMvxB5zyq3I!/dl3/
d3L2dJQSEvUUt3QS9zQnz3LzzfTjBFMjhCMUEwT0s2oDBJNzBQoU9TTEwUzc!/?ite-
mId=115511
11 on the subject of the cancellation deadlines, please see the ruling from the ECHR-Marper Case 
(2008).
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establishes different cancellation criteria.12 Specifically, it stipulates that the retention 
of profiles will not exceed the period for the statute of limitations for the offense, or 
the time legally provided for the cancellation of antecedents (in the case of a final 
judgement of conviction, or acquittal by exculpatory circumstance or a lack of im-
punity or guilt, unless there is a judicial decision to the contrary) or immediately (in 
the case of an acquittal or dismissal), or in the case of un-accused initial suspect, the 
period corresponding to the statute of limitations for the offense. The Italian Act of 
30 June 2009 on its accession to the Prüm Treaty establishes different criteria for the 
cancellation of profiles in its Art. 13. 
In order to gather EU cross-border lawful evidence, it would be desirable to establish 
cancellation periods in the European regulations, so that this requirement is harmo-
nised and the same across all Member States.
– Protection regime for DNA data in the European Union.
The application of Directive 2016/679 on the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data by the competent authorities for the purposes of 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offenses or for the ex-
ecution of criminal sanctions and on the free movement of such data13 will be an es-
sential step towards the harmonisation of the general regime of protection applicable 
to DNA data or profile included on police databases. The aim of this Directive is to 
approximate the legislation of the Member States in this matter, which is essential for 
the cross-border taking of a licit DNA test that can be used in any of the EU Member 
States.
Prior to this Directive, which repeals the Framework Decision 2008/977, the rules on 
the protection of DNA data set out in Framework Decision 2008/615 and in the not 
yet repealed Framework Decision 2008/977 applied only to ‘DNA data exchanged or 
transmitted’, excluding from its scope the ‘national DNA data’, whose protection is 
provided for in the laws of the Member States. As a consequence of this, there were 
two different schemes in the Member States, with different areas of protection, that 
produced negative effects:
Firstly, a cross-border protection regime, applicable to the DNA data exchanged, 
would have to be incorporated into the national Law of the Member States (Prüm 
Decision/Treaty-Arts-24-32). And, secondly, a national system for the protection of 
DNA data, laid out in the legislation of each Member State,14 which in the Spanish 
12 This subject has been addressed by SARRIÓN ESTEVE, J., “The guarantee of the term of the can-
cellation of data in the exchange of DNA profiles in the European Union”, in MJ Cabezudo Bajo 
(Coord), police DNA databases: Are they truly an effective tool in the fight against serious national 
and cross-border crime?, Dykinson, 2013, pp. 297-324.
13 Art. 63.1 sets out that ‘Member States shall adopt and publish, by 6 May 2018 at the latest, the 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive. They shall 
forthwith communicate the text of these provisions to the Commission. Those provisions shall be in 
force from 6 May 2018’.
14 on the guarantee of fundamental rights in relation to DNA evidence within the multilevel system, 
please see SARRIÓN ESTEVE, J., “Fundamental Rights Affected in Biological Sampling for the 
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case is provided in organic Laws 10/2007 and Lo 15/1999 Data Protection, al-
though unfortunately is not specifically applicable to criminal proceedings, should be 
amended legislatively.
The negative effects of this can be essentially summarised in three points. First, there 
is the difficulty in determining, at a specific time, the system, either cross-border or 
national, applicable to DNA data. Secondly, this double regime will lead to the in-
creasing concurrence of different levels of data protection pertaining to many criminal 
records in the Member States, with some data coming from authorities from other 
MS and other data obtained in the home country itself. Finally, it will lead to the 
weakening of EU Member States in their negotiations with third States, like the USA, 
as it will not be able to condition the exchange of information at an adequate level 
with regard to internal protection.
At this time, in order to avoid these negative effects, there are two possible solutions: 
for the EU to adopt either a rule to try to approximate the legislation of the Member 
States with regard to the protection of personal data, or a rule that can be directly 
applicable to the Member States, establishing the same protection regime for data 
exchanged and national data. Finally, the chosen outcome was the former, although, 
from our point of view, greater harmonisation would have been achieved with the 
latter option.
B) Legislative harmonisation to achieve DNA testing that is as reliable as possible.
To the end of achieving a cross-border matching that makes it possible to obtain DNA 
evidence that is as reliable as possible, it is necessary, among other things, for the legislator 
to properly regulate different issues. Detailed below are the most relevant issues.
–  Markers that must be analysed.
In order to obtain cross-border DNA testing with the highest possible reliability, it is 
necessary that the markers that are analysed in the laboratory to extract the genetic 
profile are the same. It is therefore necessary to harmonise this issue at a legislative 
level across the EU.
In this regard, the EU has adopted the Council Resolution of 30 November 2009, 
inviting Member State to use 12 markers, which form part of the current European 
standards set (ESS). This ‘invitation’ is not binding, which implies, once again, that 
each Member State may use those it deems most appropriate. In fact, each Member 
State analyses different markers, although there are some that are common.
In Spain, among the functions of the CNUFADN established in Royal Decree 
1977/2008, which regulates the composition and functions of the National Com-
mission for the Forensic Use of DNA, is ‘the elaboration and approval of the official 
technical protocols on the taking, conservation and analysis of samples, including the 
obtaining of DNA evidence valid and effective from the point of view of domestic and European 
Union law, “Journal of Law and Human genome”, no. Extraordinary, 2014, pp. 328-329; SoLETo 
MUÑoz, H, “European parameters of limitation of fundamental rights in the use of DNA data in 
the criminal proceeding” in General Review of Procedural Law, nº 38, 2016.
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determination of the homogeneous markers on which accredited laboratories are to 
perform the analyses’ (Art. 3). In this regard, the CNUFADN has established that 
Spanish laboratories have to adapt to the 12 European markers. However, the use of 
markers other than the 12 European ones is not legally established, even though the 
reality is that the Spanish Scientific Police analyses others without such normative 
coverage. 
All MS should use the same genetic markers in order to ensure that the cross-border 
taking of DNA evidence has a high degree of reliability, the maximum possible from 
this point of view.
– Method of analysis in the laboratory
Another essential element in achieving cross-border DNA testing, that is obtained as 
reliably as possible, is the harmonisation of the method of analysis in the laboratory 
at an EU level. This method should be used by all accredited laboratories in all EU 
Member States.
However, at an EU level, regulation of this method, which has in fact been legally 
established, has no binding effect on the Member States. In fact, it is the Council 
Resolution of 30 November 2009 which contains such a regulation, but only ‘invites’ 
MS to obtain analysis results according to tested and scientifically approved DNA 
techniques based on studies carried out in the ENFSI framework. This situation is 
also aggravated by the fact that in Spain the methods that are used are not legally 
established, which leads us to propose its legal provision. on the contrary, Art. 11.1 
of the Italian Law of 30 June 2009 on its accession to the Prüm Treaty provides that 
the analysis of the biological sample for the typing of DNA analyses must be carried 
out in accordance with parameters for international recognition set out by the ENFSI 
(European Network of Forensic Science Institutes), in order to ensure uniformity (of 
the analysis).
It should therefore be noted that the European legislator should regulate the legally 
binding methods to be used by the laboratories to carry out an analysis of the genetic 
profile, in order to harmonise this issue among all EU Member States.
– Laboratory accreditation.
This is regulated at an EU level and is binding, and therefore we can state that there is 
harmonisation on a legislative level in relation to the accreditation requirements that 
the laboratories carrying out an analysis of genetic profiles must be met. 
In this regard, Council Framework Decision 009/905 states that ‘laboratory activities 
shall be carried out by forensic service providers accredited by a national accredita-
tion body certifying that such activities comply with EN ISo /IEC 17025’. In Spain, 
according to Art. 5.2 of Lo 10/2007 that refers to the 1977/2008 RD of the CNU-
FADN (Arts. 3 and 8), it is established that CNUFADN is responsible for carrying out 
‘the accreditation of laboratories and an evaluation of their compliance with EN ISo/
IEC 17025, and the establishment of quality official controls to which they must sub-
mit periodically’. In this respect, the CNUFADN has reached an agreement according 
to which the laboratories have to pass quality control assessments recognised by ISFG, 
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or ENFSI by National Entity of Accreditation (according to norm EN ISo/IE 17025). 
Also, in Art. 11.2 of the Italian Law of 30 June 2009 on its adherence to the Prüm Trea-
ty, it outlines that DNA profiles may only be entered onto the national DNA database 
if they have been analysed in laboratories certified under ISo / IEC standard. 
3. Cross-border taking of dna evidence in civil matters. In order to analyse the cross-border 
taking of DNA evidence in the EU to be used in a national case, we will set out the pro-
cedure for taking DNA evidence regulated in Regulation 1206/2001 and, along the same 
lines, we will confine ourselves to identifying some problems that hinder the effective 
cross-border taking of DNA evidence in civil matters. Certainly, the methodology we 
have adopted to analyse legislation in the criminal sphere in the previous point would, in 
principle, extend to civil matters, but with the peculiarities derived from the fact that the 
aim pursued in civil proceedings is different from those intended in criminal proceedings, 
as we will indicate throughout/along this Point III. Assuming such peculiarities, we will 
identify, in the ruling laid out in the aforementioned Regulation, some of the problems 
that make it difficult to obtain a licit test which is as reliable as possible. Before this, we 
will justify that specific expert DNA evidence falls within its scope of application.
3.1. DNA testing and Regulation 1206/2001. In this section, we will explain why the 
cross-border taking of DNA evidence falls within the scope of application of Regulation 
1206/2001. To do so, we refer to Art. 1 of this Regulation that establishes its scope.15 Ac-
cording to such precept, there are four conditions for the application of the Regulation: 
1) requests for the taking of evidence; 2) evidence intended for use in judicial proceed-
ings, either commenced or contemplated; 3) in civil or commercial matters; 4) by the 
court of a Member State. It is necessary to determine whether the DNA test falls within 
its scope of application, specifically an explanation of how the term ‘civil or commercial 
matters’ has been interpreted. 
In the Report16 from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and 
the European Economic and Social Committee on the implementation of Regulation 
1206/2001 issued in 2007, the problems were highlighted that could result from the 
inclusion, within the concepts of ‘civil and commercial matters’ and of ‘evidence’, the 
taking of DNA and blood samples, especially in the context of paternity testing. The Re-
port also indicated that in 2005, the European Judicial Network in civil and commercial 
matters examined a draft for a practical guide for the implementation of the Regulation, 
drawn up by the Commission Services in consultation with the network.17 This guide 
indicates that the notion of ‘civil and commercial matters’ is an autonomous concept of 
Community Law which is to be interpreted in light of the objectives of the Regulation 
15 on the scope of the Regulation, please see WŁoSIŃSkA, A., “Taking of evidence between EU 
Member States (some remarks on a substantive scope of application of the EU Evidence Regula-
tion)” in http://blogs.sps.ed.ac.uk/sls/files/2013/08/Aleksandra-Włosińska_.pdf   
16 Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ES/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52007DC0769&-
from=EN, p. 2
17 The guide can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/evidence/evidence_ec_guide_en.pdf
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and of the EC Treaty and, in particular, in accordance with Art. 65. The European Court 
of Justice has, on different occasions, given interpretations of it.18 The Regulation applies 
to all civil and commercial proceedings whatever the nature of the court or tribunal in 
which they are taking place. It will, for instance, be applicable to litigation based on civil 
and commercial law, consumer law, employment law and even competition law as far as 
private proceedings are concerned. Moreover, it should be stressed that the scope of appli-
cation of the Regulation includes matters which are excluded from the scope of applica-
tion of the Brussels I Regulation such as in matters relating to the status or legal capacity 
of natural persons, rights for property arising out of a matrimonial relationship, wills and 
succession, bankruptcies, proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent companies 
or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings.  
From our point of view, it should be understood that DNA testing is included in the 
scope of the Regulation in accordance with the meaning and purpose of the Regulation 
itself and Art. 65 of the EC Treaty.
3.2. Procedures for the taking of DNA evidence: identification of problems of legality 
and the reliability of the test. In the event of a conflict that has a cross-border impact, upon 
identification of the competent court before which the filiation proceeding will take place 
in a given EU Member State, the taking of DNA evidence in another Member State may 
be required to prove the filiation. The procedure for the taking of evidence is carried out 
directly between the courts of the Member States (Art. 2 of the Regulation) by the most 
expeditious route possible, since, as previously noted, this procedure is informed by the 
principles of expedition, simplification and efficiency. Along this line, Art. 3 provides that 
each Member State shall designate a central body responsible for providing information to 
the courts, seeking remedies in the event of a request involving difficulties and, on an ex-
ceptional basis and at the request of a requesting court, to forward a request to said court.
Specifically, the Regulation sets out two procedures, one ordinary procedure, on the 
taking of evidence from the requested court, regulated in Arts. 10 to 16, and a second 
special procedure, for the direct taking of evidence by the requesting court, laid out in 
Art. 17. in the case of DNA testing, where it is established that the DNA sample may be 
voluntarily carried out in the requested Member State without the need to apply coercive 
measures (Art. 17 (2)), the requesting court can get the tests directly. on the contrary, 
if voluntary procurement is not laid out, then the general procedure would be applied, 
which will have to be processed according to this procedure, regardless of whether or not 
the recipient of the measure voluntarily agrees. Next, we will outline how these proce-
dures for the cross-border obtaining of DNA evidence would be developed and, specifi-
cally, we will highlight some of the problems that could arise in reference to the legality 
and reliability of this evidence.
18 See e.g. 14. october 1976, 29/76, LTU and Eurocontrol, in ECR, 1541; 16. December 1980, 
814/79, Ruffler, ECR, 3807; 21 April 1993, C-172/91 Sontag, ECR, I-1963; 14. November 2002, 
C-271/00, Steenbergen v. Baten.
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A) ordinary procedure for obtaining evidence from the requested court.
Next, we will present this procedure, for which we have differentiated three stages 
referred to as the request, admission of the request and execution, and we will highlight 
some problems regarding the legality and reliability of the DNA evidence.
– Request.
once the requesting court has accepted the practice of DNA testing in accordance 
with its lex fori,19 it can request a test to be conducted from to the requested court. 
Art. 4 of the Regulation states that the request shall be submitted by means of Form A, 
which appears in the Annex, which shall contain the following information: 1) identi-
fication of the requesting and requested courts (Art. 4.1 a); 2) name and address of the 
parties and, where appropriate, of their representatives (Art. 4.1b); 3) the type of case, 
object of the process and brief exposition of the facts (Art. 4.1 c); 4) the description of 
the measures of evidence requested, in particular the DNA evidence and information 
on the documents or objects to be examined (Art. 4.1 d and f ); 5) the information 
contained in Art. 10.3, on the law applicable to the taking of evidence, in Art. 10.4, 
on the use of technological means for the taking of evidence, in Art. 11, regarding the 
taking of evidence to be carried out in the presence of, and with the participants of 
the parties, and in Art. 12 in relation to relevant practices in the presence, and with 
the participation of representatives of the requesting court. With regard to this infor-
mation, we are going to raise an issue regarding the legality and reliability of this test.
The issue refers to the fact that the Regulation, in order to obtain a validly usable test 
in an open proceeding in the requesting State, has established in Art. 10.3. that the 
requesting court can ask that the request is executed in accordance with the procedure 
laid out in the law of its Member State by means of Form A. Likewise, the requested 
court shall also comply with this request unless the procedure is incompatible with the 
laws of the Member State of the requested court or that there are serious difficulties 
in doing so.20 In accordance with Art. 10.3, we can deduce that the Regulation seeks 
evidence that is obtained under the laws of the requesting State, provided that it is re-
spectful of the law of the requested State, so that the evidence can be effectively used in 
the legal proceedings held in the requesting State. We need to relate this interpretation 
with the peculiarities of the DNA evidence and, in particular, with the fact that, in 
order for the DNA evidence to be effectively used within a process, it must be obtained 
lawfully and in a way that means it is as reliable as possible. For this reason, we question 
whether Art. 10.3 can guarantee the necessary harmonisation of both requirements.
As for the lawfulness of the evidence, we understand that Art. 10.3 may include the 
necessary conditions for obtaining lawful evidence. Also, and in case there were any 
problems concerning the protection of fundamental rights, essentially data protec-
19 GIL NIEVAS has pointed out that in “obtaining evidence…”, op. cit., p. 459, nothing prevents 
that form from being completed by the party proposing the testing, to be subsequently completed 
and assumed by the competent court (of the requesting State) in the process of admission of evi-
dence.
20 If the requested court does not consent to the petition on any of the grounds mentioned above, it 
will inform the requesting court using Form E.
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tion, recital 18 of the Regulation states that any data transmitted under the Regula-
tion are protected by European data protection legislation.21 
However, as the DNA test is a scientific test, questions arise as to whether the issues 
that affect the reliability of the test are sufficiently guaranteed by Art. 10.3 of the 
Regulation. We understand that it is not easy to include it in the mentioned Art. 
10.3 because, among other reasons, the scientific issues associated with DNA testing 
in the civil field are not usually regulated in the legal order of the Member States. 
Specifically, we refer to the conditions related to storage and the transfer to the corre-
sponding laboratory of the DNA sample that has been taken, to the use of the same 
markers when analysing the DNA sample in the laboratory, to the requirements that 
the laboratory must meet to be accredited to carry out the function of analysing the 
DNA profile and the methods of analysis to be used, among other issues. Certainly, 
this information can be described in Form A, when it lays out a question on the inclu-
sion of the information related to the description of the measures of inquiry sought 
(Art. 4.1. (d)). This would be the only way for the requested State to comply with the 
same scientific criteria in taking the sample and the analysis of the profile, as those 
used by the requesting State. But Art. 4.1 (d) does not guarantee that the requested 
State will in fact comply with the same scientific criteria as that of the requesting State 
because, among other reasons, it may use different technologies in obtaining a reliable 
DNA test which may not even be regulated. Therefore, whether or not the results 
were a match between two DNA profiles that contributed to determine or challenge 
the filiation, the results obtained when interpreting the coincident result in terms of 
probability might not be fully reliable. Consequently, even if the evidence obtained 
cross-border was lawful (Art. 10.3), not even under Art. 4.1 (d) of the Regulation 
could assurances be made that the DNA evidence is as reliable as possible. In view of 
this current situation, where, unlike in criminal law, such issues have been regulated 
at an EU level by the European legislator, it is worth asking whether it would not be 
convenient to seek harmonisation of such aspects with regard to the reliability of the 
DNA evidence in the same way that has been achieved with respect to the legality of 
the DNA evidence under Art. 10.3 of the Regulation. 
Finally, it should be noted that neither the application nor the accompanying docu-
ments have to be authenticated nor comply with another equivalent formality (Art. 
4.2). The request for, and all necessary communications shall be drawn up in the 
official language of the requested State (Art. 5) and shall be transmitted by the fastest 
route accepted by the requested State (Art. 6).
– Admission of the application.
The competent requested court shall issue an acknowledgment of receipt to the 
requesting court through Form B within seven days of the receipt of the request for 
a DNA test. There may be various situations in which the application has not been 
21 In particular, we highlight the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 
2016 on the protection of individuals (with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data) which repeals Directive 95/46/EC.
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properly formulated. Firstly, it is possible that the request does not comply with 
the provisions set out in Art. 5 and 6 of the Regulation, referring to the language 
in which the application and communications are to be written and with respect 
to their transmission, in which case the requested court shall state as such in the 
acknowledgment of receipt (Art. 7.1). Secondly, if the court receiving the request 
was not competent, it will be forwarded to the competent authority of its Member 
State and this will be communicated to the requesting court using Form A (Art. 
7.2). Thirdly, (this is possible) the application may be incomplete (Art. 8), either 
because it does not contain data as required in Art. 4, or because of the lack of pro-
vision of funds set out in Art. 18.3, cases in which the requested court will inform 
the requesting court using Form C so as to complete the information or make up 
the provision of funds. 
– Execution of the request.
once the execution of the request is agreed,22 the requested court will execute it as 
soon as possible and in any case within ninety days following the receipt of the request 
(Art. 10) or, as the case may be, from the moment in which the requested court has 
received the duly completed request form (Art. 9). The Regulation provides that it 
may be executed in the presence, and with the participation of the parties (Art. 11) as 
well as representatives of the requesting court (Art. 12). The execution consists of the 
recipient of the measure providing a DNA sample, which at the time of the begin-
ning of the proceeding is not known with certainty. Precisely, this uncertainty is the 
very thing that justifies resorting to the ordinary procedure. This uncertainty will be 
cleared up once the stage of the execution of the request has been met, in which the 
person requested to provide the sample can assume two positions: 1) voluntarily agree 
to providing a sample; 2) not voluntarily agree to providing a sample.
In the former case, the DNA sample would be taken according to the provisions of 
Art. 10.3, that is, under the law of the requesting Member State unless it is incompat-
ible with the law of the Member State of the requested court or there are actually seri-
ous difficulties to do so. At this point, we want to bring up the previously mentioned 
problems regarding whether ‘Member State law’ has to be interpreted to include both 
the requirement of legality and of the reliability of the DNA test. Along with this 
first interpretative problem, already analysed in the previous point, it is possible to 
raise a second question, deriving from the fact that the DNA test is not obtained 
through one single action, but as we noted in relation to the criminal area, is obtained 
progressively over three stages. In the case of obtaining the DNA evidence within the 
civil field, we refer to the stages of obtaining the sample, a second one on the analysis 
of the profile and thirdly, since there are no databases addressing this field, to a com-
parison with the identified sample that is available from the beginning, in order to 
know whether they are or are not coincidental, in which case, we should interpret this 
matching result in mathematical terms of probability. Since the procurement involves 
three stages, it is worth considering whether, when we refer to the execution of the 
22 The grounds for the refusal of execution of the request are regulated in Art. 14 of the Regulation.
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DNA test, we should interpret that, according to the Regulation, the three stages must 
be carried out in the requested State, which would seem the most desirable option, 
or whether only the first stage should be carried out. If, under the Regulation, only 
the first phase was carried out in the requested State, that is to say, the obtainment of 
the DNA sample, the sample should be transferred to the requesting State in order to 
carry out the following two phases. This second option would not be totally optimal 
in view of the added problems that may arise with regard to the non-existent regu-
lation of a chain of custody that would have to be respected in these cases involving 
cross-border DNA testing.
In the second case, if the party that should provide the sample does not voluntarily 
agree to do so, although the Regulation provides for the possibility of carrying out 
coercive measures, we wonder whether this would be possible in the case of DNA 
testing, since the use of coercive measures to obtain a DNA sample23 is not established 
in the Spanish legal system. The use of coercion would not be possible if it is not 
legally established by the law of the requesting and requested States. The question 
left unanswered regarding this centres around whether, in the future, Member State 
legislators should consider enforcing this measure in civil proceedings through judi-
cial authorisation. It would be a measure restricting the fundamental right to a private 
personal life and, where appropriate, to the protection of personal data that a judge 
should decide by means of a reasoned decision in accordance with the requirements 
derived from the principle of proportionality. 
B) Special procedure for obtaining direct evidence on behalf of the requesting court.
Regarding the application, the requesting court shall submit the request for obtaining 
the DNA evidence to the central body or to the competent authority of that State referred 
to in Art. 3 through Form I (Art. 17.1).
With respect to the admission of the request, the central body or the competent au-
thority of the requested Member State shall inform the requesting court within 30 days of 
the receipt of the request as to whether it has been accepted24 and under what conditions 
the taking of said evidence must be conducted in accordance with the Law of the request-
ing Member State, by using Form J (Art. 17.4).
Finally, the taking of DNA evidence will be carried out by a member of the judicial 
staff or by any other person, such as an expert, designated in accordance with the law of 
the Member State of the requesting court (Art. 17.3). In addition, the central body or the 
competent authority may designate a court from the requested Member State to take part 
23 In Spain, the process of filiation is regulated in Arts. 764-768 of the Law of Civil Procedure, in Arts. 
748-755 LEC that generally apply, and in Arts. 108-141 of the Civil Code. Art. 767.2 LEC states 
that in filiation trials, the investigation of paternity and maternity will be admissible through all 
kinds of evidence, including biological ones; and, in Art. 767.4 LEC it is stated that an unjustified 
refusal to submit to a biological test of paternity or maternity will allow the Court to declare the 
filiation claimed, provided that there is other evidence of paternity or maternity, and evidence for 
this has not been obtained by other means.
24 Art. 17.5 establishes the grounds on which the central body or the competent authority can refuse 
the direct procurement of evidence.
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in the taking of evidence in order to ensure the correct application of the provisions of 
Art. 17 of the Regulation and of the conditions that have been established.
All of the above is with respect to whether ‘Member State law’ is to be interpreted as 
including both the lawfulness and reliability requirements of the DNA test, – together 
with the fact that the DNA evidence is not obtained through a single act, but throughout 
three stages of which it is necessary to know, which one(s), according to the Regulation, 
can be carried out in the requested Member State –, is transferable to this special method 
of taking cross-border DNA evidence. 
4. Conclusions. In the analysis of DNA evidence, it is necessary to assume the synergy 
that exists between, on one side, the scientific-technological-probabilistic issues, and on 
another, legal issues, that conform and transfer the result of this analysis to the European 
legislation and to that of its Member States, which would make it possible to carry out 
cross-border procurement efficiently.
In the criminal sphere, European legislation regulates the cross-border procurement of 
DNA evidence, so that it can become an effective tool for combating serious cross-border 
crime, especially organised crime and terrorism. However, such a tool will not really be 
effective if the essential requirements for the cross-border test to be lawful and as reliable 
as possible are not regulated in a harmonised way by the European legislator.
In the civil and commercial sphere, DNA testing has the problem that the Regulation, 
which could guarantee a licit DNA test under Art. 10.3, cannot ensure the highest pos-
sible reliability of DNA evidence (according either to Art. 10.3 or to Art. 4.1 d), which 
leads us to wonder about the effectiveness of Regulation 1206/2001 in relation to obtain-
ing cross-border DNA evidence to be used in a filiation proceeding.
The issues discussed in this paper have been raised in order to highlight some prelim-
inary conclusions but remain subject to further study. 

